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The Silence of the Dead 
Ethical and Juridical Significances of the Exhumations at 
Prestwich Place, Cape Town, 2003-2005 
 
 
‘But, first of all, is there a history of silence?’1  
 
 
‘She is about eight and a half years old now. She keeps on asking 
questions. She wants to know who her father was. It is hard to explain 
to her. At times she comes and says: “Can’t you draw a picture for 
me? Can’t you tell me? Can’t you say something that he said?” That is 
very, very hard.’  
(Nomonde Calata remembers the death of her husband Fort Calata 
at the Justice in Transition conference, February 1994)2
                                                          
1 Jacques Derrida Writing and Difference (trans Alan Bass) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978) 35. 
2 Alex Boraine, Janet Levy and Ronel Scheffer (eds) Dealing with the past: truth and reconciliation in South 









 a. method 8 
 b. outline 9 
 
CHAPTER ONE excavating the legal subject: archaeologies of transition  
 a. uncanny Cape Town 12 
 b. dispossessed identities, unidentified possessions and the  
  politics of mourning 17 
 c. landscapes of transition and constitutional monuments 35 
 
CHAPTER TWO the ethics of memory and silence  
 a. speaking of the dead 49 
 b. enigmas of memory 52 
 c. unspeaking silence 66 
 (d. postscript on archaeology and the trace: how to inhabit the archive) 69 
 
 2
CHAPTER THREE mapping the heterotopic: law and the sacred, from res religiosa   
to heritage resource 
 a. res religiosae reformed 76 
 b. res religiosae in the 20th century: the hallowed as relic,  85 
 land reform right and heritage resource 
 c. mapping the heterotopic: nomos and anomaly 110 





This thesis arises from the debates preceding and following the exhumations at Prestwich 
Place, Cape Town, between 2003 and 2005. A seemingly arcane subject, these unmarked 
burials places have become sites for far-reaching discussions about history, memory, 
space, and identity in the city, and indeed the nation. The debates about the graves should 
be seen as invoking ethico-juridical questions about memory, forgetting and 
memorialisation. These are questions that are potent in the collective consciousness of a 
nation still preoccupied with transition, reconciliation and transformation. I attempt, in 
the brief space of this extended essay, to discuss the controversy over Prestwich Place in 
a number of possibly unorthodox ways. My approach has been influenced by a number of 
discourses: those of repatriation, cultural heritage management, and the politics of 
cultural property; the obsession with memory in South African political discourse, and 
the questions of ethics and justice attendant upon institutions and gestures of transitional 
justice.  
In accordance with requirements of form, I will discontinue the use of the ‘I’ in the 
text that follows this initial autobiographical declaration and the acknowledgements. But 
before we begin, a brief autobiographical preface might serve to locate this dissertation’s 
moment of production, the sources of its methodological and disciplinary eccentricities as 
well as potential biases on the part of the author. In this I pay respect to an aesthetic and 
ethic of writing that acknowledges the centrality of the personal experience that an author 
brings to bear upon the task of writing. This does not mean that I have given in to the 
temptation to speak from the confidence of prior commitment. I have tried to establish 
the distance that suits free enquiry. But one’s attempts are always historical, and one’s 
enmeshment in contemporary controversies is always deep and difficult to disentangle, 
thus I owe the reader this brief account before we start. I also indulge in what may be a 
vain sketch of my intellectual development, since it is deeply tied to the issues set out 
here, as well as to the choice of method.  
My frustration with the professional orientation of academic legal studies was intially 
assuaged by an introduction to analytical philosophy’s engagement with law, followed by 
my discovery of the wealth of interdisciplinary experimentation and post-disciplinary 
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engagements spawned by critical legal studies. Most importantly, what I gained was an 
awareness of the legitimacy of historical and narrative accounts in the study of law.  
However, I became convinced of the value of narrative and memory in action outside 
of legal studies, during my first encounters with the District Six Museum, which is 
dedicated to the commemoration of District Six and the victims of forced removals 
throughout South Africa. In their  ‘reimaginative’ method and focus on living memory 
and cultural production, I thought I could discern an antedote to the impasse of finding 
justice through law.  
I have since been employed by the Museum, although not for the most part of the 
writing of this thesis, and I continue to be affiliated with them. Their ethical and political 
commitments have focused my own engagements with the world; even while the position 
taken in this thesis remains entirely my own, formed in the course of free enquiry, and 
possibly at odds with the views of friends and former colleagues. It was while working at 
the District Six Museum that I nearly became a participant in the Hands Off Prestwich 
Place Ad Hoc Committee, which would later rename itself the Prestwich Place 
Committee. I have sympathised with the general thrust of their political commitment, 
while being less sympathetic with specific items on their agenda. My involvement with 
the group has been interested but peripheral; I attended a few meetings, indicated an 
initial willingness to help, and later withdrew in order to complete the present work. 
Critical distance allowed me to use the unfolding events as the starting point for research 
and writing, faithful to the perspective required by academic rigour and open to insight.  
As will be seen, the present work is not only about Prestwich Place; it is about 
constitutional monumentalism, cartographies of transitional justice, the enigmas of 
memory, speaking and unspeaking silences, religiosity in the time of transition. While 
writing this thesis I have been aware of the debt I owe to self-indulgence, not only for not 
contributing to praxis, but for producing work that is possibly opaque and not 
immediately useful to the current discussions. Now, looking over what I have written, I 
can offer only (a) an apology; and (b) the hope that the work’s broadness of vision makes 
up for its lack of exacting conclusion and prescription.  
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Despite the author’s formal education in legal studies, this thesis is not loyal to its 
disciplinary canon and methodology. The initial assumption made is that insight often 
lies beyond well-worn disciplinary habits and haunts. Nor does the thesis engage in any 
particular interdisciplinary fad, any fashionable ‘law and …’; it is merely eclectic. 
Descriptions of the debates about Prestwich Place are derived from news accounts, 
correspondence between participants, reports generated by participants, interviews with 
participants, personal experience, and archaeological and historical accounts of the city. 
In this regard, Chapter One is at times historiographical. But Chapter One shifts from this 
method to a consideration of the legal frameworks in which the Prestwich Place 
controversy played out. This is not a black letter law analysis, but one that borrows from 
Rosemary Coombe’s anthropological account of law, as well as the vast amounts of work 
in cultural studies and postcolonial studies on the politics of identity. 
Chapter Two’s study of memory has been influenced by phenomenological and 
sociological accounts of memory, as well as psychoanalysis’ discourse of trauma and 
mourning and ethical discussions of transitional justice. The largest debt is owed to Paul 
Ricoeur’s phenomenology. It is impossible to talk of memory without mentioning Freud, 
and psychoanalytic concepts have been used throughout. The author has been aware of 
the need for caution in such territory, especially when neither versed in the vast 
disciplinary literature nor intiated into the practice of pyschoanalysis. Yet the vast impact 
of Freud on modern thought means that all contemporary scholarship is haunted by his 
influence. One may as well speak to the ghost. 
Derrida’s spirit is invoked constantly, in relation to his thoughts about writing, as well 
as his last endeavours to describe the interior archive,  and the hauntings of heritage. His 
work, which continues to be entirely unassimilable, is at some level an intense occupation 
with the questions of death and memory. 
Chapter Three comes closest to a study of laws, even though it is not primarily 
intended as a positivist legal analysis of the law governing graves, burials and human 
remains. Thus it is neither as detailed nor as exhaustive of the sources as it might have 
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been. Yet Roman Law, Roman-Dutch Law and South African sources have been referred 
to wherever readily available. Many questions are immediately raised by even (and 
especially) the most positivist moments of the analysis: most urgently, the assumed 
legitimacy of the reception of European law imposed during colonisation, and the way in 
which we today assimilate apartheid-era common law and legislation. Although these 
questions are crucial to the study of law in South Africa, they are not addressed because 
of the usual constraints.  
Chapter Three also makes use of the work of Yan Thomas on law’s ‘institutional self-
reference’, Foucault on the heterotopia, and Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok’s 
psychoanalytic work on mourning and haunting. Broadly, the methodological starting 
point might be said to be one that does not regard law as an autonomous sphere (despite 
its ‘institutional self-reference’), but that probes law’s deepest relations to other 
discourses and institutions of social reality 
The sweep of this methodological eclecticism accords with an engagement that is 
throughout philosophical, as opposed to professional or pragmatic; ‘any thinking that 
serves an end by producing a projected result is, by definition, not philosophy’3. The 
merits of approaching such a topical issue in such an indulgent manner must be debated 
elsewhere.  
There are two broad philosophical heritages between which the thesis finds itself torn: 
Ricoeur’s reconciliation of competing conceptions and literatures through his constant 
invocation of the dialectic; and Derrida’s constant discovery of the double-nature, the 
duplicity, of all thought. As in life, the author finds himself constantly caught between 
reconciliation and ‘deconstruction’. It is hoped that this internal conflict has been creative 
rather than destructive. 
b. outline 
In name and form, this thesis concerns the ethical and juridical significances of the 
exhumations at Prestwich Place. It has three parts, dealing with the political debates of 
the site, the ethics of the unearthing of the dead, and the juridical significance of the 
grave. More broadly put, the thesis takes up the questions of memory, mourning and 
haunting. There are wider significances of the discussion for other sites, and for thinking 
                                                          
3 Panu Minkinnen Thinking without desire: a first philosophy of law (Oxford: Hart, 1999) 5. 
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about law and nationhood generally; it is hoped that these will become apparent to the 
reader. 
Chapter One describes the unearthing of the Prestwich Place burials, and the debates 
that ensued. The burials are at first discussed in the context of the discourses of 
repatriation and cultural heritage management. What emerges is a problematic of the 
ascriptions of identity and the attributions of possession of cultural heritage. Uncertainties 
about identity are entirely relevant to the debates about Prestwich Place; the site is central 
to the development of the fraught identity politics of the city, and the law’s language of 
‘direct descendancy’ has aggravated some of these tensions. Finally, Chapter One locates 
the site within a broader landscape that might be called a cartography of transitional 
justice. For Prestwich Place is not the only burial place that raises questions of 
nationhood, identity, space and memory.  
The concerns of Chapter Two arise from the most recent disputes about Prestwich 
Place, which have occurred between those claiming scientific expertise and those 
claiming descendancy from the Prestwich Place dead. Chapter Two, asking who has the 
right to speak of and for the dead, rephrases this question as one of ethics and memory. 
How should the dead be remembered? Finally, it concludes, how should the dead be 
recognised? Here, naming is advocated as a way to proceed ethically in the encounter 
with the silent dead. Immediately the vast question of naming is raised: what is naming 
and who may name the dead? A short postscript has been added, late in the preparation of 
this thesis, as the beginning of an answer: the postscript relates different archaeologies, in 
order to ask about the relation of trace and testimony, and about the significance of the 
materiality of the dead. 
Chapter Three, finally, addresses the law, which has hung like a specter over the 
political enquiry of Chapter One and the ethical enquiry of Chapter Two. It does this in 
the form of a simple question: how has the law regarded the burial place, and how does it 
do so today? The Roman Law heritage is discussed, and the fidelities and betrayals of 
Roman-Dutch and South African law are mapped. What is at stake is the relationship 
between law and the sacred. While the old Roman Law classification of res religiosae 
and res divinis iuris apparently acknowledged the presence of the sacred and its 
heterogeneity from the things of law, it also worked to confine and manage its anomalous 
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nature. This tradition, of law and the anomaly, is traced up to contemporary legal 
encounters with the grave as archaeological relic, as land reform right, and as heritage 
resource. The new religiosity, it proposes, concerns the nation rather than the gods. 
What does this mean in the context of Prestwich Place? Chapter Three tries to rescue 
the site’s significance as an anomaly, and also tries to discern how the anomaly haunts 
the law. Here again, it is memory that is at stake. But how are the nameless dead 





Excavating the Legal Subject: Archaeologies of Transition 
 
a. uncanny Cape Town4.  
Cape Town, traditionally the most liberal of South Africa’s apartheid cities, sits poised 
between the construction of a new urban future and the presence of a monumental past. 
Bouyed by a ceaseless property market boom, the cranes and scaffolding of property 
development have become fixed features of the humble urban skyline. Amidst this, a 
highway that was started decades ago still juts out, unfinished, over the city centre, 
suspended in a phantasm of grand urban planning. Construction haunts the city. This 
perpetual incompleteness of the built environment props itself up against the fixed and 
permanent: Table Mountain and the Atlantic Ocean, the two natural features which have 
played a defining role in the geography and history of the city. While Johannesburg can 
be imagined as a place discontinuous with its past, a deconstructed apartheid city whose 
past remains only in ‘vestiges and debris’5, Cape Town’s past is always present, at least 
partly because of the monumental nature of its topography.  
Nestled between sea and mountain, the concrete and asphalt of colonial and apartheid 
urban planning constructs spatial segregation in wordless conspiracy with the textures of 
rock and water. This complicity of architecture and nature continues to both reflect and 
effect the racial segregation that, until the early 1990s, was strictly legislated. Today, 
thinking about justice and legality in Cape Town lends itself to a preoccupation with 
space and memory. Cape Town is still marked by the enactment of land segregation laws, 
as are all South African cities. To travel from centre to periphery is to experience the 
visibility of racial stratification. Poor black people remain on the edges of the city, only 
                                                          
4 The title is inspired by Ken Gelder and Jane M Jacobs Uncanny Australia: sacredness and identity in a 
postcolonial nation (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1998), an insightful and engaging look at what 
Australia’s sacred landscapes mean for non-Aboriginal people. The present section does not wholly share 
that book’s intentions, but refers to its application of the Freudian umheimlich (uncanny), an experience of 
the familiar place becoming unfamiliar or out of place. See ‘The uncanny’ (1919) in Sigmund Freud The 
standard edition of the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud vol 17 (trans and ed James 
Strachey) (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1953-74) 217. For Gelder and 
Jacobs, the uncanny refers to the strange co-existence of the familiar and unfamiliar in ‘a productively 
unstable dynamic’ (24). It is this instability of the familiar and unfamiliar that I wish to capture in the present 
portrait of transitional landscape. 
5 Achille Mbembe ‘Aesthetics of superfluity’ (2004) 16(3) Public Culture 373 at 404. 
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able to access the centre as labour. There is a contemporary politics of urban planning 
that plays out between poles of change and stasis, and is often regarded as a choice 
between logics of development and of redistribution. In this equation development 
figures as plus ça même chose, leaving the segregated cartography of the city unaltered. 
While the geometry of greater Cape Town follows the vision of early 20th century 
social engineering and mid-to-late century apartheid segregation, the roadmap of the city 
centre traces even older colonial demarcations. The first boundaries of the colony are still 
clearly named: Strand Street (‘Beach Street’) recollects where the ocean-bound edge of 
the city once was. Parallel to it is Waterkant Street (‘Water’s Edge’) which ran alongside 
the water’s edge before part of shallow Table Bay was reclaimed to create space for the 
city’s commercial and administrative district. Buitenkant Street (‘Outer Edge’) marks the 
easternmost boundary of the old city, its intersection with Strand Street guarded by the 
old military sentinel that is the Castle of Good Hope. Buitengracht Street (‘Outer Canal’) 
marks the western boundary of the old city, beyond which once lay the ‘menace of wild 
animals [and] the depredations of marauding Hottentots’6, the alien natives who once 
inhabited the Cape. The early colonists ventured past these very first frontiers long ago; 
yet the erstwhile boundaries between self and other continue to haunt the city in 
unexpected ways.  
Follow Strand Street today and, at the point where it intersects the old west boundary, 
it becomes the main drag of the area known as Green Point, once named District One. 
Previously home to the city’s red light district, gay and lesbian village, and a burgeoning 
narcotics trade, Green Point has now become less risqué, more well-heeled, and is 
considered ‘some of the most sought-after real estate in the country’7. Just below the 
main road, nestled between an old school that remains from pre-forced removal days as a 
coloured working class neighbourhood and the now fashionable restaurants and clubs of 
the area, is a cordonned-off construction site. Soon a seven-storey complex dedicated to 
luxury living will stand in its place, but for now the site lies empty.  
                                                          
6 Marischal Murray Under Lion’s Head (Cape Town: A A Balkema, 1964) 3. 
7 Gil Moodie ‘Old bones of contention. Historians want development of slave graveyard halted’ Sunday 
Times 25 January 2004 at 12. 
 13
If you stand here, says archaeologist Antonia Malan, ‘the urban landscape can be read 
like a political history book’8. The built environment is layered according to period and 
style, revealing traces of previous inhabitants and their movement through the city’s 
religious and political past. Yet standing here, the very earth, this ‘most sought-after real 
estate’, also conceals layers of political history deposited directly below. In mid-2003, 
demolition and excavation on this site, subsequently to become known as Prestwich 
Place, came to a sudden halt as the dull white bone of human remains was revealed. 
These skeletons were to become the focal point of a legal dispute about heritage and 
development, knowledge and identity, and the discovery would be seen as a metaphorical 
unearthing of the city’s unfinished business.  
 
The significance and extent of Prestwich Place were quickly determined. With, on 
average, one skeleton found per square metre9, the full and disarticulated skeletons found 
at Prestwich Place amounted to almost 3000 individuals. These re-discovered burial 
grounds are as extensive as they are dense: an area of about 1km x 1.5 km, stretching 
from the Bo Kaap to the Waterfront, is thought to contain unmarked graves and burial 
sites10. Newspapers reported that the burials were those of ‘a cosmopolitan community of 
slaves brought to the Cape from East and West Africa, second-generation slaves and 
freed slaves.’11 Documentary, archival, oral and archaeological evidence painted a 
picture of an area that had been used up until the mid-19th century for the formal and 
informal graveyards of the city’s underclass: these included not only slaves, but 
Khoikhoi, Europeans, Africans, Muslims, free blacks and ‘other members of the Cape 
                                                          
8 Antonia Malan ‘Skeletons in our cupboards: publicly contested sites and implications for archaeology in 
Cape Town’, paper presented at the Southern African Association of Archaeologists Conference 
(Kimberley, 31 March 2004). 
9 Cultural Sites & Resources Forum ‘Prestwich Place. Exhumation of accidentally discovered burial ground 
in Green Point, Cape Town. Public consultation process 9 June to 18 August 2003’ (report prepared by Dr 
Antonia Malan, Cultural Sites & Resources Forum, for South African Heritage Resources Agency & the 
Developer) at 4. 
10 Sameer Vasta ‘Is history repeating itself at Prestwich?’ Muslim Views Nov 2003 at 31. Archaeological 
exhumations had already taken place after other accidental discoveries of burial grounds in the area, 
including Cobern Street in 1994 and Marina Residential at the V&A Waterfront in 2000 (Cultural Sites & 
Resources Forum (note 9) at 6). The developer of Prestwich Place claimed that ‘[t]he problem is not unique 
to my site – I’m just one of the first to own up’ (‘The issue “is about us as South Africans”’ Cape Argus 5 
November 2003 at 14). Indeed, in October 2003 the city council was to issue a warning that developers 
must expect to find skeletons when developing in the extensive western area of the central business district 
and neighbouring Bo Kaap and Green Point areas. Developers applying for permission to rezone or build 
would also have to appoint an archaeologist, until such time as a long-term plan for dealing with such finds 
could be made (Melanie Gosling ‘Council says developers must appoint archaeologists’ Cape Times 30 
October 2003).  
11 Moodie (note 7) at 12. 
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underclass’12. This was where these lower strata of society buried their dead, the denial 
of access to the Dutch Reformed Church’s formal graveyards a final marker of their lack 
of citizenship.  
What followed the rediscovery of this site was then as much an excavation of human 
remains as an excavation of the silences of the archive, of the law, and of the disciplines 
of archaeology and historiography. A public consultation, held in terms of the National 
Heritage Resources Act (NHRA)13, quickly revealed that a small but outspoken section 
of the public were adamant that the bodies should not be exhumed at all. The South 
African Heritage Resources Agency (SAHRA), the public body tasked with guiding the 
course of action in such matters, announced its decision a month later: the bodies were to 
be exhumed forthwith, and reinterred somewhere else. There would be no grand 
memorialisation on the site. In response to this a group of concerned members of the 
public formed the Prestwich Place Committee (PPC)14 to campaign for the exhumation 
and development to be halted. The group also disputed the priority of archaeology as a 
body of knowledge and methodology for determining the meaning of the site. 
That the dead should obstruct development in this part of the city is uncanny. Their 
apparition speaks of a haunting of modernity by the frontier. For the boundary between 
city-zen and other was a founding feature in the history of the burial ground, lying as it 
did outside the city’s original perimeter, as the final resting place for all those denied 
formal burial within. This geography of bounds would in turn be reflected in the 
centrality of the frontier to the colonial history of the Western Cape15.  
In the first decade of the 20th century a still-born child was buried by a Muslim 
congregation at a cemetery that had been closed by the colonial authorities. The men 
were charged and convicted; on appeal to the colony’s Supreme Court, the men 
complained that the motive for the closure of the cemetery had been segregation, since a 
nearby Christian cemetery had remained open16. As an act of morbid protest, their burial 
procession had been still less dramatic than that which took place twenty years earlier at 
burial grounds in the vicinity of Prestwich Place, on the slopes of Signal Hill. Three 
                                                          
12 Cultural Sites & Resources Forum (note 9) at 6-7.  
13 Act 25 of 1999 (hereafter referred to as the NHRA). 
14 Initially named the Hands Off Prestwich Place Ad Hoc Committee (HOPAHC). 
15 Valmont Layne ‘Towards a national heritage site: District Six as a national site of forced removals’, 
presented at the Hands On District Six! Conference (Cape Town, 25-28 May 2005).  
16 R v Abduroof 1906 23 SC 451. The appeal was lost. 
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thousand Muslims had congregated for a funeral at Tana Baru, the final resting place for 
such holy men as Tuan Guru, founding figure of Islam at the Cape. The funeral was held 
in protest of the 1884 legislation closing these western cemeteries in the wake of a 
devastating smallpox epidemic. When policemen arrived to take the names of mourners, 
a riot broke out, and a second burial took place that day17.   
The unrest of the 19th century were a response to an imperial order that legitimised its 
plans for reordering the growing colonial settlement18 in terms of advances in medical 
knowledge and a desire for modernity, and in spite of the religious beliefs and traditions 
of those affected. It would be a premonition of how sanitation and illness would become 
a pretext for the removals and slum clearances of the next century19. Today, after 
democratisation, the site of the old boundary between citizen and subject20 still haunts the 
city. The postcolonial phantom appears at the frontier of inner city gentrification and 
development, and provides an opportunity for enquiry into not only the histories of the 
dead, but of their descendants’ modes of struggle. Indeed, how would contemporary law 
respond to the descendants’ desire to mourn the unnamed dead?  
                                                          
17 Nigel Worden, Elizabeth van Heyningen and Vivian Bickford-Smith Cape Town: the making of a city (Cape 
Town: David Philip, 1998) 210-11. 
18 On the growth of the city and the imposition of social order at the turn of the 19th century see generally 
Chapter 5 of Worden, Van Heyningen and Bickford-Smith (note 17) generally. 
19 M W Swanson ‘The sanitation syndrome: bubonic plague and urban native policy in the 
Cape Colony, 1900-1909’ (1977) 18 Journal of African History  387-410. 
20 The distinction is used in the sense described by Mahmood Mamdani Citizen and subject: contemporary 
Africa and the legacy of late colonialism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
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b. dispossessed identities, unidentified possessions, and the politics of 
mourning. 
Dispossessed Identities 
The activism of the Prestwich Place Committee borrowed from some of the stances taken 
at the very first public consultation, at which one person had shouted from the floor: ‘stop 
robbing our graves!’ This sentiment is not a new one; it is echoed around the world in the 
struggles of indigenous peoples to claim back skeletons and human remains that have 
been kept in colonial museum and university collections, or to prevent scientific study of 
newly found remains. This global contestation of the proprietorship of human remains 
has begun to be reflected not only in political action and rhetoric, but increasingly in legal 
and policy developments. 
The most well-known legislation of this kind is the United States’ Native American 
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA)21, passed by Congress in 1990 in 
response to the growing ‘Red Power’ and Native American reburial movement of the 
1970s and 1980s22. NAGPRA was meant to open up space for negotiation between 
Native American tribes and museums and other institutions. Senator Daniel Inouye 
summed up the intended consequences:  
For museums that have dealt honestly and in good faith with native Americans, this 
legislation will have little effect. For museums and institutions which have consistently 
ignored the requests of native Americans, this legislation will give native Americans 
greater ability to negotiate’.23  
Whether the legislation has been successful or not is arguable: no doubt the changed 
law has played at least some part in the increased willingness of archaeologists and 
anthropologists to enter into collaborations with indigenous communities. But the Act has 
also created certain arenas of conflict. 
                                                          
21 Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act 25 USC §§ 3001-13. 
22 For a history, as well as a history of the anthropological practices and legal formations that preceded 
Native American consciousess, see David Hurst Thomas Skull Wars: Kennewick Man, archaeology, and 
the battle for Native American identity (New York: Basic Books, 2000). 
23 Statement of Sen. McCain, 136 Cong Rec s 17174 (daily ed 26 October 1990), quoted in Jack F Trope 
and Walter R Echo-Hawk ‘The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act. Background and 
legislative history’ in Devon A Mihesuah Repatriation reader: who owns American Indian remains? 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000) 123 at 140, emphasis found. 
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For the Act to be applicable, remains and artefacts must first be shown to be Native 
American24. If the Act is applicable, then it sets out a threefold hierarchy of entitlement25 
to such ‘Native American cultural items’, a definition encompassing human remains, 
funerary objects, sacred objects and other items of cultural patrimony26. Entitlement is 
awarded first to a lineal descendant27, that is, someone who can trace her ancestry 
directly and without interruption in terms of the kinship system of her tribe, or in terms of 
the common law system of descendance28. 
Where lineal descendants cannot be ascertained, entitlement is next awarded to the 
tribe on whose land the remains or objects were found29, failing which entitlement is 
awarded to the tribe which has the closest cultural affiliation to the remains or objects, 
and which claims them30. Cultural affiliation requires ‘a relationship of shared group 
identity which can be reasonably traced historically or prehistorically’ between a present 
day claimant and an earlier group31. Ascertaining cultural affiliation should be based 
upon ‘an overall evaluation of the totality of the circumstances and evidence pertaining to 
the connection between the claimant and the material being claimed and should not be 
precluded solely because of some gaps in the record’32.  
The third and final allocation of entitlement occurs where cultural affiliation cannot 
be reasonably ascertained, but the objects were found on Federal land that has been 
recognised as aboriginal land of a particular tribe by the Indian Claims Commission or 
the United States Court of Claims. In this case, entitlement is awarded to that tribe, if it 
claims the remains or objects, and it has not been shown by a preponderance of the 
                                                          
24 Bonnichsen v US 367 F.3d 962 at 972. 
25 25 USC §§ 3003. 
26 See 25 USC §§ 3002 for a detailed definition. 
27 25 USC §§ 3003(1). 
28 Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act Regulations, Final Rule 43 CFR 10.14(b) (1 Oct 
2003). 
29 25 USC §§ 3003(a)(2)(A). 
30 25 USC §§ 3003(a)(2)(B). 
31 25 USC §§ 3002(2). 
32 Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act Regulations, Final Rule 43 CFR 10.14(d) (1 Oct 
2003). Regulation 10.14(c) gives further guidelines on the ascertainment of cultural affiliation, and invokes 
the use of a wide range of evidence ranging from archaeological to oral histories. It is quite likely that such 
broad guidelines set the stage for ‘fundamental cultural and legal conflict’ (Patty Gerstenblith ‘Cultural 
significance and the Kennewick skeleton: some thoughts on the resolution of cultural heritage disputes’ in 
Elazar Barkan and Ronald Bush (eds) Claiming the stones/Naming the bones: cultural property and the 
negotiation of national and ethnic identity (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2002) 162 at 173). 
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evidence that another tribe has a stronger cultural relationship with the remains or 
objects33. 
Intentional excavation and removal of human remains and objects are only allowed 
where a number of conditions are complied with, including the obtaining of a permit 
issued in terms of the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 197934, and after 
consultation with or obtaining consent of the appropriate tribe35. Where human remains 
or cultural objects have been inadvertently discovered on Federal land, the Act requires 
that the Secretary of Department, or the head of any other agency with primary 
management authority with respect to the land, be notified; such a discovery on tribal 
lands entails that the appropriate Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization must be 
notified36. The discoverer must cease any activity in connection to which the discovery 
was made, and must make a reasonable effort to protect the remains or objects. Activity 
may be resumed thirty days after the relevant state or tribal authority has certified that 
they have received notification37. 
NAGPRA had its most controversial application in the case of Kennewick Man, a 
human skeleton discovered in Kennewick, Washington, in 1996. The skeleton, unearthed 
from the bed of the Columbia River by natural processes, was determined to be around 
9000 years old, and one of the oldest found in the Americas38. While anthropologists 
worked to unravel the puzzle of one of the oldest skeletons found in North America until 
that time, various Native American tribes claimed the skeleton as theirs and therefore off 
limits to scientific examination. The difficulties of identification were evident not only in 
various tribes’ wishes to claim a relation to the skeleton, but also by scientists’ claim that 
remains so old could be related to anybody in the world. Many of the media reports 
focused on the ‘caucasian’ resemblance of an artist’s reconstruction of the ancient man. 
James Chatters announced Kennewick Man’s resemblance to Captain James Picard, of 
Star Trek fame, and various newspaper headlines announced that this was proof that there 
                                                          
33 25 USC §§ 3003(a)(2)(C). 
34 16 USC 470aa et seq. 
35 25 USC §§ 3003(c). 
36 25 USC §§ 3003(d)(1). 
37 25 USC §§ 3003(d)(1). 
38 James C Chatters Ancient encounters: Kennewick Man and the first Americans (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2001) is a first person account by the first forensic anthropologist to examine the skeleton. Jeff 
Benedict offers an account of the ensuing controversy from the point of view of Doug Owsley, a forensic 
anthropologist who subsequently examined the skeleton, in Jeff Benedict No bone unturned (New York: 
HarperCollins, 2003).  
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had been other Americans before Native Americans; quite possibly ancestors of 
Columbus!39 At one point the Asatru Folk Assembly, who claim to be descendants of a 
pagan European group, also claimed the skeleton for reburial and as their kin40. At stake 
was not simply to whom the skeletal remains belonged, but who could claim the right to 
inhabit America and recall its history.  
The dispute incited confrontations between such sensationalist and esoteric readings 
of history, the uncertainty of anthropological theories of human origins in the Americas, 
and Native Americans’ own oral histories; it also raised thorny questions about the 
constitutional relationship between religion, science and the state41. What is repeatedly 
questioned in encounters such as this is the validity of forms of knowledge, with 
indigenous activists often highlighting the historical complicity of the anthropological 
and archaeological disciplines with colonisation, eugenics and race science, and with 
grave robbing and looting of cultural property42. Archaeologists not only deny that their 
discipline carries the trace of this history, but also claim that the study of human 
skeletons is still useful. Kennewick Man is thus seen as of special scientific value 
because of the few remains of that age and completeness that have been found, and 
because it can help scientists’ speculation on how the Americas came to be populated43.  
As if it was a distillation of these complexities, the legal dispute centred on identity. 
The pivotal question was whether the Kennewick skeletal remains were Native 
American, and thus whether NAGPRA was applicable. NAGPRA defines ‘Native 
American’ as meaning ‘of, or relating to, a tribe, people, or culture that is indigenous to 
the United States’44. What, then, is indigenous? The Act does not explicitly say. A 
Department of Interior memorandum issued early in the dispute stated that indigenous 
refers to  
                                                          
39 David Hurst Thomas (note 22) at xxi. 
40 Gerstenblith (note 32) at 164. 
41 Douglas W Owsley and Richard L Jantz ‘Kennewick Man – A kin? Too distant’ in Elazar Barkan and 
Ronald Bush (eds) Claiming the stones/Naming the bones. Cultural property and the negotiation of 
national and ethnic identity (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2002) 141 at 156 claim that 
government support for Native American claims constituted inappropriate state support for a religion.  
42 See David Hurst Thomas (note 22), Devon A Mihesuah ‘American Indians, anthropologists, pothunters, 
and repatriation. Ethical, religious, and political differences” in Devon A Mihesuah Repatriation reader: 
who owns American Indian remains? (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000) 95. 
43 See Chatters (note 38), Owsley and Jantz (note 41). 
44 25 USC §§ 3002(9). 
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human remains and cultural items relating to tribes, peoples, or cultures that resided 
within the area now encompassed by the United States prior to the historically 
documented arrival of European explorers, irrespective of when a particular group may 
have begun to reside in this area, and, irrespective of whether some or all of these groups 
were or were not culturally affiliated or biologically related to present-day Indian tribes.45  
Such a definition would mean that NAGPRA applied to the Kennewick remains, and that 
scientists could legitimately be barred from their study. 
However the Oregon Court of Appeals finally allowed the scientists access to 
Kennewick Man, deciding that NAGPRA was not applicable46. That the Act’s definition 
of Native American referred to a community that ‘is indigenous’ was taken as meaning 
that the Act intended that ‘human remains bear some relationship to a presently existing 
tribe, people, or culture to be considered Native American’47. This was, according to the 
court, in accordance with a purposive reading of the Act:  
NAGPRA was intended to benefit modern American Indians by sparing them the 
indignity and resentment that would be aroused by the despoiling of their ancestors’ 
graves and the study or the display of their ancestors’ remains.… Congress’s purposes 
would not be served by requiring the transfer to modern American Indians of human 
remains that bear no relationship to them.48
The court’s decision was also consistent with a particular frame of remembrance of 
the nation. Native American is defined in terms of groups that are indigenous ‘to the 
United States’, which gave to the meaning of Native American a specific historical 
reading:  
The “United States” is a political entity that dates back to 1789…. This term supports that 
Congress’s use of the present tense (“that is indigenous”) referred to tribes, peoples, and 
                                                          
45 Francis P. McManamon, letter to Lieutenant Colonel Curtis, 23 December 1997 (online at 
http://www.kennewick-man.com/kman/legal/story/3280882p-3310389c.html, last accessed 4 August 
2005). 
46 Bonnichsen (note 24);  The same court subsequently rejected a request for rehearing by four Native 
American tribes, see ‘Scientists win another battle over Kennewick Man’ (Associated Press, 20 April 2004) 
(online at http://www.kennewick-man.com/kman/news/story/4985988p-4914180c.html, last accessed 4 
August 2005). Later that year the Justice Department said it would not ask the US Supreme Court to 
review the case. ‘Justice won’t appeal Kennewick Man case’ (Associated Press, 22 July 2004) (online at 
http://www.kennewick-man.com/kman/news/story/5328772p-5266824c.html, last accessed 4 August 
2005). 
47 Bonnichsen (note 24) at 972, emphasis found. 
48 Ibid., 973-4. 
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cultures that exist in modern times, not to those that may have existed thousands of years 
ago but who do not exist now.49
 
Clearly, as suggested by the debates around Kennewick Man, repatriation and reburial 
reflect the sensitivities of identity politics and the particular power relationships they 
entail. In the UK, archaeology is considered an indigenous tradition rather than a colonial 
one50; thus, descendants of the dead buried in the 18th and 19th centuries in the crypt of 
Spitalfields Church ‘were not only deeply interested in [an archaeological project] but 
were able to contribute valuable historical information about their dead ancestors’51. This 
does not mean that all archaeological digs in the UK have gone unhindered by identity 
politics. Burials in Jewbury, York, dating back to the 12th and 13th century, were deemed 
to be Jewish and were reburied after pressure from members of the Jewish community52.  
Repatriation issues are most hotly disputed in countries, such as Canada, USA and 
Australia, where indigenous peoples have struggled against devastating colonial legacies 
and continue to be marginalised in their ancestral land. In Australia, heritage legislation 
in the different states typically dates back to around thirty years ago. Aiming to protect 
archaeological sites from amateur diggers and relic hunters, such laws53 generally vest 
ownership of artefacts in the Crown, and provide for administration by a government 
department without effective Aboriginal input54. Such legislation is greeted with anger by 
Aboriginal representatives such as Wayne Atkinson: ‘In today’s scientific terms 
[Aboriginal cultural heritage] is regarded as archaeological evidence, but really it is the 
tangible evidence of our ancestors’ occupation of this continent.… They are in fact 
Aboriginal sites, not archaeological sites’55. While there is as yet no federal legislation 
that returns ancestral remains to their Aboriginal descendants, two policy statements were 
issued in 1993: Previous Possessions, New Obligations by the Council of Australian 
Museums Association, now known as Museums Australia; and National Principles for 
                                                          
49 Ibid., 976, emphasis added. 
50 Mike Parker Pearson The archaeology of death and burial (Phoenix Mill: Sutton, 1999) 185. 
51 Ibid., 184. 
52 Ibid., 179-180. 
53 Thus in Victoria, for example, the Archaeological and Aboriginal Relics Preservation Act 1972 (Vic) 
protects Aboriginal cultural heritage only in relation to its value to archaeological study. 
54 Sharon Sullivan ‘The custodianship of Aboriginal sites in Southeastern Australia’ in Isabel McBryde (ed) 
Who owns the past: papers from the annual symposium of the Australian Academy of the Humanities 
(Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1985) 141. 
55 W Atkinson ‘Aborigines’ perception of their heritage’ 1985 ANZAAS Papers 1 at 4. 
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the Return of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Cultural Property by the Australian 
Aboriginal Affairs Council, a state-federal ministerial body. Previous Possessions asserts 
that there remains a scientific interest in keeping human remains, while acknowledging 
that museums cannot unilaterally place conditions on the return of remains56. Aboriginal 
reactions have suggested that these policies don’t go far enough, especially in the light of 
the recognition of pre-common law Aboriginal rights by Mabo v Queensland [No 2]57.  
Archaeologists have also confronted demands for repatriation and reburial by issuing 
codes of ethics at a global level. Shortly before the enactment of NAGPRA, the World 
Archaeological Congress, the ‘only representative world-wide body of practising 
archaeologists’58, had responded to debates about reburial and repatriation with the 
Vermillion Accord, a code of ethical principles adopted in 1989. Its provisions could 
hardly be condemned, and they begin by stating that ‘[r]espect for the mortal remains of 
the dead shall be accorded to all, irrespective of origin, race, religion, nationality, custom 
and tradition’. Yet such broadness inevitably means vagueness. On the one hand, article 3 
urges ‘[r]espect for the wishes of the local community and of relatives or guardians of the 
dead … whenever possible, reasonable and lawful’. On the other hand, article 4 requires 
‘[r]espect for the scientific research value of skeletal, mummified and other human 
remains … when such value is demonstrated to exist’. The accord ends with the hope that 
‘[t]he express recognition that the concerns of various ethnic groups, as well as those of 
science are legitimate and to be respected, will permit acceptable agreements to be 
reached and honoured’59. 
The World Archaeological Congress subsequently published a more specific First 
Code of Ethics60, drawn up by indigenous representatives and a non-indigenous 
archaeologist, and in terms of which members agree that they ‘have obligations to 
indigenous peoples’, and agree to abide by principles such as acknowledging the ‘special 
importance of indigenous ancestral human remains’61, and that ‘the important 
                                                          
56 See Lyndon Ormond-Parker ‘A Commonwealth repatriation odyssey’ (1997) vol 3 no 90 Aboriginal Law 
Bulletin 588 on the history of these policies and reactions to them. 
57 (1992) 175 CLR 1. 
58 ‘About the World Archaeological Congress’, World Archaeological Congress web site (available online at 
http://ehlt.flinders.edu.au/wac/site/about.php, last accessed 4 August 2005). 
59 Vermillion Accord on Human Remains (South Dakota World Archaeological Congress Inter-Congress, 
1989) (online at http://ehlt.flinders.edu.au/wac/site/about_ethi.php, last accessed 4 August 2005). 
60 World Archaeological Congress First Code of Ethics (1991) (online at 
http://ehlt.flinders.edu.au/wac/site/about_ethi.php, last accessed 4 August 2005). 
61 principle 3. 
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relationship between indigenous peoples and their cultural heritage exists irrespective of 
legal ownership’62. Further principles commit members: 
6. To acknowledge and recognise indigenous methodologies for interpreting, curating, 
managing and protecting indigenous cultural heritage. 
7. To establish equitable partnerships and relationships between Members and indigenous 
peoples whose cultural heritage is being investigated. 
8. To seek, whenever possible, representation of indigenous peoples in agencies funding 
or authorising research to be certain their view is considered as critically important in 
setting research standards, questions, priorities and goals. 
 
The Code of Ethics goes even further in committing members to certain rules, 
including that they shall ‘with rigorous endeavour seek to define the indigenous peoples 
whose cultural heritage is the subject of investigation’63, that they shall not ‘interfere 
with and/or remove human remains of indigenous peoples without the express consent of 
those concerned’64, and finally that they shall ‘recognise their obligation to employ 
and/or train indigenous peoples in proper techniques as part of their projects, and utilise 
indigenous peoples to monitor the projects’65. 
The Internation Council of Museums has addressed the matter of human remains in 
its Code of Ethics as well66. The Code does not go so far as to bar research on human 
remains or oblige members to repatriate collections, but rather states that acquisition, 
research and display should be done ‘in a manner consistent with professional standards 
and the interests and beliefs of members of the community, ethnic or religious groups 
from which the objects originated, where known’67. Display of such remains must be 
‘with great tact and respect for the feelings of human dignity held by all peoples’68. 
International law has not been particularly helpful in allocating entitlements to 
ancestral remains. Although the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Prohibiting and 
                                                          
62 principle 4. 
63 rule 1. 
64 rule 5. 
65 rule 7. 
66 ICOM Code of Ethics for Museums (2004) (available online at http://icom.museum/ethics.html, last 
accessed 4 August 2005). 
67 sections 2.5, 3.7 and 4.3. 
68 section 4.3 
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Preventing of the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property69 
has been touted as being a first step towards the protection of cultural property, it fails to 
make provisions for repatriation and reburial70. However, the United Nations Draft 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People71 protects the right of indigenous peoples  
to maintain, protect and develop the past, present and future manifestations of their 
cultures, such as archaeological and historical sites, artifacts, designs, ceremonies, 
technologies and visual and performing arts and literature, as well as the right to the 
restitution of cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken without their free 
and informed consent or in violation of their laws, traditions and customs.72  
More specifically, the draft law promises the right ‘to the repatriation of human remains’, 
and calls on states to ‘take effective measures, in conjunction with the indigenous peoples 
concerned, to ensure that indigenous sacred places, including burial sites, be preserved, 
respected and protected’73.   
 
In South Africa, there have been similar calls for the repatriation of skeletons by 
indigenous communities. One successful claim has been for the remains of Griqua chief 
Cornelius Kok II, previously held by the University of Witwatersrand’s Department of 
Anatomy74. Yet this one example is, as in other countries, a result of a systematic history 
of museological and scientific acquisition of human skeletons. Martin Legassick and 
Ciraj Rassool’s Skeletons in the Cupboard, which reveals the extent of a competitive 
trade between grave robbers and South African and European museums in the early 20th 
century, has called upon South African museums to take stock of their collections of 
                                                          
69 Not ratified by South Africa as at 3 October 2003: see UNESCO web site, 
http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws/1970/html_eng/page3.shtml (last accessed 4 August 2005). 
70 Skeletal material could be regarded as being cultural property within the meaning of article 1(c) of the 
Convention, which includes ‘products of archaeological excavations (including regular and clandestine) or 
of archaeological discoveries’ in its definition; yet this would merely protect it from illegal trafficking and 
say nothing further about relations within states. 
71 UN doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1 (1994). 
72 para 12. 
73 para 13. 
74 See Chapter 4 of Colette Pietersen The politics and policies of repatriating archaeological skeletal 
material: a case study into South Africa’s indigenous past (MA thesis, University of Cape Town, 1997); 
also Martin L Engelbrecht ‘The connection between archaeological treasures and the Khoisan people’ in 
Cressida Fforde, Jane Hubert and Paul Turnbull (eds) The dead and their possessions: repatriations in 
principle, policy and practice (London: Routledge, 2002) 243.  
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bones75. In the first decade of the 20th century, racial anthropometric study began its 
decline in the Northern hemisphere following Franz Boas’ loss of confidence in its 
importance. Yet at the same time, this practice of relating the measurements of human 
anatomical features to racial characteristisc became a motivating force of acquisitions for 
South African museums76. The desire for Bushman remains, considered relics of a dying 
race, became steadily more unsavoury. The living and the dead were not well 
differentiated in the haste to acquire their bodies as natural history specimens. One 
missionary, Reverend H Kling, was in the practice of sending Bushman skeletons to 
South African Museum director Louis Péringuey. It appeared that the the remains were of 
of recently deceased people with whom Kling had been acquainted, since he was able to 
clearly identify the individuals77.  
Even more notorious was the reputation of Viennese anthropologist Dr Rudolph 
Pöch, whose programme of racial classification aimed at identifying Bushmen as one of 
the remaining pure human races78. The legacy of his research is ‘one of systematic grave 
robbery, and of clandestine deals for newly dead corpses in the name of science’79. Even 
more horrifying was his shady employee, ‘Dr’ Mehnarto, whose grisly reputation derives 
from cooking recently dead bodies to obtain their skeletons80. 
Old Katje, the wife of one of the people exhumed and boiled by Mehnarto, was alive 
to witness it:  
After I heard that the white men had taken my relatives’ bodies and cooked the 
flesh off their bones, I prepared to leave for Langberg to report the matter to the 
Police, but I was told that Bushmen were outside the Law, and that I would get 
no hearing. People at Kuie told me this, I thought they were right and kept quiet. 
                                                          
75 Martin Legassick and Ciraj Rassool Skeletons in the cupboard: South African museums and the trade in 
human remains 1907-1917 (Cape Town and Kimberley: South African Museum and McGregor Museum, 
2000). 
76 Ibid., 3. 
77 Ibid., 7; Alan G Morris ‘Reverend Kling’s skeletons’ (1987) 10(4) South African Journal of Ethnology 159. 
78 Legassick and Rassool (note 75) at 11. Leggassick and Rassool trace his research, via his work in Austro-
Hungarian prisoner of war camps of the early century, to its implication in the origins of Nazi ideology (at 
12); on his wife’s continuation of his work after his early death in 1922, his membership of the German 
national ‘racial hygiene’ society and his close links to Eugen Fischer, whose theories influenced Mein 
Kampf, see Legassick and Rassool 100; also Robert Gordon ‘The rise of the Bushman penis: Germans, 
genitalia and genocide’ (1998) 57(1) African Studies 38. 
79 Legassick and Rassool (note 75) at 12, emphasis found. 
80 Ibid., 15. 
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Since I heard that my relatives bodies were taken and cooked I am sick from 
sorrow and I will not recover from the shock for a long time. I wept for days.81
 
It is clear that Mehnarto was not the only one guilty of boiling bodies to derive 
specimens of indigenous anatomy82. In contrast to the reviled activities of Europe’s 
Resurrectionists, who illegally exhumed bodies to make them available to anatomists, 
those who excavated Khoisan bodies in South Africa would not have regarded 
themselves in the same light: ‘for the occupation was considered to be quite legal as long 
as it was non-European bodies that were being exploited.’83 Péringuey himself believed 
that no permission was required for excavating ‘these old relics’84.  
Yet, as Leggassick and Rassool point out, while there was no law governing 
exhumation in the Cape colony, the Cape government had stated that it would allow no 
such exhumations without permission being granted by the Minister. After enquiries as to 
the date and cause of death, permission might be granted subject to the agreement of 
cemetery authorities, and on condition that it would not be a danger to public health, or a 
public nuisance, or go against the requirements of local authorities85. The Cape Law 
Department cited Matthaeus and Voet’s Commentaries on the Pandects to the effect that 
it was a crime to violate a sepulchre, and that it did not matter that the graves were not 
within an official burial ground86. 
The Bushman Relics Act of 191187 was introduced partly to stem what came to be 
seen by officials as a ‘ghastly business’88, although it seemed that the Department of 
                                                          
81 Statement of Old Katje, quoted in Legassick and Rassool (note 75) at 23. 
82 Ibid., 51. One vivid 19th century account by a colonial officer goes like this:  
Dr A- of the 60th had asked my men to procure him a few native skulls of both sexes. This was a task easily 
accomplished. One morning they brought back to camp about two dozen heads of various ages. As these were 
not supposed to be in a presentable state for the doctor’s acceptance, the next night they turned my bath into a 
caldron for the removal of superfluous flesh. And there these men sat, gravely smoking their pipes during the 
live-long night, and stirring round and round their heads in the seething boiler, as though they were cooking 
black-apple dumplings. 
(Stephen Lakeman What I saw in Kaffir-land (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1880) quoted in Legassick 
and Rassool (note 75) at 75). 
83 Alan G Morris ‘Trophy skulls, museums and the San’ in Pippa Skotnes (ed) Miscast: negotiating the 
presence of the Bushmen (Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 1996) 67 at 71. 
84 Letter quoted in Legassick and Rassool (note 75) at 25. 
85 Governmental communication quoted in Legassick and Rassool (note 75) at 25. 
86 Legassick and Rassool (note 75) at 26 citing letter of the Law Department. These common law authorities 
will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three. 
87 Later the Bushman-Relics Protection Act 22 of 1911. 
88 Department of Justice memo cited in Legassick and Rassool (note 75) at 1. 
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Justice89 was at least equally motivated by the desire to keep valuable ‘relics’ from 
unfairly bolstering the work of foreign scientists. Take, for example, the skeletons 
impounded by Port Elizabeth customs in 1910, en route to Dr Pöch in Vienna, and 
collected by George St Leger Lennox90. It is thought by some that Lennox simply shot 
the Bushmen whose skeletons he needed91; although some think it more likely that he 
exhumed recently buried people, and knew where to do so since he was familiar with the 
people of the area92. Péringuey wrote to Lennox, bargaining with him to obtain the 
skeletons even as Lennox threatened to sell his skeletons for more money to Pöch. Said 
Péringuey: ‘I feel so much more disappointed that I fear these relics are going to leave the 
country which as I told you is laid systematically bare of this valuable scientific 
material.… Why should all scientific work of that kind be sent to Germany, when it is … 
as well done in England?’93 94
Grave robbing did not stop with the promulgation of the Busman Relics Act. 
Leggassick and Rassool, tracing their story up to 1916, point out that Péringuey 
continued to collect skeletons. He claimed an exclusivity to do so because of the new 
Act’s prohibition on exports; and ‘[h]is scientific avidity for human remains meant that 
he continued to create a climate in which the search for and sale of even recent human 
remains was encouraged’95. There is evidence that the famed palaeontologist Dr Robert 
Broom, who would later recount his practice of boiling the flesh off human heads96, was 
in the 1920’s obtaining his research material by a relatively slower process: he would 
                                                          
89 Leggassick and Rassool conclude that the Bushman Relics Act of 1911 ‘undoubtedly’ had its origins in the 
conversations of Péringuey, Medical Officer of Health Dr A J Gregory, and the Cape Law Department; 
(note 75) at 15-16. 
90 Better known as ‘Scotty Smith’, ‘South Africa’s Robin Hood’; see F C Metrowich Scotty Smith: South 
Africa’s Robin Hood (Cape Town: Books for Africa, 1962). 
91 Morris (note 83) at 72; Morris ‘ The reflection of the collector: San and Khoi skeletons in museum 
collections’ (1987) 42 South African Archaeological Bulletin 12 at 18; Metrowich (note 90) at 194. 
92 Legassick and Rassool (note 75) at 31. 
93 Letter quoted in Legassick and Rassool (note 75) at 32. 
94 So too, for example, when the magistrate of Kuruman, in what was then Bechuanaland, wrote to the Law 
Department in Cape Town in 1910, asking whether there would be any objection to the exhumation and 
examination of Bushman remains by Mehnarto, the Law Department replied that this did ‘not seem fair to 
the dead’. The Medical Officer for Health concurred on the basis that even if these were of scientific value, 
they should be retained in the Cape Colony; Legassick and Rassool (note 75) at 15. That year a police 
report was submitted detailing Mehnarto’s activities: he had removed rock carvings by drilling them from 
the rock, and had removed the bodies of three Bushmen, and reputedly boiled the flesh from their bones 
(15, cf 18-19). A police report on Mehnarto’s activities condemned them on the basis that the feelings of 
Bushmen would be wounded, but also because the removal of ‘valuable specimens of art’ would ‘[deprive] 
the country and future generations of one of its most valuable treasures so far as art is concerned’ (police 
report quoted at 15-16). 
95 Legassick and Rassool (note 75) at 45. 
96 L H Wells ‘The Broom Collection of Nama Hottentot skulls in the Edinburgh University Anatomical 
Museum’ (1951) 48 South African Journal of Science 97; Legassick and Rassool (note 75) at 51-2. 
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inter the bodies of the recently deceased in order that decomposition might take its 
course, and he would retrieve their clean skeletons soon afterward97. Graham Avery, of 
the South African Museum, writes that ‘[s]keleton hunting, conducted under the guise of 
‘physical anthropology’, continued to devastate large portions of significant Stone Age 
archaeological sites and was only stopped just prior to the promulgation of the National 
Monuments Act in 1969’98. Avery also suggests that the provincial Human Tissue and 
Anatomy Acts of the mid-1920s were a response to this nefarious history of skeletal 
acquisitions99.  
What such accounts make clear is the historical complicity of anthropological and 
archaeological discipline with the colonising project; indeed their articulation as a project 
of knowledge. After military subjugation, the Khoisan ‘were opened to the scientific gaze 
of the all-poweful coloniser’100, and their bodies became ‘the centre of the transformation 
of the museum in South Africa as an institution of order, knowledge and 
classification’101.  
It would be exactly this gaze that Pippa Skotnes tried to interrogate in 1996, with 
questionable results. Skotnes’ exhibition entitled Miscast: negotiating Khoisan history 
and material culture, held in the same year that the TRC hearings were to begin, 
provoked strong emotions that had been stoked by past museological practices of 
collection and display. Miscast collected ethnographic representations of the Khoisan, 
from the beginning of colonial history to the present, together with the artefacts, plaster 
casts of humans remains and anthropometric instruments of colonial science, and had 
been intended as a ‘a critical and visual exploration of the term “Bushman” and the 
various relationships that gave rise to it’102. However, indigenous representatives 
objected vociferously to what was, in their eyes, simply an offensive and gratuitous 
exhibition of Khoisan bodies at the South African National Gallery103. The reactions of 
many critics were no doubt inflamed by memories of the South African Museum’s 
                                                          
97 Legassick and Rassool (note 75) at 51-2. 
98 Ibid., 82. 
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100 Ibid., 2. 
101 Ibid., 1-2. 
102 Pippa Skotnes ‘Introduction’ in Pippa Skotnes (ed) Miscast: negotiating the presence of the Bushmen 
(Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 1996) 15 at 18. 
103 See especially Yvette Abrahams  ‘Miscast’ (Jul/Aug 1996) 43 Southern African Review of Books; Yvette 
Abrahams ‘Yvette Abrahams responds’ (Jul/Aug 1996) 43 Southern African Review of Books. 
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‘Bushman diorama’, an exhibition of plaster casts of indigenous people, naked and frozen 
in an imagined state of nature104. 
While Skotnes’ intention to critically exhibit the exhibitors was misread by some 
indigenous representatives, and was cause for ceaseless controversy, there was much 
broader consensus on the question of Sara Baartman’s remains. Baartman, a twenty-year 
old Khoi Khoi woman, was taken from Cape Town to London in 1810, where she 
became known as the ‘Hottentot Venus’ and exhibited as a freak and a spectacle of 
exaggerated African sexuality. When she died in 1816, her body was dissected and her 
brains and genitals displayed at the Musée de l’Homme in Paris. Her remains were 
successfully repatriated and reinterred in 2002, following a dedicated campaign by South 
African activists and capitulation by the French Senate105. Subsequently, the body of Sara 
Baartman, and the narrative of the return of her remains, have been appropriated as 
symbols of the national estate with relevance beyond localised struggle by descendants of 
the Cape’s indigenous peoples. 
Unidentified Possessions 
In many cases then, repatriation has been plagued by doubts about the identities of the 
repatriated and of the community to which the remains are to be returned106. This is the 
heart of the politics of cultural property: this difficult intersection of the cultural 
expression of identity and the legitimacies of senses of proprietorship and patrimony107. 
The success of claims to representation and proprietorship are especially interesting in the 
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107 For more on this point, see Julian Jonker (2003) ‘Own/Other. Negotiating cultural ownership and social 
identity in the post-colonial state’ in Herman Wasserman and Sean Jacobs (eds) Shifting selves: post-
apartheid essays on mass media, culture and identity (Cape Town: Kwela, 2003).  
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case of Prestwich Place, where the anonymity of the dead and the fraught identity politics 
of the Western Cape give rise to particular obstacles. From the beginning, the difficulty 
of representing the descendant community seemed apparent, and the connections between 
descendancy, mandate and right were not always convincingly articulated by those 
wishing to speak for Prestwich Place under the banner of the Prestwich Place Committee.  
When SARHA announced on 1 September 2003 that exhumation would continue, it 
was clear that the Committee’s main aim would be to prevent exhumation, rather than to 
take part in the discussion about off-site memorialisation. Father Michael Weeder, the 
main organiser of the campaign, told the media: ‘A plaque is insufficient. It is an 
insignificant gesture. Those skeletons are the ancestors of everybody’108. 
Yet, at the same time, the Committee’s press statement alluded to rifts along the lines 
of cultural identity: 
[SAHRA has] repeatedly claimed that no immediate descendents of people buried there could be 
found. The conclusion that the significance of the site is therefore questionable, suggests a lack of 
understanding of this city's history….  We … question how the Prestwich Street burial ground 
would have been dealt with if it were located in another part South Africa. Would heritage 
authorities have ignored the cry for the remains of ancestors to be dealt with sensitively and with 
respect?109
While statements like this hinted at a rhetoric of regional (and, implicitly, coloured) 
marginalisation, the Prestwich Place Committee also positioned itself as part of a broader 
black (and non-regional) struggle110. Weeder delineated his specific concerns in an 
opinion piece published in a regional newspaper soon afterwards. He recalled the words 
of a speaker from the floor at the first meeting, who had asked: ‘Why are white people 
digging up black bodies?’111 Describing his feelings on seeing a white archaeologist at 
work, Weeder recalled the words of Malcolm X: ‘Just because a person feeds the fish, it 
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doesn’t mean that he is a friend of the fish’112. And yet, in the same article, voicing a 
vision of an inclusive descendant community, he wrote: ‘[y]es they are ours, whether by 
blood or in the way we choose to love them as our neighbours’113. 
Such equivocation by activists and other commentators would foreshadow the 
Prestwich Place Committee’s failing attempt to articulate a marginalised subjectivity 
while refraining from deploying apartheid categories. In the face of this, the developer 
impassively referred to the legislation, which required that a representative community 
show ‘direct descendancy’ in order to be granted any authority over the future of the 
object of heritage114. Later, in an administrative appeal, the developer would elect not to 
contest the Committee’s claims to direct descendancy; this seemed to be disappointing to 
the group, which perhaps wished to use disagreement about descendancy as a stage for 
re-imagining conceptions of identity115.  
Yet the identity issue did not end here. In a subsequent appeal, this time to a tribunal 
constituted by Department of Arts and Culture, the campaign group pleaded that the law 
had a much more insiduous blindspot regarding identity. It contended that the public 
consultation process, which had drawn an intense response but from a small group of 
people, had assumed a ‘middle-class familiarity’ with methods of public consultation, 
and indeed, with the significance of the issue. The process failed to ‘take into account the 
erasure of layers of undervalued history and of memory which have come to be 
associated with the very communities who by history and association would have an 
interest in this site’116. The contention was that the very act which the site symbolised 
was the erasure of subjectivity of the people buried there – their anonymity and the 
conditions of their non-recognition by contemporary descendants. What really defined 
the Prestwich Place Committee’s efforts, then, as well as its chief obstacle, was this 
attempt to re-imagine identity and community, and to obtain legal recognition for this re-
imagined sense of a community of descendants.  
Valmont Layne would later write that the reference to direct descendancy was  
                                                          
112 Ibid. 
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114 Section 36(6)(b) of the National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999 (hereafter referred to as the NHRA). 
The heritage legislation will be discussed at greater length in Chapter Three. 
115 Hands Off Prestwich Place Ad Hoc Committee ‘Issues arising from Prestwich Street hearing, Thursday 
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116 Prestwich Place Project Committee Submission to DAC Tribunal (20 May 2004).  
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… a bitter reminder of Apartheid’s most powerful claims in which “colouredness” was 
posited as a condition of hybridity, of step-child status, of in-betweenness, a condition 
with only a fragmentary claim to history, so to speak.  Against this legacy is a diverse 
community charting new paths through modernity with the lingering burden of 
colouredness in contemporary memorial politics.  It did not seem to matter that the 
remains found on the site in fact represented a complete cross-section of humanity at the 
colonial Cape, all faiths, all racial designations.  What mattered in the heat of the moment 
was the racial representivity of the contestants.117  
While this encapsulates the core problem with the language of direct descendancy, it 
is perhaps more correct to say that all participants in some way based their claims upon 
genealogical or representational privilege, or the lack thereof.   
 
Prestwich Place is but one example of a range of diverse scenarios involving collective 
interests and senses of proprietorship that may sensibly be grouped under the umbrella of 
the term ‘cultural property’118. Disputes over cultural property form a vivid image of how 
law produces and limits subjectivities, since they typically invoke claims that are 
simultaneously claims of law and claims against law. As Elazar Barkan and Ronald Bush 
note, the term ‘cultural property’, used in so much of the literature about claims of this 
sort, is itself a paradox119. Advocates for legal measures against cultural appropriation 
claim that property is at the foundation of the Enlightenment doctrine of universal rights 
and individual liberties, which do not sit well with dynamic conceptions of collective 
identity and ownership120. Claims to cultural property aspire to be claims of legality; yet 
often, by invoking the cultural as opposed to the civic, these claims are not recognised by 
the law, or they are recognised only as exceptions to deep-seated civic rights121. Cultural 
                                                          
117 Valmont Layne ‘“Hands on District Six”: towards a politics and poetics of memorialisation at a South 
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property disputes are therefore generally imbued with a deep confusion of subjectivity 
and citizenship. Part of the problem is that cultural property only reveals its identity when 
it has been lost122; as if alienation was an intrinsic property of identity, and loss an 
identifying element of possession. Claims to cultural property must therefore always look 
back, memorialise, risk reification. 
Rosemary Coombe, in her discussion of appropriation and the cultural politics of 
intellectual property, claims that law cannot avoid setting limitations on the collective 
subject, and is forced to adopt certain rhetorical positions which Coombe calls Orientalist 
and Romantic123. From the former perspective, law regards identity as discrete, fixed and 
based upon biological or cultural essences. The latter perspective borrows from Romantic 
thought, with its preoccupation with genius, originality and authorship124: the qualities of 
the self-contained individual defined by the property in his or her possession are lent by 
the logic of modernist thought to nation-states and ethnic groups, who are then 
individualised in the political imaginary125. From this perspective, then, the nations or 
ethnic collectives that would hold cultural property must be ‘territorially and historically 
bounded, distinctive, internally homogenous, and complete unto themselves. In this 
worldview, each nation or group possesses a unique identity and culture that are 
constituted by its undisputed possession of property’126 127.  
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This difficulty with articulating a conception of identity that is hybrid, dynamic, and 
constantly subject to incomplete description of its rights to cultural property is a 
structural silence within law’s discourse of right and justice: law’s inexpressible subject. 
In this view, the Prestwich Place Committee failed because it invoked a hybrid and 
dynamic identity that often intended to open up rather than determine questions about 
genealogies and notions of descendancy. It might be argued, then, that it was the 
inexpressibility of this open-ended conception of identity that can be found at the basis of 
law’s inability to come to the aid of the group.  
But this silence wells from deeper discourses than the legal: descriptions of hybridity 
at any level are fated to be fraught with tautology and vagueness. More usefully perhaps, 
critique needs to shift from questioning the responsibility of law – the question of to 
whom does the law respond – and towards another, prior questioning of the source of 
law, the founding myths that are responsible for law. A creative legal activism then 
invests itself in the potential not to find but to found responsibility. This potential exists 
in the role of memory and the presence of the past in the very constitution of the law, at 
the time of the law’s constitutional mo(nu)ment. A work of excavation of these memorial 
foundations of law, of the relationship between memory and the constitution of the law, 
would allow activism not to approach the law as found, but to find how its 
responsibilities might be re-activated. 
c. landscapes of transition and constitutional monuments 
If the struggle centered on Prestwich Place has seemed uncanny, then perhaps it is 
because its will to re-imagine identity has recalled vestiges of the open-ended cultural 
formations of District Six, location of Cape Town’s most notorious forced removals128. 
District Six’s multicultural community has increasingly been imagined as a vibrant pre-
apartheid identity, source of a cultural dynamism that was destroyed by apartheid’s racial 
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classifications, their attendant cultural stereotypes and supposed biological aggregates. 
An area on the eastern outskirts of the city centre, the District was, since early colonial 
days, a vital manifestation of Cape Town’s existence as a port city. All kinds of people 
lived, worked and loved there: immigrants from Europe, the Carribean and the Americas, 
slaves and freed slaves of Southern African and South East Asian origin. Recent 
descriptions of Cape Town that narrate the city’s history as a locus of creolisation129 
identify District Six, as place and as community, as an important catalyst for processes of 
cultural contact and exchange and the formation of novel, hybrid identities. District Six 
also had a reputation for intense and vibrant artistic, intellectual and political activity, and 
is often summoned to represent the uniqueness and vibrancy of cultural life in Cape 
Town before removals, much as Sophiatown does for the Witwatersrand130. If apartheid’s 
metaphor of apart-ness made of it a primarily spatial ordering131, then District Six was 
‘not of South Africa in its apartheid guise, but a place apart’132. 
Truly the District did not fit into apartheid’s vision of urban planning133, for between 
1966 and 1982 its 60 000 residents were methodically removed to townships on the 
margins of the metropolis. Their houses were bulldozed to the ground, so that today the 
only remnants of the once vibrant community are the churches, mosques and synagogues 
which stand painfully alone on the otherwise empty land. The barren landscape that 
remained would become a ‘monumental emptiness’134, an icon of the remembrance of 
forced removals. 
In the mid-eighties, after removal had been completed, District Six became the object 
of what may be described as practices of memory as resistance. These practices – humble 
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acts and gestures such as the writing of poetry, the staging of plays, the painting of 
murals and grafitti, the gathering of ex-residents around dinner tables – were persistent 
and self-consciously resistant, and finally imprinted the District onto the popular 
imagination as one of the key symbols of the injustices of forced removals, as well as of 
the struggle not to forget. ‘Remember District Six’ urges a Plaque of Remembrance at the 
entrance to the District Six Museum, reminding us that the urge to remember became a 
key mode of cultural resistance during the most turbulent years of apartheid135: 
Remember Dimbaza. 
Remember Botshabelo/Onverwacht, 
South End, East Bank, 
Sophiatown, Mukuleke, Cato Manor. 
Remember District Six. 
Remember the racism 
Which took away our homes 
And our livelihood 
And which sought 
To steal away our humanity. 
Remember also our will to live, 
To hold fast to that 
Which marks us as human beings: 
Our generosity, our love of justice 
And our care for each other. 
Remember Tramway Road, 
Modderdam, Simonstown. 
  
These practices of memory were an important part of the formation of an activist 
grouping called the Hands Off District Six Campaign, which won an important victory 
during the 1980s when it was able to exert enough pressure to prevent the intended 
redevelopment of the District. The group, somewhat ironically, had its origins in what 
seemed to be the apartheid government’s dismantling of its land segregation laws in the 
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late 80s136. In November 1986, British Petroleum (BP) announced that it would invest 
R100 million in the ‘renewal’ of District Six, in what would be the first ‘open residential 
area’ in the country137. BP explicitly looked on its plan to rebuild a racially integrated 
business environment as a ‘post-apartheid solution’, committed to using the land 
equitably. Yet many former residents and activists looked upon the land as ‘salted 
earth’138, and denied that the BP development would be a positive one. Out of this debate 
came the Hands Off District Six committee, and the image of the barren land, which 
commuters to the central business district must pass everyday, began to symbolise the 
spirit of the fight for land, restitution and justice. 
Much of the area therefore still stands empty, an ‘open wound’139 between mountain 
and sea that disturbs the city’s natural beauty. It is a powerful marker of destruction and 
memory that meets the eye of every commuter entering Cape Town’s central business 
district. Preventing development on the land fulfilled both strategies of resistance of the 
Hands Off campaign. Firstly, the land remained visually scarred, a powerful symbol of 
memory as resistance. At the same time, it remained physically empty, waiting for a time 
when those who had been removed would be able to return.  
With the arrival of freedom in 1994, return became a real possibility, in line with the 
new government’s land restitution programme. The District Six Beneficiary Trust, which 
has administered the land claim for ex-residents of the District and now manages the 
process of return, grew out of the initial activist agenda. It was formed in the wake of the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act140 and a successful appeal to a newly constituted Land 
Claims Court, and resolved ‘to drive, co-ordinate, and monitor the land restitution 
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process until all claims are validated, verified, and settled’141. The Hands Off campaign 
also gave birth to another programme for change, one that continued to work with 
practices of memory, such as oral history collections and the production of creative work, 
and that resulted in the establishment of a District Six Museum142.  
These two programmes, of restitution on the one hand and memorialisation on the 
other, share origins institutionally, historically and even conceptually. Yet with the 
achievement of return, one can begin to discern a divergence. Those involved in the legal 
programme have been concerned with the meeting of requirements of the legislation, and 
such matters as the establishment of a social contract between residents (aiming, amongst 
other things, to define and limit rights to use and transfer property in the area). The 
Beneficiary Trust’s programme is an entirely necessary one, and a victory that is in line 
with the initial activist agenda. Yet it is a process that through its reliance on modes of 
legality must engage in the discourses of proprietorship and patrimony. Thus, who is 
entitled to restitution? What does this right entail? Who is an ex-resident? Who is the 
descendant of an ex-resident? Who belonged to the community of District Six, and who 
will belong to a reconstituted community? Justice is understood, in this language, in 
terms of right, inclusion and exclusion143. 
The programme of memorialisation, on the other hand, can read the signification and 
significance of the site in a different way. The Museum, and related practices of memory, 
use the District as a text from which to read an alternative history of the city and re-
imagine possibilities for citizenship and identity. In this work of memory, the history of 
District Six is not simply one of the material dispossession of individual residents, but 
related to a much wider cultural dispossession, a legacy of social engineering that has 
curtailed the cultural imaginary of the city and is thus intrinsically related to the city’s 
contemporary geography and its persistent racial stratification. The Museum’s work, at 
its most productive, involves itself not only with the commemoration of a discrete 
community of the District, but with questions about race and citizenship in the city 
generally, about the re-imagination of the built environment generally, and about what 
                                                          
141 District Six Beneficiary Trust website, http://www.d6bentrust.org.za/ (last accessed 31 August 2004). 
142 For the history of the District Six Museum Foundation, see Ciraj Rassool and Sandra Prosalendis 
Recalling community in Cape Town: creating community in Cape Town (Cape Town: District Six Museum 
Foundation, 2001) 3-20 and passim. 
143 For a recent account of the tortuous seven years of political wrangling that resulted, inter alia, from such 
questions, see Coombes (note 104) at 144-47. 
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indigeneity and creolisation might mean in the city generally144. While the Beneficiary 
Trust’s legal activities work within a reconstituted civic sphere, the Museum continues to 
ponder the renewal and reconstitution of that civic sphere. 
This divergence between projects of restitution and memorialisation has practical 
implications for the redevelopment of the District. The Beneficiary Trust, in managing 
the return of ex-residents, discusses the establishment of utilitarian housing schemes and 
the possibility of a social compact amongst residents. The District Six Museum, on the 
other hand, discusses the possibility of establishing memorial parks and other public 
spaces and places for civic activity. The two approaches are not contradictory, and indeed 
both have been complementary in arriving at the recent slogan of Hands On District 
Six!145 Yet there is the potential for a politics artising from the choices made necessary by 
budgetary and spatial constraints as the processes of cultural and physical restitution 
unfold. What is immanently at stake is whether the District is primarily a place for the 
‘direct descendants’ of those who were forcibly removed, for a diaspora more widely 
conceived, for all who have been deprived of civic access to the city, or even for all the 
people of the city146.  
Annie Coombes characterises District Six Museum’s memory work, for example its 
psychogeographic tours through the city’s haunted spaces, as a ‘Freudian 
archaeology’147; and archaeology has been literally practised at the site of the District’s 
destruction148. Most interesting though is the archaeology of the site’s hauntologies149 
                                                          
144 This characterisation of the Museum’s work is taken from the author’s personal experience as an 
employee. An introduction to the methodology of the Museum is given in Coombes (note 104) at  116-148; 
see also the essays collected in Rassool and Prosalendis (note 142). 
145 This name was given to a conference held by the District Six Museum in May 2005, coinciding with the 
date of return of some of the families. The continued use of this metaphor of the hands gives rise to 
interesting questions about the tangible and the intangible, especially in the context of heritage and legal 
discourses which tend to distinguish between the two. The complementarity of the projects of 
memorialisation and restitution have so far worked to refuse an easy distinction between tangible and 
intangible. 
146 These issues were raised persistently at the Hands On District Six! conference, and are inherent in the 
Museum’s wish that the site be classified as a ‘Grade I’ national heritage site within the meaning of the 
NHRA. 
147 Coombes (note 104) at 133. 
148 For example, Antonia Malan and Crain Soudien ‘Managing heritage in District Six, Cape Town: conflicts 
past and present’ in J Schofield (ed) The archaeology of twentieth century conflict (London: Routledge, 
2002). On the different archaeologies of the site, see especially Nick Shepherd Archaeology and post-
colonialism in South Africa: the theory, practice and politics of archaeology after Apartheid (PhD thesis, 
University of Cape Town, 1998) 227-236. 
149 Being more or less faithful to, but perhaps out of joint with Jacques Derrida Specters of Marx: the state of 
the debt, the work of mourning, and the New International (trans Peggy Kamuf) (New York: Routledge, 
1994), the ‘hauntology’ is used here to describe a discursive haunting: discourses of the spectral that are 
themselves spectral, a haunting of the rhetoric of haunting. 
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that took place with the District Six Public Sculpture Project, in which the empty space 
was (re)populated with sculptures and public art works by 96 artists150. Through such 
memorial imaginings, characterised by a creative engagement with hauntings151 as much 
as by physical and literal archaeologies, emerge the traces with which the contemporary 
city’s memorial and constitutional topographies are formed and inscribed. 
 
The Prestwich Place Committee had originally been named the Hands Off Prestwich 
Street Ad Hoc Committee, recalling the stridency of the Hands Off District Six 
Campaign. Indeed, a number of Hands Off District Six’s members were instrumental in 
formulating the Prestwich Place campaign, and both organisations arose from what has 
been called ‘a crisis of authority, of the right to speak’152. This crisis of political 
representation is also the crisis of re-imagination, the necessity of being creative in the 
face of the old racial identities that continue to crowd out the social and political 
imagination153. Both the campaigns for District Six and Prestwich Place battle against 
these fixed and restrictive delineations of identity, and against an amnesia of the future 
anterior, of what might have been possible. 
Their work of re-imagination is a backward-looking, or memorial, work of the 
imagination, that arises from the potentiality of a ‘short-circuit between imagination and 
memory’154. For example, the popular, if romanticised, narrative of District Six is one 
which trumps official, bureaucratic or statistical narratives because of its ‘power of 
reinvention and renewal.... It matters not therefore that the details of a story are wrong. 
                                                          
150 Crain Soudien and Renate Meyer (eds) The District Six Public Sculpture Project (Cape Town: District Six 
Museum Foundation, n.d.). 
151 See also Coombes (note 104) at 134ff on the hauntings of District Six. 
152 Valmont Layne ‘Towards a politics of the emerging community museum sector in South Africa’, presented 
at the 68th South African Museums Association Conference (Cape Town, 1-3 June 2004), emphasis 
found.  
153 As one commentator has put it, ‘under apartheid what was construed as the problematic conjuncture of 
working-class origins, cosmopolitan aspirations, and being African or “colored” has left a complicated 
legacy. This means that the memory of District Six is not easily accommodated in the “new” South Africa 
either.’ Coombes (note 104) at 118. 
154 Paul Ricoeur Memory, history, forgetting (trans Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer) (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2004) (hereafter referred to as Ricoeur Memory, history, forgetting) 5. Cf 
Sean Field ‘Fragile identities: memory, emotion and coloured residents of Windermere’ in Zimitri Erasmus 
(ed) Coloured by history/shaped by place: new perspectives on coloured identities in Cape Town (Cape 
Town: Kwela, 2001) 97 at 102-3 on how the victims of traumatic forced removals resort to myth-making 
and romanticisation of their pre-traumatic memory of the place. 
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What matters is the right to remake’155. Without condoning the excesses of re-
imagination, what is at stake is a creative element in the work of recognition and 
identification. This contiguity of the work of memorialisation and of imagination gives us 
a clue as to why memory became such a vital element of the liberation struggle’s 
optimism, and has enduring potency  after 1994. It also suggests how one might 
approach, in a narrative or memorial way, what was earlier named the ‘constitutional 
moment’ of the law. 
The successes of the struggle for District Six are indicative. Even as the everyday 
legality of apartheid rule determined and produced stratified racial identities through the 
minutiae of segregation, it was the imagination of District Six, its image held in memory, 
that located it as an important site for struggle, for re-imagining law and hoping for a new 
legal compact. This creative struggle for memory would make of District Six a 
constitutional monument, in the sense that it is the remembrance of such sites and events 
that inform a new constitutional regime’s monumental vision of justice and legality.  
Indeed, the apartheid past is explicitly memorialised in the fundamental laws of the 
new dispensation156. The epilogue or ‘postamble’ of the Interim Constitution had 
conceived of the founding document as not a rupture but a ‘historic bridge’ between the 
apartheid past and a future of reconciliation and reconstruction157. The final version of 
the Constitution, perhaps hoping that we had crossed this bridge, urged us to look 
backwards before looking forward:  
We, the people of South Africa,  
Recognise the injustices of our past;  
Honour those who suffered for justice and freedom in our land;  
Respect those who have worked to build and develop our country; and  
Believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity.158
 
                                                          
155 Crain Soudien and Lalou Meltzer ‘District Six: representation and struggle’ in Ciraj Rassool and Sandra 
Prosalendis Recalling community in Cape Town: creating community in Cape Town (Cape Town: District 
Six Museum Foundation, 2001) 66 at 69, emphasis added. 
156 On this “constitutional entrenchment of memory”, see Edouard Fagan ‘The Constitutional entrenchment 
of memory’ in Sarah Nuttall and Carli Coetzee (eds) Negotiating the past: the making of memory in South 
Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); the constitution ‘regulates the future conduct of 
government, of course, but it also contains a number of unusual provisions which are best explained as 
deliberate attempts constantly to remind the interpreter of the constitution of the unequal society that 
forms the backdrop to the text’ (at 250). 
157 Epilogue of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (the ‘Interim Constitution’). 
158 Preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 (the ‘Final Constitution’, 
hereafter referred to as the Constitution). 
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The constitutional jurisprudence of these early years has been, at least at first, 
appropriately monumental. Thus the judges of the Constitutional Court have on occasion 
placed equality at the centre of the Constitution ‘in the light of our own particular 
history’159; while urging an understanding of equality that goes beyond formal equality, 
because of the memory of the inegalitarian past160; they have reflected on the respect for 
diversity that arises because ‘reconciliation so as to overcome the strife and division of 
the past’ underpins the constitutional order161;  and read the right to life as being 
‘influenced by the recent experiences of our people in this country. The history of the 
past decades has been such that the value of life and human dignity have been 
demeaned’162. And so on, like a lodestar guiding from behind. This memorial 
jurisprudence has perhaps its finest moment in Judge Albie Sachs’ historical exegesis of 
the values informing the right to life, in that nigh inaugural case of constitutional reform, 
S v Makwanyane: 
Constitutionalism in our country also arrives simultaneously with the achievement of 
equality and freedom, and of openness, accommodation and tolerance. When reviewing 
the past, the framers of our Constitution rejected not only the laws and practices that 
imposed domination and kept people apart, but those that prevented free discourse and 
rational debate, and those that brutalised us as people and diminished our respect for 
life.163
Here then is the constitutionalism not of the ‘historical bridge’ but of the rupture, one 
that exchanges death for life. The past is dead, long live the constitutional memorial, 
viva! But what of the dead? Especially when they arise at awkward moments? 
Furthermore, what would the role of imagination and the memorial be beyond the 
transition of 1994-1996, and indeed, following the ten-year honeymoon period of 
constitutional transformation? Has the jurisprudential influence of memory, the 
constitutional topography of transition, been exhaustively mapped by the cartographies of 
the Constitution and post-Constitutional legal texts? This is the question to which legal 
and ethical debates arising from the Prestwich Place and a larger post-1994 landscape of 
cultural memory are made to respond.  
                                                          
159 Dissenting judgment of Kriegler J in President of RSA v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC), para [74]. 
160 Goldstone in Hugo, para 41. 
161 Per Sachs in S v Lawrence; S v Negal; S v Solberg 1997 10 BCLR 1348 (CC), para [147]. 
162 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC); 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) at para [218]. 
163 Makwanyane at para [391]. 
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Prestwich Place captures a certain political zeitgeist, to admit a pun in bad taste. 
Aside from national and global resonances alluded to earlier, similar claims also animate 
a more expansive landscape of unnamed burials that has begun to emerge over recent 
years in the Cape164. Most recently, a dispute has erupted over the Tana Baru, parts of 
which had fallen into the hands of private owners who wish to develop the land. A fatwa 
has been issued by the Muslim Judicial Council (MJC) forbidding development of the 
land165, although there have previously been varying opinions issued by Islamic 
universities166. The key issue remains the significance of what is not so much intangible 
but buried sacred heritage, even as gentrification in a rapidly growing city threatens not 
just burial sites but the rest of the surrounding culturally significant area, the Bo Kaap167. 
Similar development has been prevented by legal action at the Oudekraal kramats168.  
At ‘The Woods’, an area next to St Cyprians School and at the foot of Table 
Mountain, a protracted dispute evolved between 1998 and 2000 when oral histories 
conflicted with archaeological evidence about the significance of the site. The school 
wished to develop the area, yet members of the MJC claimed that beneath the earth lay 
the sacred burial site of Sayed Abdul Malik. While the archaeologist employed by the 
school failed to find evidence of the kramat, customs and oral histories attested to 
traditional significances of the place to worshippers169. A negotiated agreement to 
embark on a heritage project at the site was finally reached; yet elsewhere other events 
continue to question the claims of archaeology and other methods of historiography. This 
year, a sangoma alleged she could identify the burial sites of chiefs on Robben Island 
after dreaming about them in the Eastern Cape170. In Simons Town, a search for the 
                                                          
164 An overview is given by Noëleen Murray ‘On remembering and forgetting: sites of memory in post 
apartheid Cape Town’ Architecture South Africa 2004; also Antonia Malan ‘“Noises off …”: claiming a 
central role in reinterpreting South African cities’ Architecture South Africa 2004; Antonia Malan, Noëleen 
Murray and Ulrike Rivett ‘Managing heritage – mapping ‘sacred sites’ in Cape Town: a collaborative 
approach’ paper presented at the Southern African Association of Archaeologists Biennal Meeting (Cape 
Town, 7-10 July 2002). 
165 Muslim Judicial Council Fatwa Committee, fatwa, issued 8 March 2005; see also Marianne Merten 
‘Muslim council issues fatwa against property development’ Mail & Guardian 1 July 2005. 
166 For example, the opinion of Azhar University Dispensation Committee, issued 14 November 1979, which 
states that building is allowed where remains have ‘disintegrated’. See also the opinions contrary to the 
MJC fatwa mentioned in Marianne Merten ‘Muslim council issues fatwa against property development’ 
Mail & Guardian 1 July 2005. 
167 John Reed ‘Booming real estate prices cloud the view from the top’ Financial Times 29 July 2005. 
168 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and others 2004 3 All SA 1, also reported as 2004 (6) 
SA 222 (SCA). 
169 Unpublished papers of Abdulkader I Tayob, Mary Patrick, Anthony Haggie and Auwais Rafudeen, on file 
with the Cultural Sites and Resources Forum, University of Cape Town. 
170 Personal conversation with Tim Hart, March 2005. 
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kramat of 17th century political exile from Sumbawa has been prompted by the sighting 
of his ghost, and has provoked debates about the merits of archival evidence and oral 
histories that are equivocal about whether he had ever arrived in the Cape171.  
Like the dead, these sites of burial and exhumation proliferate, typically causing 
controversy and contestation on their surfacing. But Prestwich Place makes a particularly 
eloquent cartographer of the topography of transition, because of the magnitude of the 
space implicated, its historical significance, its location in the heart of the city (at least in 
terms of property values), and the time of its emergence, as if an omen, shortly prior to 
the sometimes violent confrontations over space and identity that would take place in 
Cape Town in the year 2005. Addressed by claims to place/space, memory and justice, 
Prestwich Place is a site located at the intersection of discourses of cultural property, 
urban planning, and transitional justice.  
Yazir Henri and Heidi Grunebaum, two activists involved with the Prestwich Place 
struggle and with broader landscapes of memory in the Western Cape, argue that the 
discovery of the Prestwich Place burial ground disrupts a post-Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) reality in which ‘mourning … has become both depoliticised and 
increasingly psychologised’172. The TRC was established after South Africa’s first 
democratic election in order to provide some sense of closure for the traumatised national 
psyche173. Yet focus on individual memory and trauma has placed the project of truth and 
reconciliation in a therapeutic paradigm even as experiences of ongoing hurt and 
marginalisation bring the past into the present, exceeding discourses of memory as 
trauma and exacerbated by the lack of reparations174. 
                                                          
171 Unpublished papers and correspondence of Ebrahiem Manuel, on file with the Cultural Sites and 
Resources Forum, University of Cape Town. 
172 Yazir Henri and Heidi Grunebaum ‘Re-historicising trauma: reflections on violence and memory in 
current-day Cape Town’ (unpublished paper, 2004). 
173 This psychotherapeutic metaphor is apt, given, for example, the psychobiographical introspection of 
Antjie Krog’s description of the proceedings of the TRC in Country of my skull (London: Random House, 
1999). See also the account by psychologist Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela A human being died that night. A 
story of forgiveness (Cape Town: David Philip, 2003). Psychotherapy also informed the comment of Albie 
Sachs, made before the establishment of the TRC, when he had encouraged the establishment of 
something named the ‘commission of truth and repair’! See Sach’s comments recorded in Alex Boraine, 
Janet Levy and Ronel Scheffer (eds) Dealing with the past: truth and reconciliation in South Africa (Cape 
Town: IDASA, 1994) 129. 
174 Christopher J Colvin ‘“Brothers and sisters, do not be afraid of me”: trauma, history and the therapeutic 
imagination in the new South Africa’ in Katharine Hodgkin and Susannah Radstone (ed) Contested pasts: 
the politics of memory (London: Routledge, 2002). 
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For Grunebaum and Henri, the claiming of Prestwich Place is an act of memory that 
disrupts the official amnesia of ‘nation-building-as-reconciliation’175. By this, they refer 
to how the TRC, as Grunebaum has said elsewhere, has underwritten a discourse of 
reconciliation which discerns ‘admissible from inadmissable forms of historical 
consciousness and representations in the domains of the public’176. The TRC’s 
establishment was a product of negotiated settlement, and marked by compromise. The 
moral calculus of transition was a simple if relatively novel one: retribution would be 
foregone in exchange for the truth about apartheid’s violent history. A public process 
opening out into catharsis, the narration of grief and, hopefully, remorse and forgiveness 
would then clear the path to reconciliation.  
Yet if the TRC has been unable to achieve enduring reconciliation, it is because, as 
Mahmoud Mamdani had already pointed out in 1997, its hearings and Report narrated 
apartheid as a history of the few, of perpetrators and individual victims, rather than as a 
history of the many, of beneficiaries and shared victimhood177. What has been left out, 
the violence of the everyday and the continuities of the colonial past, is ‘unfinished 
business’ in the words of Terry Bell and Dumisa Ntsebeza178. In Cape Town this 
structural legacy is visible in the planning of the urban built environment and experienced 
through the popular racial imaginary. Derrida would later warn that forgetting was the 
very purpose of the TRC179, but it is from Mamdani and other critics that we can learn 
the specific terms upon which this forgetting happened.  
The TRC became like the archive of which the postcolonial theorist Achilles Mbembe 
warns:  
Archiving is a kind of interment, laying something in a coffin, if not to rest, then at least 
to consign elements of that life which could not be destroyed purely and simply. These 
elements, removed from time and from life, are assigned to a place and a sepulchre that is 
                                                          
175 Ibid. 
176 Heidi Grunebaum ‘Invisible synchronicities, the “new” and the politics of time’, (unpublished paper, 
c2004). 
177 Mahmood Mamdani ‘Reconciliation without justice’ (Nov/Dec 1996) 46 Southern African Review of Books 
3; also Mahmood Mamdani ‘A diminished truth’ in Wilmot James and Linda van de Vijver (eds) After the 
TRC: reflections on truth and reconciliation in South Africa (Cape Town: David Philip, 2000). 
178 Terry Bell and Dumisa Buhle Ntsebeza Unfinished business: South Africa, apartheid and truth (Cape 
Town: Redworks, 2001). 
179 Jacques Derrida ‘Archive fever’ (seminar given at University of the Witwatersrand, August 1998, 
transcribed by Verne Harris) in Carolyn Hamilton, Verne Harris, Jane Taylor, Michele Pickover, Graeme 
Reid & Razia Saleh (eds) Refiguring the archive (Cape Town: David Philip, 2002); see also Ciraj Rassool, 
Leslie Witz and Gary Minkley ‘Burying and memorialising the body of truth: the TRC and national heritage’ 
in Wilmot James and Linda van de Vijver (eds) After the TRC: reflections on truth and reconciliation in 
South Africa (Cape Town: David Philip, 2000). 
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perfectly recognisable because it is consecrated: the archives. Assigning them to this 
place makes it possible to establish an unquestionable authority over them and to tame 
the violence and cruelty of which the ‘remains’ are capable, especially when these are 
abandoned to their own devices.180  
 
Mbembe’s words echo those of others who have described the TRC as a ‘paradox … 
of history’s simultaneous exhumation and burial’181, and are at the same time a striking 
reminder of Prestwich Place and the revenants who emerge, uncalled, from the absences 
and silences of the state’s archives. If there is an ethical fulcrum upon which these issues 
turn, it is how we deal with our past. 
The critiques of the TRC and its approach to transitional justice then also provide a 
framework in which to address the articulation of sites such as District Six and Prestwich 
Place. These sites, and the broader emerging cultural landscape that they represent, are 
claimed as the ‘unfinished business’ of transitional justice, markers on a cartography of 
incomplete political transformation. Occupying central and prominent spaces in the city, 
as well as places of desire in the plans of development capital, these places speak to the 
continuity of racial stratification and the haunting presence of the past. They prompt us to 
think about forms of descendancy, genealogies of proprietorship, and histories of 
citizenship, and remind us that we need to reconceptualise received ideas of identity, 
belonging and the civic. But mostly what these sites present to us are archaeological 
potentialities, places where excavation might unearth the relationships between the 
memory of the past and the juridical self.  
Transitional justice, as an institutional and discursive field, is concerned with 
societies in transition between totalitarianism and democracy and how they deal with the 
leaders of the old regimes and the perpetrators of the past. It is an attempt to unearth the 
truth and lay ghosts to rest, one that simultaneously exhumes and buries. The question of 
transitional justice is also two-fold, in that it is at once an epistemological question and an 
ethical question. ‘How should we remember the past?’ is a question of what we 
remember, and what we ought to do with that memory: remember, forget, prosecute, 
forgive, etc.  
                                                          
180 Achille Mbembe ‘The power of the archive and its limits’ in Carolyn Hamilton, Verne Harris, Jane Taylor, 
Michele Pickover, Graeme Reid & Razia Saleh (eds) Refiguring the archive (Cape Town: David Philip, 
2002) at 22. 
181 Rassool, Witz and Minkley (note 179) at  116. 
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Paul Ricoeur has described how transitional justice forums confuse the roles of 
historian and judge182. While the judge approaches the past in order to deliver an 
adjudication that is final, the historian knows her narration of the past will be open to 
constant revision and critique. This influences the method by which they go about their 
work, their visions of understanding the past, until ‘one can wonder whether the judge 
and the historian hear testimony, that initial structure common to both roles, with the 
same ear’183. The trials of transitional justice often confuse the roles of judge and 
historian, where judgments are entered as historiographical works, and historians work 
under the pressure of conformity to a judicial verdict.  
Yet the institutions and discourses of transitional justice are not only concerned with 
historiography and adjudication, but become vehicles for collective remembrance184. If 
the historian is concerned with history, and the judge with adjudication, then it is the 
citizen who is concerned with collective remembrance, as the imagination of what 
constitutes citizenship185. The citizen has a memorial gaze, looking back upon the work 
of judge and historian in order to form his own opinion as ‘the ultimate arbiter’186. It is in 
this sense that the TRC’s shaping of public memory can also be seen as concerning itself 
deeply with the formation of citizenship, as can the remembrance of the cultural 
geographies discussed so far. The next chapter will argue that it is recognition, as an aim 
of the work of memory, that links the commemorative project and the juridical subject. 
 
                                                          
182 Ricoeur Memory, history, forgetting (note 154) at 314ff. 
183 Ibid., 322. 
184 Mark Osiel Mass atrocity, collective memory, and the law (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1997). 
185 Benedict Anderson Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism (New York: 
Verso, 1991). 
186 Ricoeur Memory, history, forgetting (note 154) at 333. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Ethics of Memory and Silence 
 
a. speaking of the dead  
The dilemmas of Prestwich Place are inflected with silence. There is a resonant silence 
that can be discerned first in the silence of the bones themselves, in the absent testimony 
of the dead, and so profoundly echoed by the namelessness of their bodies. 
The silence of the bones is a silence of the archive, which resonates also in the 
contemporary discourse of the living. It sounds in the inability of descendants to claim or 
accept the remains as ancestral, and in their unwillingness even to do so. There is the 
silence that is produced by the technical legislative requirement of ‘direct descendancy’, 
but it is in some sense a more primordial silence that is simply reproduced by this 
language. There is also the echo of a difficult but intimate silence in the Prestwich Place 
Committee’s Sunday evening vigils; these were a moving expression of commitment by 
its members to the remembrance of the dead, yet nevertheless failed to attract much 
popular support, even to a site of such profound political and spiritual significance.  
As we continue to confront anonymity and failed recognition, silence proliferates in 
the wake of the exhumation of the dead. The politics of memory instituted by the 
Prestwich Place Committee’s activism opposes those who would make the bones speak 
by the methods of archaeology and anthropometry187. In April 2005 a meeting convened 
by SAHRA and the Prestwich Place Committee denied two University of Cape Town 
graduate students permission to study the bones for the purposes of thesis research and a 
broader anthropometric project.  
There have been at least three shades of objection to SAHRA’s decision188, and an 
understanding of what is common to them will indicate an avenue for further thought. 
Firstly, there are claims that the Prestwich Place Committee’s position obfuscates a 
                                                          
187 The naming of the disciplines which would engage in study of the bones – archaeology, forensic 
anthropology, anatomy – reveals an institutional politics and a politics of knowledge that is entirely 
relevant to the current discussion, but is not discussed here because of the usual constraints. 
‘Anthropometry’ will be used, as if it were a term of art, to refer to these related disciplines that would draw 
conclusions from the study of human bones. ‘Professional’ or ‘practical’ archaeology will refer to any 
excavation that has as its purpose the unearthing of remains or artefacts, including exhumations. 
188 These objections have been heard in various forms in personal discussions. 
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legitimate scientific research project, that the bones are legitimate subject matter for 
science, and that scientists have some legal or ethical right to study the bones. This is an 
appeal to law and the legitimacy of scientific method, and even to their natural mutuality. 
While such a claim may well derive legal support from the Constitutional right to 
freedom of scientific research189, it is not yet clear what this right will support or how it 
would be shaped by the limitations analysis190. It is not the purpose of the current 
discussion to to engage in legal positivist analysis, especially in the absence of prior 
jurisprudence191.  Ethically, this objection  raises even more interesting questions about 
the scientificity and invasiveness of specific anthropometric methods, and whether these 
methods are tainted by the colonial history referred to in Chapter One. Given the 
possibility of conflicting versions of history told by anthropometry, historiography, oral 
tradition and popular mythology, the question of methodological licence must also be 
understood as a question of who has the (ethical) right to speak for the dead and of the 
dead.  
Related to this question of the right to speak is the second type of objection: that the 
Prestwich Place Committee do not have a legitimate claim to accurately represent the 
descendant community, and thus have no legitimate authority to influence scientific 
access to the remains. This objection adds that without further study we will never know 
who the descendants truly are; and so implies that Prestwich Place Committee’s claims to 
represent the descendant community will never be valid until study of the remains has 
                                                          
189 Section 16(1)(d) of the Constitution grants the right to ‘academic freedom and freedom of scientific 
research’. 
190 Section 36 of the Constitution allows that such a right may be limited by a law of general application, ‘to 
the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including – 
a) the nature of the right; 
b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
Should scientists’ access to the Prestwich Place be deemed to fall under the right to freedom of scientific 
research, section 36 of the NHRA, which sets out the authority of direct descendants to direct the 
reinterment of human remains, would qualify as a law of general application and thus a possible limitation 
upon the constitutional right.  
Descendants might find assistance in the s 15 right to freedom of religion, belief and opinion, and the s 10 
right to dignity. That the remains are not regarded as property by the NHRA means that the s 25 right to 
property would not assist descendants who wish to prevent scientific research. Chapter Three further 
discusses conflicts between the right to property and the right to freedom of religion, belief and opinion. 
191 There has been little analysis of the right and no jurisprudence. For an application to a topical medico-
legal problem see Jerome Amir Singh ‘Freedom of expression: The constitutionality of a ban on human 
cloning in the context of a scientist’s guaranteed right to freedom of scientific research’ 1999 (62) THRHR 
577, who claims that the right questions ban on the ban on genetic engineering contained in s 39A of the 
Human Tissues Act 65 of 1983.  
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named the nameless. But this argument must first recall all that has already been said 
about the technical language that requires ‘direct descendancy’ and the difficuties of 
memory and imagination that are invoked in the present context. Moreover, the second 
objection could be said to mistake the role of the Prestwich Place Committee, to the 
extent that it claimed descendancy instrumentally and is more appropriately described as 
an interest group. Their claim to authority is then not based on a claim to descendancy 
but on their advocacy of a particular interest in the site and remains. The question then is 
not who may speak for the dead, but what is to be said of them. How, and of what are the 
dead made to speak? 
The third type of objection leads from this, and is expressed in the puzzlement and 
frustration of those who, claiming a benevolent interest in the bones, insist that the 
forgotten and suppressed histories of the people buried at Prestwich Place will be lost to 
present and future generations without anthropometric study. Again, not who has the 
right to speak for the dead, but how are the dead themselves to be heard? The fear of this 
objection is that the namelessness of the nameless dead will remain unalleviated. This 
fear of silence crucially highlights a contradiction within the activist position, which 
deplores the silence of the dead but is at best equivocal about how to alleviate it.  
It seems indisputable that anthropometry could provide some form of knowledge 
about the silent dead192. At the same time there is the historical complicity of the 
anthropometric disciplines with the morbid colonial histories mentioned in the first 
chapter, and a fear that these disciplines continue to be invasive, dehumanising and 
colonial193. There is the fear that a certain sanctity of silence will be violated by a 
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discipline that has not assessed its complicity with the colonial project194. Which silences 
are appropriate to remembrance, and which to forgetting? Are the histories of the 
unspeaking dead to remain silent, or the complicities of disciplinary knowledge? 
The current impasse at Prestwich Place can be phrased in terms of these difficulties of 
silence and memory. Is there an ethics of silence? This is not simply a question of an 
excavation of the dark Foucauldian archive but, more and less than this, a question of 
practice and profession. Who may profess to speak for the dead at Prestwich Place? What 
practice may allow itself to break an ancestral silence? Understanding the potential roles 
of anthropometric disciplines requires a deep theoretical exegesis of their methods and 
assumptions, a Foucauldian excavation even, that is not possible here. The present 
chapter attempts merely to situate that enquiry in an ethical framework that asks how to 
respect the silence of the nameless dead, and upon what conditions that silence may be 
broken. What, it asks, is the ethical significance of silence in the context of the 
remembrance of the dead? 
b. enigmas of memory 
What, first of all, is the relation between ethics and memory? The first chapter has 
located Prestwich Place in a chronotope195 of unfinished political transformation and a 
cartography of transitional justice. The crucial questions addressed at this site-in-time are 
those of ethical memory and remembrance: what ought to be remembered? Who should 
remember? How should we remember? What is the relationship between silence, memory 
and forgetting? How to respond to the profound silence of the unnamed dead?  
Given the current enthusiasm for memory, not only in South Africa but globally and 
following the infamous atrocities of the  20th century and the early 21st century196, it 
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might seem hard to deny the ethical imperative of remembrance. Yet this is too simple; 
the nature of memory is far too enigmatic to imagine that ethical remembrance is a 
simple duty.  
There are four aspects to this enigma of memory and remembrance.  
Enigma 1: Memory and Image 
Firstly there is the enigma of memory itself. Since the Platonic discourses of memory as 
image or impression, a tradition continued by empiricism and phenomenology, 
philosophy has been confronted with the aporetic nature of memory as the presence of an 
absence. Descriptions of memory as the re-presentation or re-presentification of the 
absent past raise a double question of how absence is made presence and anteriority is 
made present.  
Paul Ricoeur claims this difficulty as the aporia common to the phenomenology of 
memory, the epistemology of historical representation, and the historicity of the human 
condition197. The difficulty for phenomenology becomes one of distinguishing between 
memory and imagination, exacerbated by the empiricist tradition’s reliance on the notion 
of memory as image. This difficulty of confusing memory and image, the possibility of 
‘remembering’ what has never happened, follows memory into testimony, into the 
document, the archive, and so on into historiography and all our attempts to know the 
past198.  
The ambiguous relation between memory and image speaks already from one of 
Plato’s accounts of memory, given in the course of a Socratic dialogue about sophistry 
and false argument. The presence of memory, despite the absence of the thing 
remembered, is enigmatic: Socrates’ solution is the wax block, gift of Mnemosyne 
(Memory), ‘the mother of the Muses’, and placed inside the soul. Upon this wax block is 
made an impression, and it is this image, eikōn, that presents itself to us when we 
remember199. Memory, described in these terms, is an aporia of presence and absence; 
yet in the Sophist, Plato will complicate the distinction between the absent thing and the 
present thing. In the Sophist, the Stranger is discussing sophistry with Theaetetus, and 
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compares it to the art of portrait making. He divides this art in two: one art, tekhnē 
eikastike, produces the the eikōn or likeness, while the other produces phantasma, the 
semblance or simulacrum200. But the distinction encounters difficulties, since the likeness 
is a copy, lacking ‘real existence’ although it ‘really is what we call a likeness’. 
Concludes Theaetetus: ‘[r]eal and unreal do seem to be combined in that perplexing way, 
and very queer it is.’201  
While the Platonic discourse acknowledges the paradox of presence and absence, it 
does not discuss that essential feature of memory upon which Aristotle insists: ‘to 
remember the future is not possible … nor is there memory of the present … But memory 
relates to the past’202. In the title of his meditation on memory, Of Memory and 
Reminiscence, Aristotle makes use of a Greek linguistic distinction between a passive 
form of memory, mnēmē, denoting the memory spontaneously evoked, and an active 
form, anamnēsis, reminiscence or recollection, which involves an active search for a 
memory. This distinction evokes the enigma of memory: presence, which comes 
unbidden with mnēmē; and absence, that which frustrates anamnēsis.  
How is it then that memory can re-present what is absent? Is memory presence or 
absence? ‘One might ask how it is possible that though the affection [the presentation] 
alone is present, and the [related] fact absent, the latter – that which is not present – is 
remembered’203. Again the metaphor of an impression is used: ‘[t]he process of 
movement [sensory stimulation] involved in the act of perception stamps in, as it were, a 
sort of impression of the percept, just as persons do who make an impression with a 
seal’204. But the enigma remains: ‘when one remembers, is it this impressed affection that 
he remembers, or is it the objective thing from which this was derived? If the former, it 
would follow that we remember nothing which is absent; if the latter, how is it possible 
that, though perceiving directly only the impression, we remember that absent thing 
which we do not perceive?’205 This would imply the possibility of ‘remembering’ that 
which was never present to us; thus arises the difficulty of distinguishing memory and 
imagination. ‘A picture painted on a panel is at once a picture and a likeness: that is, 
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while one and the same, it is both of these, although the ‘being’ of both is not the same, 
and one may contemplate it either as a picture, or as a likeness’206. The mnemonic 
phenomenon is to be distinguished as a likeness; but eikōn still runs the risk of being 
mistaken for phantasma. 
In Aristotle’s account, what is common to the two forms of memory, mnēmē and 
anamnēsis, is temporal distance207. This relation to time – that is, that memory is of the 
past – also distinguishes the memory-image from the image of that which has not 
happened. This relationship to time, that memory is memory of something previously 
perceived, means that ‘remembering, as we have conceived it, essentially implies 
consciousness of itself.’208 For it is possible for the mind to evoke an image and mistake 
it for a memory; yet we do not remember without being conscious that the memory is a 
memory. Memory bears the mark of anteriority.  
Drawing on this Platonic and Aristotelian heritage, it is possible to describe the 
enigma of memory in terms of a dialectic of presence and absence, mediated by temporal 
distance. The temporal element distinguishes memory from imagination. According to 
Hobbes, ‘[f]ancy and memory differ only in this, that memory supposeth time past, as 
fancy does not’209.  
In contrast, Mary Warnock disagrees that a simple feeling of ‘pastness’ can be used to 
distinguish memory and imagination, since memory must be invoked in order to 
experience the pastness of an image210. Plato’s paradigm of the memory-image, memory 
as  wax block or as eikōn, haunts every philosophical engagement with memory. There is 
for Warnock a general characteristic of images and representation; that is, that images are 
not simply images but images that refer to what they are images of. ‘It is as if every 
picture had to declare to us, as we look at it, what it is a picture of’211. Here again is 
Aristotle’s question: do we, in remembering, perceive the impression or the seal that 
made it?  
Warnock therefore reaches for an understanding of memory based on recognition: in 
order to remember correctly, rather than imagine, yet another work of memory is required 
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to recall the anteriority which is supposedly remembered. This work of memory in 
relation to memory is better described as the work of recognition; it is the re-cognising of 
the anteriority referred to by the memory-image. The past is made present by recognition. 
What exactly is the past that recognition makes present? It is past cognition. Thus it is 
better to restate the mnemonic phenomenon as a sort of knowledge than as the perception 
of an image. ‘Happy’ memory – recognition - is a knowledge that contains in itself the 
past, rather than an image referring back to the past.  
For Sartre too, memory need not rely on images, but is of the real: an event, once it 
has happened, does not become unreal but goes ‘into retirement; it is always real but 
past. It exists past, which is one mode of real existence among others’212. Sartre’s 
recollection is a form of time travel: ‘[w]hen I recall this or that memory I do not call it 
forth but I betake myself to where it is, I direct my consciousness to the past where it 
awaits me as a real event in retirement’213. Memory is not ‘given-in-its-absence’ but 
‘given-now-as-in-the-past’214.  
For Ricoeur the necessity of rescuing memory from a tradition that couples it with 
imagination lies in the need to argue that imagination is aimed at the fantastic, the 
possible and the unreal, and memory at elapsed reality215.  Yet recognition only describes 
a certain ideal of regaining the past. Even when conceived of as knowledge, memory 
encounters difficulties, for it must distinguish between experience and other sources of 
knowledge. One might ‘remember’ seeing an event that one has in fact only read about. 
Knowledge is itself imagined in this case.  
Yet this persistence of the image and imagination can be helpful, since it leaves us 
with the possibility of the creative work of reimagination mentioned in the preceding 
chapter. Reimagination productively uses the overlap of memory and imagination. For 
Warnock, it is the coincidence of memory and imagination that produces narrative truths 
such as autobiography: ‘[t]he value we attach to recollection is understandable at 
precisely the point where memory and imagination intersect’216. This is where the human 
capacity for remembrance, as a sort of narrative work, exceeds merely knowing again 
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one’s times tables and grocery lists. Recognition is, after all, an ideal of ‘pure’ memory, 
and an ideal is something sought after but seldom captured. Reimagination might then be 
something which takes into account remembrance’s desire for perfect recognition, but 
works with and even revels in its slippages and impossibilities. 
Enigma 2: The Persistence of Forgetting 
Jorge Luis Borges’ Funes el memorioso tells the story of a man with perfect memory, 
whose mind is ‘like a garbage heap’. Funes does not see a wine glass on a table but 
‘every grape that had been pressed into the wine and all the stalks and tendrils of its 
vineyard’217. The recollected moment in all its details takes up every waking moment of 
life, displacing the present and allowing for no sense to be made of experience. This 
cautionary tale would show us how unthinkable memory without forgetting is.  
This deep relationship between memory and forgetting is another enigmatic aspect of 
memory and remembrance. Marc Augé’s book Oblivion points out poetically how 
memory and forgetting are intimate and complicit: the traces of memory are ‘the product 
of an erosion caused by oblivion. Memories are crafted by oblivion as the outlines of the 
shore are created by the sea’218. They are like life and death: death is the horizon of life, 
but also takes on a ‘more subtle and more everyday meaning’219. In the same way 
oblivion defines and is a part of memory and remembrance. ‘Memory is a structuring of 
forgetting’, concurs Ricoeur on this entanglement220; or, in the memorable words of 
Verne Harris, memory and forgetting ‘open out of each other’221.  
Recall and recognition only occur after forgetting; and so we can never be sure 
whether we have ‘really’ forgotten. ‘So late did I recognize you, is the emblematic 
admission of all recognition … If a memory returns, this is because I had lost it; but if, 
despite everything, I recover it and recognize it, this is because its image had 
survived’222. Ricoeur introduces a second type of forgetting to explain this persistence of 
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memory, which he calls ‘forgetting in reserve’223. It is after all a mystery whether we 
ever forget absolutely: ‘[t]his uncertainty regarding the essential nature of forgetting 
gives the search [anamnēsis] its unsettling character’224, as if we are seeking whether the 
memory has been effaced forever or only temporarily. We can only suppose that it lies in 
this ‘forgetting in reserve’. 
What then is memory, if it is so bound up with forgetting? How do we navigate their 
waves and erosions? ‘So late did I recognize you…’ If memory and forgetting exist only 
in counterpoint to each other, then it is best that we learn something from their 
movements. It is recognition that identifies the ideal of this complicity of memory and 
forgetting; for in striving for recognition one attempts to move from forgetting to 
memory.  
Enigma 3: Involuntary Memory 
The complicity of memory and forgetting reminds us that both are involuntary. Memory 
is spontaneous, as is forgetting: this is what frustrates the notion of a duty to remember. 
Even if one were obliged to remember a birthday or a stranger’s face, one might 
conceivably forget it without fault of the will. Often the greater the will to remember, or 
to forget, the more likely the opposite result is achieved.  
Does this difficulty obstruct all possibility of an ethics of memory? It may be wrong 
to begin with the assumption that an ethics of memory relies on obligation or 
responsibility to remember. Agamben describes responsibility as ‘irremediably 
contaminated by law’225. Following an etymology of the word and its appearance in 
ancient Roman law, Agamben finds reponsibility to be rooted in the juridical, and not the 
ethical:  
in the [ancient Roman] promise of marriage, the father would utter the formula spondeo 
to express his commitment to giving his daughter as wife to a suitor (after which she was 
then called a sponsa) or to guarantee compensation if this did not take place. In archaic 
Roman law, in fact, the custom was that a free man could consign himself as a hostage – 
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that is, in a state of imprisonment, from which the term obligatio derives – to guarantee 
the compensation of a wrong or the fulfilment of an obligation.226
Both obligation and responsibility are then at root juridical notions, delimited by 
these gestures of imprisonment and judgment of culpability: ‘[h]ence the insufficiency 
and opacity of every ethical doctrine that claims to be founded on these two concepts’227. 
Remembrance is thus more properly the object of the juridical duty and its gestures of 
judgment and binding. Ethics aims at the good life, and no duty to remember can produce 
‘good’ memory. Instead demands upon memory are juridical, and imply a juridical 
technology, a tekhnē of memory, a way to imprison memory and to sponsor mnemonic 
debts. 
Thus the involuntariness of memory and forgetting induces us to leave the realm of 
individual memory and consider how memory is captured in writing, in archives, in 
memorials – all the devices of mnemotechnics and forms of hupomnēsis; and also in 
collective works of remembrance, in which one relies upon others to assist in the task of 
memory. 
More can be said of collective memory, which can be regarded as assisting us against 
the involuntariness of memory. Is this not part of the purpose of anthems, religious 
rituals, commemorative festivities, and the monuments of nations? Avishai Margalit, for 
example, describes a ‘shared memory’ which is more than the mere statistical 
aggregation of individual memories, but instead ‘integrates and calibrates the different 
perspectives of those who remember the episode … into one version’228. This integration 
of this collective work of memory is based on communication, with the work of 
remembering being ‘built on a division of mnemonic labour’229. Memorial objects and 
rituals play a key role in this scheme of sharing. In modern societies the division of 
mnemonic labour is elaborate, says Margalit, as there are no direct lines between a people 
and their shaman or storyteller: ‘shared memory in a modern society travels from person 
to person through institutions, such as archives, and through communal mnemonic 
devices, such as monuments and the names of streets’230. 
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Collective memory is spoken of so regularly in the popular domain that it may be 
surprising to stop for a moment and ask whether such a thing actually exists. Or, since an 
idea with such great popular tenacity must correspond with some strongly held belief 
about social experience, it may be more productive to rephrase the question and ask 
whether collective memory is really memory, or whether it is metaphor or analogy. 
It was Maurice Halbwachs who first introduced the notion of collective memory, 
influenced by Durkheim’s new sociology and its urge to investigate the collective 
psychology. Halbwachs hypothesised that collective memory and individual memory 
were interconnected, and attacked the ‘psychologism’ which proposed that individal 
memory is the basis of recollection and recognition. Most memories, he said, ‘come back 
to us when our parents, our friends, or other persons recall them to us.… it is in society 
that people normally acquire their memories. It is also in society that they recall, 
recognize, and localize their memories’231. Thus the experience of individual memory 
could have no existence outside of ‘social frameworks of memory’. In those times in 
which the individual is outside of these social frameworks – dreaming, for example – his 
experience is fragmented and disorganised because he can no longer rely on social 
frameworks of memory, which act as systems of conventions232.  
This conception of collective memory is more radical than Margalit’s. The past is not 
preserved in something called individual memory at all, but ‘is reconstructed on the basis 
of the present’233, using collective frameworks of memory. What Halbwachs implies is 
that the subject who remembers is collective. Indeed, the very idea of a collective 
memory must question notions of subjectivity, since the notion of personal memory 
assumes a model of individual interiority234. Halbwachs instead argues that ‘[i]t is 
necessary to place oneself in the perspective of the group or groups’235. Yet group 
boundaries are porous and shifting, and it is notoriously difficult to define collective 
identity. How are we to identify the subject of collective memory? 
                                                          
231 Maurice Halbwachs On collective memory (trans Lewis A Coser) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1992) 38ff. 
232 Ibid.,  39, 41-42. 
233 Ibid., 40. 
234 Ibid., 168. Ricoeur remarks that for the phenomenological tradition, individual memory ‘is a model of 
mineness, of private possession’ (Memory, history, forgetting (note 154) at 96). 
235 Halbwachs (note 231) at 40. 
 60
Halbwachs provides three candidates for this collective subject who remembers: the 
family236, the religious group237, and the social class238, and acknowledges that there are 
other groups. Yet the questions of boundaries and identity remain239. Perhaps it is better 
to conceive of the collective subject as being formed by the act of remembering, rather 
than preceding it. This is a dynamic conception of the ‘we remember’, in which the 
‘remembering’ and the ‘we’ are fashioned in the same activity – rather than reifying the 
subject by assuming that it arrives, perfectly formed, at the task of remembering. Doing 
the latter reduces the idea of a collective memory to what Margalit had called ‘common 
memory’: the mere aggregation of individual memories240.  
The power of the notion of collective memory is instead that it has a life of its own, 
and is deeply linked to the creation of the very collective that remembers. There is an 
interesting comparison to be drawn here with the psychoanalytic concept of the ‘chosen 
trauma’. More than the trauma experienced by an individual, chosen trauma is 
experienced by a group in a certain uniform manner. The experience generates a group 
affective response, and this becomes a mark of collective identity. ‘One could say, in fact, 
that no individual event took place that resulted in a trauma, and that the trauma is indeed 
only an affect resulting from group identification (whether individually willed, or 
imposed externally).… The chosen trauma, or the event qua event, takes on a particular 
resonance for the history of the people, their most deeply felt cultural affiliations and 
anxieties, and collective symbols of a community’ 241. The formation of a traumatised 
collective is bound up with the formation of the traumatic affect, rather than there being a 
simple memory-event correspondence. To venture a generalisation of the concept, 
perhaps the act of remembering and the creation of the remembering subject might be 
viewed as simultaneous too, so that there is no simple relation of priority between 
memory and subject.  
Ricoeur’s solution of these problems is, as usual, elegant and dialectic. Memory can 
be placed in a dialectic of ‘reflexivity’ and ‘worldliness’, since one always remembers 
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oneself acting in the world242. Edward Casey’s phenomenological account of memory 
names these poles of worldliness and reflexivity as ‘memory in mind’ and ‘memory 
beyond mind’243. Between these poles lie other ‘mnemonic Modes’: reminding, 
reminiscing, recognizing. Reminding makes use of clues in order to aid recollection. 
Reminiscing is an activity engaged in with others, or internalized as a meditation with the 
self, which, unfolding, seeks to reanimate the past. Recognizing is all important, as it 
identifies the anterior presence of the memory-image. Recognition, that ideal which 
Ricoeur likens to a ‘small miracle’244: here again is the recurring theme of our 
confrontation with enigmatic memory, and the anterior absent made present. One might 
venture to say that collective memory has no other goal than individual recognition of the 
collective subject. Recognition forms not only a bridge between presence and absence, 
past and present, but also the remembering individual and the remembering collective. 
Just as recognition provides the link between our own memories and the collective, 
we also recognise what we have saved from faulty personal memory by all the techniques 
of hypomnēsis – memorials, archives, writing. These things are even essential, as 
Margalit has said, for the workings of the collective memory. But this invocation of 
hypomnēsis leads to the fourth enigma. 
Enigma 4: Hypochondriac Memory245
The work of remembrance is susceptible to an ambivalence of hupomnēsis – an 
ambivalence of artificial memory, of memorials and archives – that is related to the 
ambiguity of the pharmakon that Derrida points out in Plato’s discussion of writing. The 
Phaedrus records Socrates telling the story of how the god Theuth, inventor of writing, 
presented the Egyptian king Thamus with his gift of writing, saying:  
‘Here, O king, is a branch of learning that will make the people of Egypt wiser and 
improve their memories; my discovery provides a recipe (pharmakon) for memory 
(mnēmē) and wisdom (sophia)’ 246. 
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The ambiguity that is introduced is inherent in Plato’s use of the word pharmakon, 
which can mean either remedy or poison247. The king objects:  
‘ … If men learn this, it will implant forgetfulness in their souls; they will cease to 
exercise memory because they rely on that which is written, calling things to 
remembrance no longer from within themselves, but by means of external remarks. What 
you have discovered is a recipe not for memory, but for reminder. …’248  
Is writing then a remedy or a poison of memory? In fact, these meanings operate at 
the same time: Plato is supicious of medicine, and there can be no simply beneficial 
remedy. The remedy can be painful in its administration; and more profoundly, is 
harmful in its artificality249. Derrida compares the ambivalence of the pharmakon in the 
Phaedrus to that of the hemlock given to Socrates, also named pharmakon in Plato’s 
Phaedo. Here the pharmakon is intended as Socrates’ poison; but before drinking the 
hemlock Socrates spends the day arguing for the immortality of the soul. He at last bids 
that an offering be made to Asclepius250: this was the Greek custom to be followed on an 
ill person’s recovery251. Thus the poison becomes a remedy: the pharmakon ‘is 
transformed, through the effects of the Socratic logos and of the philosophical 
demonstration in the Phaedo, into a means of deliverance, a way toward salvation, a 
cathartic power’252. Is it not the case that we believe writing, archives and memorials to 
be a recipe for immortality in this way, and also a sort of catharsis in the face of 
mortality? 
The gif/t of writing is thus both remedy (pharmakon) and poison (pharmakon). As 
such it aims at hupomnēsis rather than mnēmē253; it offers a primordial hupomnēsic 
dialectic of memory and amnesia254. This hupomnēsic dialectic must also inflect our 
understanding of the memorial, the archive, and every other form of hupomnēsis. In this 
way too it can be said that there is a ‘victory of the scriptural at the very heart of the 
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250 Plato Phaedo 118; (trans Hugh Tredennick) in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. Edith Hamilton and 
Huntington Cairns (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961). 
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memorial’255 – as hupomnēsis they both take part in the dialectic of remedy and poison, 
memory and forgetting. Here is ‘the irreducible link between thought as memory and the 
technical dimension of memorization, the art of writing, of “material” inscription, in 
short, of all that exteriority which, after Plato, we call hypomnesic, the exteriority of 
Mnemon, rather than that of Mnēmē.’256
How then do we live with the enigma of the memorial, which helps us to forget as 
much as to remember? Just as the memorial encourages us to forget what we have 
carefully captured in its form, we are also able to return to it. What is crucial in this 
movement towards the memorial, in the approach one adopts in nearing it for the second 
time. As Socrates remarks, written words cannot ‘do anything more than remind one who 
knows that which the writing is concerned with’257. A familiar theme has arisen. We are 
again concerned with recognition as the ideal movement of the dialectic which frames 
our latest enigma. If the hupomnēsic dialectic can be said to move towards an ideal, then 
it is that of the return to knowledge, a move towards the recognition of that of which the 
mnemonic aid would remind. Recognition’s idealism supposes that the memorial is just 
an exterior reflection of another, interior, sort of memorial, or of a knowledge that is 
‘written in the soul of the learner’258, an archive-without-archive, an archive-within259. 
Recognition and Transformation 
Aiming at recognition provides us with ways of living with the aporetic nature of 
memory that begins with the impossible presence of anteriority and absence, and persists 
even into the ambivalent structure of our monuments and archives. 
Recognition also provides the aim for a praxis concerned with memorial ethics. 
Michael Lambek regards memory as intersubjective and active, in a way that reminds of 
what was said earlier about collective memory between the reflexive and the worldly. 
This memory is not the object that tourism brochures advertise for our collection on 
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foreign beaches, nor is it the video camera passively left running260. It is rather an act; it 
is manifest in actions between subjects and it works to reconstitute social contracts. 
Memory exists not so much as an object within the mind, but rather ‘between people, a 
confirmation of the sense of continuity (caring) and discontinuity (mourning) that each 
person experiences in their relations with others, and likely acknowledged by additional 
parties’261. This vision of remembering is explicitly ethical, for it implies that memory is 
constantly ‘reformulating […] social ties and commitments. The value of articulating a 
particular version of the past would be explicitly connected to its moral ends and 
consequences for relations in the present’262. 
Remembrance, considered as knowing-again, as aiming at the ideal of re-cognising 
the past, must pay more attention to the actions of living memory than to the vain erection 
of monuments. And, if the ethical imperative is always to extend ethical bonds to others 
and so to enlarge the ethical community, then the work of memory calls for the 
proliferation of recognition263.  
Such a praxis of recognition is transformative, as it engages in reconfigurations of 
memory and forgetting. It is possible to look at the various enigmas mentioned so far for 
clues to this transformative praxis. The first enigma, for example, inspires the idea of a 
re-imagination that engages in this reconfiguration of memory and forgetting. The 
problems of the memorial, on the other hand, inspire us to think about archives-within, 
and the sustenance of living memory. These are merely first gestures; in them lies a 
tantalising glimpse of the possibility of theorising transformation, a concept that is so 
important to the political discourse of our ‘new’ nation and so intriguing because, like so 
many of our political concepts, it hints at a theology of transition and an eschatology of 
memory264.  
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More provocatively, here is a prescription for how participants in the debates around 
Prestwich Place might approach the issue in a way that respects ethics and memory. The 
implications for anthropometric disciplines, memorial activism, and state intervention 
flow from the concern to engender recognition and transformation. The following section 
attempts to make these implications clearer. 
c. unspeaking silence 
Knowing and Protesting The Negative 
What of the recognition of silence? How do we know-again the silent past? Is it not 
precisely silence that defeats recognition?  
Silence and memory cannot be discussed without recalling what has been said about 
the representation of the Shoah265. It is necessary then to import these crucial debates266 
even while refusing absolutely to say anything comparative about trauma and the events 
of history. Auschwitz presents us with ‘the very aporia of historical knowledge: a non-
coincidence between facts and truth, between verification and comprehension’267.  
The Shoah is often spoken of as a historical event at the limit, and these limits of are 
two-fold. First, there is an exhaustion of the available resources of representation to 
adequately articulate the event at the limits. Yet at the same time, there is an ‘internal 
limit’, that is the demand to speak that arises before discourse from the centre of the 
atrocity268. The silence of the event at the limits is an unbearable one, for it must be 
spoken of, at the same time that it cannot be spoken of. This silence might therefore be 
characterised as an ethical-epistemological silence, described by the ‘impossible 
adequation of the available forms of figuration to the demand for truth arising from the 
heart of lived history’269. For it is exactly this confrontation, between the epistemological 
impossibility of ‘the available forms of figuration’ on the one hand, and the ethical 
‘demand for truth’ on the other hand, that results in the silence. 
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Therefore it is not correct to view the unrepresentable nature of the Shoah as a failure 
of historiography. The silence is instead an ethical, even theological protest. The silence 
of the Shoah marks an inability to provide an explanation in the face of trauma and 
radical evil. Here it is necessary to borrow from Ricoeur the idea of the attestation-
protestation, the testimony of the witness that is also a protest against God270. She who 
bears witness to the atrocity also asks why, as if questioning the existence of God or of 
the Good, but is greeted only by silence. Perhaps it is this silence that is always at the 
core of remembered suffering, a silence not so much of doubt or blame as of the 
awareness of negativity. Silence, as the echo of this pure ethical-epistemological 
negativity, should not be easily filled. It denies representation rather than simply being 
incapable of it. 
The silence of this deep protest, and its denial of representation, can be regarded as 
justifying an approach such as that of Lawrence Langer, who believes that narrative is 
incapable of representing the atrocity of the Holocaust, and that it offends the victims by 
its attempt271. This kind of silence has therefore pervaded monumental and memorial 
discourses. One example is the architecture of the Jewish Museum in Berlin, where the 
silence is echoed spatially by the ‘voids’ that run through Daniel Libeskind’s design272. 
Here the void becomes a productive mnemonic source, rather than a masking: ‘[i]ts very 
presence points to an absence that can never be overcome, a rupture that cannot be 
healed, and that can certainly not be filled with museal stuff’273. The void is a 
‘fundamental epistemological negativity’ that ‘cannot be absorbed’274 – and yet in its 
negativity is more meaningful than anything that might replace it. 
Silence That Speaks and Unspeaks 
The possibility arises then that silence can be a mnemonic and ethical response in itself, a 
recognition of some core truth, some ‘fundamental epistemological  negativity’. Yet, 
even while affirming this possibility, it would be simplistic to separate silence from its 
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context. It is more helpful to differentiate between articulate silence and inarticulate 
silence, or even to describe silence as a dialectic of the articulate and the inarticulate.  
Silence is articulate when it speaks. The acknowledgement of silence in the face of 
the unspeakability of the Shoah is articulate in this way. This silence is articulate because 
it speaks eloquently of the unrepresentable. Here is the namelessness of that which has no 
name, like the silence of God or Good or even of Evil itself. Silence is the only and most 
articulate way to acknowledge even while refusing to name the absence. Yet the only 
way to be sure of this silence is to have attempted to name that which cannot be named, 
and to have failed. This silence follows much speaking, and is a sort of recognition, at 
last. 
There is another sort of namelessness; this is not the namelessness of that which 
cannot be named, but follows the forgetting or the effacement of the name. This kind of 
silence is inarticulate, because instead of some ‘fundamental negative epistemology’ it 
speaks only of its own inarticulacy. It does not further recognition, but frustrates it; it 
doesn’t follow attempts to speak, but obstructs speaking. It is not the silence of the full 
stop, pregnant with the weight of the unspoken, but of the ellipsis that breaks up the 
attempt to find words.  
The frustration of remembrance at Prestwich Place mostly has to do with inarticulate 
silence, the silence of names that have been left out of the archive. The ethical response is 
the same as that which psychoanalysis recommends interminable mourning: a work of 
naming. To the extent that the silence represents some fundamental negativity, it will 
evade attempts to name it. Those silences which exist only because no attempt has been 
made to name them echo only the ‘desperate silence of chaos’275. 
Is there then an ethics of silence? Should silence be recognised and remembered? The 
ethical silence is that in which memory is recognised. Returning to lessons learnt from 
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the representation of the Shoah, competing approaches to representation take place 
between the poles of singularity and exemplarity. On the one hand, the disenchanted, 
non-narrative approach seeks to establish the unrepresentable singularity of the event. 
This approach seeks the recognition of the victims. On the other hand, the enchanted 
narrative, whether Maus or Schindler’s List, aims at exemplarity. This exemplarity is one 
which can relate history to those who were not present. In locating an ethics of narrating 
the traumatic event, one might do best to seek the ‘proper tension between our fidelities 
to the uniqueness and communicability of memory’276. One wishes to be silent, to respect 
the singularity of the event, yet one wishes also to recognise the exemplarity of the event. 
In fact this dialectic of singularity and exemplarity governs the relating of the event; for 
to mediate memory between victim and stranger concerns the establishment of an ethical 
relation. The always imperfect work of representation must make its way guided by this 
ideal of the ethical relation, that is, the recognition of the other. 
This dialectic presents itself also as the difficulty of the unnamed dead. The singular 
silence of a site such as Prestwich Place cries out to be preserved, even as the nameless 
demand naming. Herein awaits the difficult task of reconciling (for example) 
historiographical and anthropometric methods that would read and name silent vestiges 
and the work of memorialisation that would preserve the articulacy of silence. This work 
of memory and of reconciliation – of transformation even, for all participants – stretches 
toward the horizon of an ideal recognition to come277. 
(d. postscript on archaeology and the trace: how to inhabit the archive 
The question of naming has been raised. When the preceding thoughts were presented to 
a seminar audience, one participant asked just what kind of naming anthropometry is able 
to perform; he was cynical that, in the light of its history, techniques and language, it 
would be capable of a humanising work of naming278. Now, as then, the author is able to 
produce no argument for or against what is a timely and indeed urgent question. What 
precedes has been intended as an ethical framework for advancing an answer. Further 
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arguments about specific technologies must be left to those who have more specialised 
knowledge. 
But the question of naming haunts; thus this note. Here there has been time to add 
only these few words about one particular name. In a debate that has too frequently been 
characterised as being about ‘archaeology’, it is tempting to ask what exactly archaeology 
is; or, much rather, what it might be. (Recall that the decision was made earlier on to use 
the term ‘anthropometry’ rather than archaeology – itself a dangerous decision given 
historical usages of the former word – to describe those disciplinary projects and 
techniques that concern themselves with the material remains of dead human bodies). 
Archaeology, it seems, has become a metaphor, and a particularly rich one in the case 
of Prestwich Place, where there are different candidates for archaeological work. In the 
events and debates provoked by Prestwich Place, actual digging encountered the 
metaphorical excavations of knowledge formation and of collective and individual 
psyches. Practices of professional archaeology, the actual excavation of earth, were 
immediately summoned by the heritage legislation, even as the legitimacy of the 
discipline’s immediate access to the unnamed dead was questioned. Indeed, this criticism 
of ‘scientific’ archaeology is informed by a homonymic, Foucauldian archaeology and its 
suspicions that the discipline ‘carries within itself the traces of its own formation as a 
field of knowledge construction, and as a material practice rooted in specific historical 
and political contexts’279. What is urged by Foucault’s spirit is an archaeology of 
archaeology. And furthermore, beckoning from the discourses of transitional justice and 
its unfinished business, is psychoanalysis’ excavation of memory, the Freudian 
archaeology of the psyche280.  
There is a need for a thorough excavation of what these archaeologies share; here 
there is only room for a few pressing thoughts. These archaeologies are of course 
heterogenous projects, yet their sharing in the same name seems to indicate at least 
figuratively similar motivations for reading traces of the past. Digging, especially for the 
dead, is an introspective project; perhaps this is what attracted Freud to archaeology as 
model and metaphor. The work of excavation aims at the thrill of discovery, but also the 
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thrill of the dig itself. For Walter Benjamin, this is the probing pleasure of introspection 
and inward reminiscence:  
He who wishes to approach his own buried past must act like a man who digs…. and he 
who only keeps the inventory of his finds, but not also this dark bliss of the finding itself, 
cheats himself of the best part. The unsuccessful search belongs to it just as fully as the 
fortunate search. This is why memory must not proceed by way of narrative, much less 
by way of reports, but must, rather, assay its spade, epically and rhapsodically in the most 
rigorous sense, in ever new places and, in the old ones, to delve into ever deeper 
layers.281  
 
Yet this visceral thrill of the dig finds a response in an equally deep fear, since the act 
of ground-breaking is a violent one, as can be the archaeologist’s gaze and the 
archaeologist’s work of naming. The fear of archaeology is that it works to objectify the 
subject, by taking the trace not as testimony but as symptom. The ‘symptomatic reading’ 
or the reading of clues, as described by Carlo Ginzburg, is an age-old tradition that goes 
back to the earliest practices of tracking and divination, and that came to a kind of 
systematic prominence in the work of Sherlock Holmes, Freud and art historian Giovanni 
Morelli 282. What was common to all these symptomatic readings was ‘an attitude 
oriented towards the analysis of specific cases which could be reconstructed only through 
traces, symptoms, and clues’283. Today the symptomatic reading animates forensics, 
pyschoanalysis, semiotics, and all the forms of reading traces. Yet the difference between 
trace and testimony is crucial: ‘[t]he clue is noticed and decrypted; testimony is deposed 
and criticized’284. Practical archaeology, Freud’s excavation of the psyche, and the 
Foucauldian archaeology of knowledge may be heterogenous, but share at least in the 
obsession with the surfacing of the past’s hidden archive. The very fact that this archive 
is hidden means that it must be read symptomatically, as symptom rather than as 
testimony.  
Is there then an archaeology capable of a humanising work of naming? In the 
archaeologist’s gaze the remnant of the subject would seem to be an unresponsive object, 
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a desubjectified subject. The preoccupation with cryptology effaces the possibility of a 
speaking subject. This is most evident in Foucault’s archaeology, dehumanising indeed in 
his explicit intention to efface ‘Man’285. Could the psychoanalyst who does not hear the 
analysand, or the anthropometric archaeologist who does not listen to the descendants of 
the dead, be said to be dehumanising too, even intentionally so?  
But why should testimony be valorised over clue and symptom? The two are distinct 
but complementary: for ‘internal to the notion of the trace’, remarks Paul Ricoeur in his 
usual reconciliatory fashion, is the ‘dialectic of clue and testimony286. The trace of 
writing is an adequate illustration for now. Writing records testimony, or rather, it 
attempts its very best to record the inscription of testimony; whereas the stroke of 
writing, its kinetic making, is not testimony but clue, which when decrypted can tell us 
about the moment and conditions of testimony’s inscription. Writing is then both 
testimony and clue. And of course it is with writing that these distinctions crucially break 
down, for is the testimony that writing inscibes not better named clue? And isn’t every 
trace that is not a sign of testimony used in the attempt to fill writing’s silence, to guess at 
the testimony that hides behind writing? 
For our purposes, another objection surfaces. What of absent testimony? When 
subjects can no longer bear witness, we are left with only clues. One illustration 
immediately avails itself, a vivid image of a work of excavation that transgressed the 
boundaries of all the heterogenous archaeologies mentioned so far. Berlin’s Active 
Museum group, described in Karen Till’s account of places of memory in the new 
Berlin287, was a response to the state planned transformation of the Martin Gropius Bau 
in the early 1980s. The area was on the fringes of pre-unification West Berlin, and once 
at the centre of the administrative headquarters of the Third Reich’s terror apparatus. A 
protest action took place in the form of a ‘Let’s Dig’ excavation in 1985, a complex 
symbolic and material excavation of the ‘Gestapo Terrain’:  
activists questioned officials’ use of the landscape as evidence of national history, at the 
same time that they symbolically dug for traces (Spuren) from the past. Their goal in this 
protest action was not to interpret or cite the landscape objectively as a historical object 
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but rather to resituate and recombine texts, signs, things, and locations, and create new 
meanings, new opportunities for the future.… Operation Let’s Dig spatially relocated the 
landscape through historical maps, collages, texts, and bodily performances. The dig 
created a different material present and presence through the excavation of “forgetful” 
history.288  
 
Here was an archaeology that was simultaneously a Freudian excavation of the 
repressed memories of the Nationalist Socialist past; a Foucauldian archaeology of the 
genealogies of urban place;  and at least a simulation of the actual practice of professional 
archaeology. It was finally, and harking back to some of the suggestions made earlier in 
the present work, aimed at ‘re-imagination’ rather than discovery. Activist pressure 
evetually led to formal excavation of the site and the unearthing of the foundations of old 
Gestapo prison cells and administrative buildings. These remnants have become the site 
of the ongoing development of the Topography of Terror, an interactive memory centre 
that also leaves the unearthed remnants as an “open wound” in the German psyche289. 
Besides this apposite image of a multi-disciplinary archaeology, what will detain us 
for a little while longer are the notions of Spur and Zeugnis. As Till explains, the Spur 
describes a material trace, a clue; while zeugnis is a trace of a more juridical nature, it is 
evidence or the testimony of an eyewitness (Zeuge)290. (The Spur will of course remind 
of the spoor (animal tracks), and thus of Carlo Ginzburg’s primordial symptomatic 
reading, the hunter’s gaze). The Spur is what one digs for:  
Only people who arrive at a scene or search out a place find Spuren: the act of discovery 
constitutes their meaning as material traces. Detectives, historians, archaeologists, and 
forensic specialists and other experts who work with archives, fragments, and sites, for 
example, reconstruct past actions, such as criminal acts, through traces.291  
Such spuren ‘also imply secrecy’; thus the younger generations of Germans (and 
perhaps those who took part in Operation Let’s Dig), confronted with the silent 
complicities of their parents, have ‘assumed the role of detective in their search for the 
truth’292. These young detectives, enacting a sort of forensics of transitional justice, ‘also 
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felt the moral duty to prosecute, to use the Spuren as Zeugnisse’293. To make the trace 
into testimony and even eyewitness: here is a vision of a humanising archaeological 
gesture. 
 
Similarly, it is the unavailability of testimony that Giorgio Agamben sees at Auschwitz in 
the figure of the so-called Müsselman, the prisoner who bore the worst of the atrocity of 
the camp and did not survive it. Who would dare speak for this pathetic figure? Poets, 
Agamben seems to say. Agamben has in fact tried to make of ‘desubjectification’ the 
most selfless act of testimony294. Like Foucault, Agamben also believes that it is 
language and not the subject that is capable of speaking295. Thus the subject is 
desubjectified in ‘the simplest act of speech’296. Yet this persistence of desubjectification 
means that it contains the potential for a superbly humanising act. In Agamben’s 
description of testimony one can, through desubjectification, bear witness for another’s 
suffering. But this is the desubjectification that the poet experiences or that of glossolalia. 
Finally, it is a matter of inhabiting the archive in a new way: 
to bear witness is to place oneself in one’s own language in the position of those who 
have lost it, to establish oneself in a living language as if it were dead, or in a dead 
language as if it were living – in any case, outside both the archive and the corpus of 
what has already been said.297
The details of a humanising archaeology are still to be worked out. In this project lies 
the possibility of survivors’ recognising of the dead298. Several possibilities have been 
mentioned already: multi-disciplinary, poetic (in Agamben’s sense that emphasises 
poiēsis), reimaginative (in the sense mentioned in Chapter One). All involve a particular 
orientation towards the archive, even a way of occupying it.  
Perhaps this is one way to distinguish the archaeologies mentioned by Edward Said in 
his Freud and the non-European, in which he refers to how (anthropometric) archaeology 
has been used both as a scientistic base for national ideology, and brought into the service 
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of a liberation struggle as evidence of a living indigenous tradition299. Theirs is a disunity 
of purpose: one archaeological practice uses facts to substantiate identity and rationalize 
the nation’s founding myth, while the other is a practice which challenges archaeology 
‘so that those “facts” and the practices that gave them a kind of scientific pedigree are 
opened to the existence of other histories and a multiplicity of voices’300. Recall all that 
has been said here about silence: what is necessary is for an archaeology that make the 









                                                          
299 Edward W Said Freud and the non-European (London: Verso and Freud Museum London, 2003) 45ff. 
300 Ibid., 50. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Mapping the Heterotopic: Law and the Sacred, from Res 
Religiosa to Heritage Resource 
 
a. res religiosae reformed 
Much has been said so far about memory and haunting in politics and ethics, but little 
about law. The rhetorical weight of precedent in legal practice, the constitutional 
monumentalism mentioned in the first chapter, and also well known theories of the 
hermeneutics of law, especially Dworkin’s vision of a Herculean spirit that haunts the 
law301, would seem to endorse the opinion that ‘[c]onstitutionalism is arguably a strong 
form of ancestor worship’302, and law with it. What is still missing is an enquiry into law 
and laws. This chapter therefore ask one specific, almost positivist question: how does 
the law treat the resting place of the body after death?  
As with any legal question there is a short answer, which in a case such as Prestwich 
Place must take the form of a referral to the provisions of the National Heritage 
Resources Act; and there is a long answer, full of the intrigues and confusions of 
doctrinal history and paradigmatic conceptual shifts, but no longer as clear on the 
implications for the rights and duties of contemporary legal actors. The latter answer is 
attempted here, in the belief that it will also illuminate the relationship of law and the 
sacred site. 
Res Religiosae in Roman Law 
It is necessary to start with the law of the Romans, whose respect for tomb and grave303 
has been both followed and betrayed by our law. In the old sources we find that the 
ancient Romans regarded the grave as a hallowed thing in law, a res religiosa. What is a 
res, a ‘thing’, in law?  Maasdorp wrote that ‘[t]he term property (res) is applied in law to 
everything which can be the object of a right, that is, everything with respect to which 
                                                          
301 Ronald Dworkin Law’s empire (London: Fontana Press, 1986). 
302 John E Seery Political theory for mortals. Shades of justice, images of death (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1996) 31. 
303 The Romans held ‘unusally high respect’ for the tomb. Neville Cloete ‘Res religiosae en die stigtingsfiguur 
– ‘n histories ondersoek na die juridiese aard en konstitusie van die sogenaamde religieuse sake in die 
Suid-Afrikaanse reg’ 1986 Transkei Law Journal 147 at 151 speaks of ‘die buitengewone groot eerbied 
wat die Romeine vir die menslike graf en begrawing gekoester het. Hierin was die Romeine nie uniek nie, 
aangesien eerbied vir begrawing en die menslike graf in die oudheid ‘n byna universele verskynsel was.’  
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one person may be entitled to a right and another person to a duty’304. Voet stated simply 
that a thing is an object of which the law takes cognisance305. And yet numerous debates 
have turned on this matter of definition306, for example whether there is such a thing as 
an incorporeal thing307.  
A contemporary definition might ultimately accept a thing as ‘a corporeal object 
external to man which is an independent legal entity susceptible to private ownership and 
valueable and useful to mankind’308. Yet this definition already excludes res extra 
commercium. The distinction between res in commercio (things which are susceptible of 
ownership) and res extra commercium (things not susceptible of ownership) was Roman 
law’s primordial classification of things309. Justinian’s Institutes distinguished between 
things capable of being owned (in nostro patrimonium) and things not capable of being 
owned (extra nostrum patrimonium)310. According to Voet’s interpretation of the Roman 
law, the distinction to be made is between res in commercio as things susceptible of 
ownership, private or public, and res extra commercium as things that were not 
susceptible of ownership at all311.  
Roman law further divided res extra commercium into res omnium communes, things 
common to mankind by virtue of natural law, such as the air and running water312; res 
publicae, public things, belonging the state but intended for use by the public, such as 
roads and rivers313; and res divini iuris, things of divine law, dedicated to and of the 
gods314. These things belong to no-one, because they belong to heaven: Nullius autem 
sunt res sacrae et religiosae et sanctae: quod enim divini iuris est, id nullius in bonis 
est315. Voet sums the scheme up: 
Things are said to be either somebody’s or nobody’s. Things again which belong to 
nobody fall either under human or under Divine law. Those which are nobody’s and 
                                                          
304 A F S Maasdorp Maasdorp’s Institutes of South African Law Volume II The Law of Property 9th ed [1903] 
(Cape Town: Juta & Co, 1971) 1. This definition raises substantial problems within the classification of 
things into corporeal and incorporeal, but this must be overlooked for now.  
305 Voet Elementa juris 2 1 1: Res est omne id de quo ius dicitur.  
306 See C G van der Merwe ‘Things’ in WA Joubert (ed) The law of South Africa (Durban: Butterworths, 
2002) (hereafter Lawsa) vol 27 (first reissue) §§ 204 et seq. 
307 A study of contemporary discourses of tangible and intangible patrimony in the context of these 
defintional debates immediately suggests itself, but must be postponed for the usual reasons. 
308 Lawsa vol 27 (first reissue) § 205. 
309 Lawsa vol 27 (first reissue) §§ 211-12. 
310 I 2 1.  
311 Voet Commentarius 1 8 1. 
312 I 2 1 1-5. 
313 I 2 1 6. 
314 Lawsa vol 27 (first reissue) § 217. 
315 I 2 1 7. 
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which fall under human law are those things said to be common by the law of nations. 
Things falling under Divine law are either things properly falling under that class, namely 
things sacred and hallowed; or falling into it by a sort of analogy, that is, things inviolable 
by law. Things which are somebody’s are either in the public ownership of many persons, 
or in the private ownership of individuals.316  
 
Let us briefly refer back to the issue of definition: what sort of thing is a thing? In 
Roman law, Thomas wrote in his well known Textbook of Roman Law, ‘the law of things 
comprised the objects and contents of a person’s estate’317. It is, he adds in a footnote, 
‘the law of patrimony’318. Compare this with Voet’s thing, which is any thing of which 
the law takes cognisance. Here, with our interest in the things of divine law, we wish to 
concern ourselves with this law of patrimony only insofar as it defines objects outside of 
its patrimonium and outside of its power. The potential for confusion, echoed by 
contemporary debates about definition, is evident: if a thing is something which the law 
recognises, then can a thing be that which the law recognises it does not recognise? How 
is law to name this ‘thing’, without bringing it under its power by naming it as such? The 
res divini iuris finds itself between two laws, between the human and the sacred, both 
inside and outside the law. 
 
Passing on from this difficulty of locating the anomaly within law’s nomos: there were 
three sub-categories of res divini iuris: res sanctae319, res religiosae, and res sacrae. 
Before Christianity, res sacrae (sacred things) were ‘dedicated to the gods above’ and 
included temples, basilicas, altars, sacred groves and sacrifices; res religiosae were left to 
the gods below320. Res sacrae were to be consecrated by public law321. In Christian times 
the law was suitably adapted: Justinian notes that res sacrae could only include ‘those 
properly consecrated to God by the bishops, holy churches, for instance, and gifts duly 
dedicated to the service of God’, and did not include something which an individual tried 
                                                          
316 Voet Commentaries 1 8 1. 
317 J A C Thomas Textbook of Roman Law (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company, 1976) 125. 
318 Ibid 125 note 2. 
319 Res sanctae, which will not be discussed here, were not consecrated to the gods but protected by the 
gods. They included such things as the Roman city walls and gates, the limes. They fell under divine law 
‘in a certain sense’, as if by analogy (G II 8: Sanctae quoque res, velut muri et portae, quodam modo divini 
iuris sunt. Also D 1 8 1, 8-9; I 2 1 10). 
320 G II 4: Sacrae sunt, quae diis superis consecratae sunt; religiosae, quae diis Manibus relictae sunt. 
321 Gaius had said that in order to be sacred land must be consecrated ‘by authority of the Roman people, by 
a statute on the matter, for instance, or by a Senate resolution’ – G II 5, also D 1 8 6. 
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to make sacred322. They remained unsusceptible to ownership: such things could not be 
alienated or pledged, except to redeem captives323. In fact the sacred nature of a thing 
was persistent: the ground upon which a sacred thing stood remained sacred even though 
the building itself might be destroyed324. 
While a res sacra had to be consecrated, anybody could ‘by his own will’ make a 
place religiosus through interment of a corpse325, if burying it on his own ground326. Res 
religiosae were dedicated to the gods below327, and included tombs and graveyards. Res 
religiosae were outside of commercial activity, so long as certain conditions were met, 
for mere interment of a corpse did not automatically make a place religiosus.  The burier 
had to be the one with the responsibility of burying the body328. One could bury on 
another’s land provided one had consent of the the landowner, or he ratified the burial 
after the act, in which case the place still became religiosus329. Yet where a body has 
been buried on another’s land without their consent, it did not create a locus religiosus330. 
Only the place occupied by the body and its tomb, or the area taken up by a burial place 
destined for further burials, became religiosus331.  
All three forms of res divini iuris were not susceptible to ownership332, and so if all 
the above conditions were met, then interment of the body made the place extra 
commercium; thus, ‘if a field were sold in part of which a body had been buried, the field 
was automatically reduced in size to that extent’333. Although nobody could own a burial 
place, title to it could be passed on to heirs.334 A place near or adjoining a sepulchre was 
not religiosus, and could therefore be alienated335. At one point an empty tomb had been 
believed to be religiosus, but a rescript was issued to the effect that a cenotaph – a 
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334 C 3 44 4. 
335 C 3 44 4, 9. 
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monument to the memory of a deceased but containing no remains – was not 
religiosus336. 
What then about moving an entombed body?  Justinian’s Codex records Emperor 
Antoninus’ edict allowing a subject to remove the remains of his son to another place if 
the remains ‘should be threatened by the waters of a river, or any just and necessary 
cause should arise’, and with the consent of the Governor of the Province337. A corpse 
could also be removed if it were ‘not permanently committed to the tomb’338. But in 386 
it was proclaimed that ‘No one can transfer a human corpse from one place to another 
without permission of the Emperor’339.  
Sepulchri violatio, the violation of a tomb, was reviled, and any person who 
committed this act was branded with infamy340. An interdict quod vi aut clam was 
available against demolition of a sepulchre, or of a monument attached to a tomb341. An 
actio popularis was also available against someone who violated a tomb342, which meant 
that any member of the public could sue343. However the action fell first to the person 
who owned the land344. The action was also available against someone who lived in a 
sepulchre or had a building on the ground above it345. The violation had to be committed 
with malicious intent346. However, since enemy sepulchres were not considered 
religiosae, no crime was committed in relation to them347. 
The crime was also regarded as falling under the lex Julia relating to public violence, 
which prohibited anyone from preventing the interment of a corpse348. Punishment for 
this reviled crime was of the strictest order: he who removed bodies or bones would face 
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capital punishment if of low rank, or otherwise be sent into exile or condemned to the 
mines349. The armed despoiler of dead bodies faced capital punishment350.  
Death and Reformation in Roman-Dutch Law 
Voet, that Dutch jurist most commonly referred to by South African courts,  follows 
Roman law faithfully in his commentary on res religiosae: a place is religiosus if the 
dead body of a human, free or slave, or the main portion of it, that is, the head, has been 
interred there for its eternal abode351. Voet accepted that it was the bones themselves that 
were religiosi: a cenotaph – an empty tomb or monument erected to those buried 
elsewhere, or whose bodies are missing – was not religiosus352. The burial had to be on 
the burier’s land, or else consent had to be obtained from the landowner or co-owner 
(unless the co-owner himself was to be buried)353. Burying a body in a place in which 
one has no right means that the place will not be religiosus354, but this does not mean that 
the rightful owner of the land may exhume the bones, except with the authority of the 
Emperor or the Pope: ‘[t]his is because the very removal of the bones embraces in itself 
something of a religious nature’355. And yet the one whose right has been infringed is 
allowed an action against the burier for the removal of the bones, or for the price of the 
ground or vault356. 
In Voet’s view, res religiosa could be alienated for a just cause357; and it could be 
sold together with land, that is, ‘as an accessory to the sale of something larger’358. This 
was on condition that the thing continued to be used for its hallowed purpose359. Res 
religiosae were extra commercium: ‘just as the place becomes hallowed – not wholly, but 
to the extent to which the body has been put under the sod, or the place marked off as 
hallowed – so also it starts to be withdrawn form the commercial dealings of 
mankind’360. Yet despite the fact that the res religiosa was not susceptible to ownership, 
there was a sense in which the burier had title to the buried: ‘in so far as we have the right 
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of interring a dead person in our tomb it is in that sense said to be ours, and everyone is 
said to inter the dead in his own place’361. There is here a sense of ‘quasi-proprietorship’, 
indeed a right of sepulture and a right to inter the dead that could be passed on to heirs, 
and even sold to others though the nature of the place remained religiosus362.  
Voet also regarded res religiosa as acceding to the larger land, so that if the land were 
sold the sepultural place would be sold with it, unless a term to the contrary were 
included in the agreement of sale (in which case a right of way to the locus religiosus 
would also be preserved for the funerary visitor)363. The place ceased to be religiosus if 
the remains had been removed by the command of the Pope or Emperor364. 
Voet recognised the action for arising from the violation of a tomb, that had been 
given in the Lex Julia on public violence365. Damages were based not on the enrichment 
of the one who violated the tomb, nor on the loss which resulted, but instead on the insult 
caused366. This act of violating a tomb, Voet reminds us, was ‘regarded not as a trivial 
but as a most heinous affront, nay a very monstrosity of crime to disturb the rest of 
deceased persons’367. A prohibitory interdict also forbade the use of force against one 
who was interring a dead body where he had the right to inter368. The interdict was to be 
given so as to avoid the delay of a full hearing, as the matter of a funeral was regarded as 
urgent. In addition to this lay a second reason for the availability of the interdict, that is, 
the law’s ‘favour shown to religion and to dutifulness, as well as to the public interest, to 
the end that corpses may not lie unburied. This favour is so great that sometimes in 
doubtful questions of religion we are wont to pass over and make light of the strict reason 
of the law, since a reason which works on behalf of religion is the highest of all 
reasons’369. 
Yet against Voet’s religiosity and faith in the Roman Law authorities, other Roman-
Dutch commentators differed markedly on whether the Roman res religiosa was still 
recognised by the law of Holland. Thus Grotius wrote that: 




364 Voet Commentarius XI 7 6. 
365 Voet Commentarius XI 8 1. 
366 Ibid.  
367 Ibid. 




In relation to man many writers have distinguished things as belonging to God 
(res divini juris) and belonging to men (res humani juris); and under things 
belonging to God the Romans included dedicated things (res sacrae), the graves 
of the dead (res religiosae) and the walls of the cities (res sanctae): but upon a 
careful examination it will be found that all these things belong to men, but for 
separate uses; and what is more, nothing is so completely appropriated to God 
but that one often sees it converted to other uses …370
 
Some properties belonged to a ‘smaller community (minder gemeenschap)’ and were 
indeed to be applied to specific uses371; thus churches and things associated with them 
were for sacred uses and might be property common to a parish372; while burial places 
were for ‘the service of the dead (den dooden-dienst)’ and belonged to the people of the 
town or parish or to certain families. However some burial places belonged to individuals 
and could be left to heirs or sold inter vivos; however they remained to be used only for 
the purpose of burial373. Such things that were for the use of specific purposes were to be 
put to those uses only, unless a change were permitted by the provincial or local 
authority374. 
Groenewegen remarked that things formerly sacred and consecrated to God were now 
subject to commerce, as were sepulchres:  
Formerly sacred buildings or temples were with due ceremony consecrated by 
the bishops to God. But this does not obtain by our customs, nor is any sanctity 
attributed to the buildings themselves by our people; so that to-day they belong, 
not to no-one, but to the body or person who built them, and modern sepulchres 
which are in temples, are possessed by right of dominium, and at the will of the 
possessor can be alienated.375  
 
This meant also that bodies could be reinterred more freely, requiring not the 
permission of the emperor or priests, but merely ‘the ordinary judge of the area, or also 
… the overseers or wardens of the churches (kerckmeesters)’376. 
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Huber also failed to accept that the Roman classification of things as sacred and res 
nullius could be a part of the law of his time, for ‘it is certain that according to the simple 
rule of the Christian doctrine nothing is in itself sacred, except the word of God and the 
seals of the covenant in our Lord Jesus Christ’377. Nor could graves be said to be 
sanctified, but were instead ‘the private property of individuals or societies, although we 
may owe graves a certain kind of reverence, or something of that kind, on account of the 
memory of the dead and the expectation of the resurrection’378. 
For Van Leeuwen too, the idea of res nullius as things which can ‘in no way be 
brought under the dominion of anyone’ that is, churches, tombs and the walls of towns, 
no longer obtained; ‘for since the Reformation we have so far departed from it that we do 
not attach any veneration to the mere churches themselves’379. This applied also to 
tombs, which were ‘possessed by us with full right of ownership, and may be sold or 
encumbered by the true owner as his own property’380 Indeed, given the fading of such 
‘superstititon’,  ‘we ought long since to have begun to establish cemeteries beyond the 
city’ due to the the illnesses which proximity to the dead might bring381.  
Van der Linden also found the practice of burying the dead in temples, in the city, or 
generally near the living to be ‘impermissible’, due to the harmfulness to health of the 
‘exhalations’ from the grave. In any case, he noted: 
[the] cause of such an observance is to be mainly found in superstition; as though 
we Christians who profess the reformed religion are ashamed to have reposed our 
faith in it! It cannot be that we believe there to be anything religious in having 
tombs in churches. It cannot be that we believe that the intercession of the saintly 
departed, which was the reason why the ancient Christians desired to be buried 
near their tombs, avails to have any result on the securing of our eternal 
salvation.382
 
Why this change, given that many of the Roman texts had been written or compiled 
during Christianity? There had of course been a sea change of religious doctrine. The 
Reformation had made itself felt in Holland in the mid-16th century, with ‘religious 
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freedom’ being declared in 1572. With the public practise of Roman-Catholicism banned 
in 1580, the Roman Church had lost its authority and all things fell under worldly 
political authority383.  
Yet paradoxically, the violation of a tomb was still recognised as wrongful by the 
Roman-Dutch commentators384. For Groenewegen at least it seemed to have lessened in 
heinousness: thus the penalty stipulated in the Digest was not to be applied, but was 
instead to be ‘of a discretionary nature’385. Much of what Justinian’s Codex said on the 
violation of tombs Groenewegen declared obsolete or no longer observed; although it 
remained the case that ‘no impediment must in any way be placed in the way of burying 
the bodies of deceased persons’386. And the authority of the Roman tradition was not 
unequivocally recognised. Matthaeus recognised sepulchri violatio as a crime in Roman 
law387; yet while he doubted that the crime had been abrogated by disuse, neither did he 
confirm that it was still used in Dutch law388. 
b. res religiosae in the 20th century: the hallowed as relic, land reform right 
and heritage resource 
Res Religiosae and Sepulchri Violatio  in the early 20th Century 
Are res religiosae recognised by South African common law? Manfred Nathan’s 1904 
treatise on the common law of South Africa, based on Voet’s Commentary on the 
Pandects, simply mentions that Roman Law knew a class of things subject to divine 
law389. Broadly speaking, the Roman Law classification had ‘been practically adopted in 
Dutch Law’390. Hahlo and Kahn declare that Roman-Dutch law principles of property 
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have been ‘largely preserved’391, but note that the classification of churches, burial 
grounds and the walls of cities as res sacrae, res religiosae and res sanctae ‘was obsolete 
in Roman-Dutch law’392.  
The contemporary comprehensive reference on South African law, Joubert’s trusted 
Law of South Africa, notes that res sanctae had explicitly not been recognised by the 
Roman Dutch Law, while res sacrae and res religiosae had taken on a secular meaning 
after the Reformation and John Calvin’s Institutiones393. These things had become res in 
commercio and susceptible to private ownership. While those things dedicated to 
religious worship (the old res sacrae) are susceptible to private ownership, for example 
by churches, municipalities or private persons, ownership must be exercised in a fashion 
that is compatible with religious worship. Graveyards on private property form part of the 
land and are transferred with the land; they are not inalienable because of their religious 
nature. The implication of this is that damages to tombstones or cemetery fences do not 
afford relatives of the persons buried there with an action for patrimonial loss, since these 
things belong to the owner of the land394. However, the common law offence of sepulchri 
violatio has been retained at common law395. 
These principles of common law are derived from the fairly meagre set of cases 
cocnerning burial sites that have come before the South African courts during the late 
19th and 20th centuries. The first such matter came before the Cape Colony’s Supreme 
Court in 1890, Cape Town and Districts Waterworks Co. (Limited) v Executors of 
Elders396. Here a conflict had arisen over a piece of land. The respondents had purchased 
it but not taken transfer of it before the previous owner died. They had nevertheless 
proceeded to use it as a burial ground. The applicants had taken transfer of the land from 
the owner’s heirs, and now proceeded against respondents for trespassing on the land. 
The respondents contended that the land had been transferred erroneously to the 
applicants, as it was res religiosa and therefore extra commercium.  
The question was therefore whether such things were still recognised by our law. 
Chief Justice De Villiers found that Voet’s acceptance of the hallowedness of burial 
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places (of which he did not ‘discuss as fully as is usual with him the modifications which 
had been introduced by modern usage or legislation’397) was outweighed by the certainty 
with which Groenewegen, Van Leeuwen  and other eminent Dutch writers stated that res 
religiosae were no longer part of the law of Holland398. But ultimately the issue was one 
of policy, and here the exigencies of modern commerce outweighed the old rule:  
In this Colony it is the most usual thing for the owners of farms to have burial places for 
their dead upon their farms and it has never been supposed that without a special 
reservation of such burial places the transfer of a farm does not convey with it the 
ownership of the burial place.399  
The Chief Justice added that, while the presence of graves did not make land 
inalienable, the Roman law prohibition of desecration of graves and exhumation of 
remains without authorisation remained in force400.  
That the crime of violating a grave still existed in South African common law was 
confirmed by the Supreme Court in the Orange Free State in 1947401. The following year 
the Transvaal Provincial Division heard a similar case402. The circumstances are worth 
mentioning: a grave digger helped to bury a 15 month ‘European’ baby, then returned 
after the funeral to the grave, broke open the coffin and chopped off a portion of the 
deceased child’s face, seemingly for the purposes of muti. The appeal judge found that 
the sentence imposed by the Potgietersrust court had been too lenient403, even though the 
accused could be said to be motivated less by criminality than by ‘a dark superstitious 
mind’. Indeed, ‘the proper cure for this sort of crime is that these savage people should be 
converted to Christianity and led away from such gross and dark superstitions’404. The 
contrast with the violators of Khoisan graves of the same period, equally grisly but 
deemed to be at the forefront of European civilisation, could not be more stark405. 
 
                                                          
397 at 11. 
398 at 11-12. 
399 at 12. 
400 This last point must of course be regarded as obiter, since the respondents did not wish to remove the 
burials or desecrate them in any way. 
401 R v Lekota 1947 (3) SA 713 (O). 
402 R v Sephuma 1948 3 SA 983 (T). 
403 The present case concerned sentencing, the grave digger having already been convicted of violation of a 
tomb. 
404 at 983. 
405 See Chapter One. 
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The question of the violation of graves would be raised again, though in different 
circumstances, in the Cape in 1950. In Dibley v Furter406, the defendant submitted that R 
v Lekota and R v Sephuma had been incorrectly decided, since ‘the crime of sepulchri 
violatio was inseparably bound up with the conception that graves were res religiosae 
and, as in our law graves are no longer res religiosae, the foundation of the Roman Law 
crime had disappeared’407. Unfortunately for our historical curiosity, the court felt it 
unnecessary to decide, since the case instead concerned other issues408. 
The events that led up to the case centred on a farm in Bellville named, amusingly, 
‘Shangri-La’. The plaintiff had bought the farm from the defendant, not knowing that on 
it were more than 80 graves. All signs of the graves had been removed, and the plaintiff 
only discovered their existence after he had made the place his residence. The plaintiff 
thus sought a return of the purchase price and damages from the seller, alleging that the 
existence of the graves constituted a latent defect giving rise to the actio redhibitoria 
(redhibitory action for restoration of the positions of the parties before sale); or else that 
the seller had fraudulently concealed from him the existence of the graves. 
For the first cause of action it had to be shown that the existence of graves was a 
defect capable of founding the actio redhibitoria; the court accepted that a redhibitory 
defect is one which, objectively viewed, impairs the usefulness of the thing sold, for the 
purpose for which it was sold or for which it is commonly used, and is a material 
defect409. Was the existence of the graves such a redhibitory defect? The purchaser found 
their presence ‘abhorrent’; he would not have bought the property had he known of their 
existence410. But did their presence impair the usefulness of the property? The main 
consideration here was whether it would be an offence to cultivate over the graves or 
whether the purchaser could be prevented form doing so by anyone411. This was where 
the court felt it did not need to express any opinion on the contemporary validity of the 
crime of sepulchri violatio; for no violation of the tombs would be committed by 
cultivation over them. The purchaser ‘would be removing nothing from them and the 
                                                          
406 1951 (4) SA 73 (C). 
407 at 83C-D. 
408 at 83E. 
409 at 82D-E. 
410 at 82F. 
411 at 83A. 
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mere planting of a crop on them would not … constitute a violation where all visible 
signs of them had been removed’412.  
(Yet even while denying that it was deciding the issue, the Court did lend some 
support, at least obiter, to the existence of the offence of sepulchri violatio. The 
purchaser, it says, would commit an offence where he cultivated over tombs which were 
not concealed but still identifiable413. The purchaser did not commit an offence here 
because no bones were removed from the tombs414. Note that sepulchri violatio has 
become a crime of exhumation, rather than one of damage to a tomb, the outer casing of 
aburial. Perhaps the court would have decided differently here if the purchaser had to 
remove bones while laying the foundations for a multi-story building?) 
Even if the tombs did not constitute a redhibitory defect, could it not still be the case 
that the seller had been fraudulent in not disclosing their existence415? The Court thought 
so, since the existence of a burial ground on the property ‘was so peculiar that it should 
be disclosed to enable the parties to contract on equal terms’416. More than 80 graves 
existed on the property, taking up a large portion of it, and the most recent of which were 
only four years old; Judge Van Zyl noted that ‘the majority of people would not want to 
live on or own the property’417.  
The dead had surfaced in another case before the Cape Provincial Division that year. 
Gillespie v Toplis and Another418 had established that no action for patrimonial loss or 
sentimental damages lies against a property owner who removes the tombstones and 
railings of an earlier burial, unless this constitutes breach of contract or infringement of a 
sevitude. In effect, a grave can effect no limits on one’s ownership, except where some 
form of real right results from a contract or servitude.  
Here a previous owner of the farm in question had allowed the plaintiff’s mother to 
be buried on his farm, and the plaintiff had erected a tombstone and railing over this 
burial. Ownership of the farm changed hands, and the new owner removed the tombstone 
and railing, and then built a garage above the burial place. The plaintiff now sought relief 
                                                          
412 at 83F-G.  
413 at 83E-F. 
414 at 83F-G. 
415 In order to show fraudulent non-disclosure, the non-disclosed fact need not have been a defect such that 
would ground the actio redhibitoria, but could instead be a defect which, if not disclosed, places the 
parties on unequal terms (at 87F); or else it need not be a defect, but instead a non-disclosure of facts 
that forms part of the acts leading up to the contract (at 87G). 
416 at 88E. 
417 at 88F. 
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against this owner’s estate, inter alia, in the form of damages for patrimonial loss419. Yet 
this cause of action failed because the plaintiff could not prove that he had suffered 
patrimonial loss because of the destruction of the tombstone420. The plaintiff’s argument 
had been interesting if somewhat tortuous: he relied upon an extended Aquilian action 
incorporating the old Roman actio popularis for violation of tombs, which had been 
extended in turn by way of the actio utilis so as to be available for personal injury and not 
only damage to property. The Court noted that the actio popularis had become obsolete 
in our law421, and so the basis of plaintiff’s cause of action amounted simply to Aquilian 
liability. The plaintiff might have succeeded if he had been able to show that he had a 
right by virtue of a contract or a servitude in respect of the property; otherwise the 
tombstone and railing ‘acceded to the land and became the property of the owner, who 
could only be made liable to plaintiff on the basis of a breach of contract or infringement 
of a valid servitude’422.  
It is clear that there has been a shift since Cape Town and Districts Waterworks Co. 
(Ltd), which, despite the abrogation of the classification of res religiosae, seemed to 
agree with the Roman Dutch Law authorities that the purpose of such things should be 
retained even after alienation of the land on which they might be situated423. With 
Gillespie, this is no longer the case. Instead, for any retention of the purpose of a burial 
place, real rights must be established by way of contract or servitude. The reason for this 
shift, spelt out also in Dibley v Furter and already in Cape Town and Districts 
Waterworks Co. (Ltd), is the courts’ hesitancy in restricting the rights of the property 
owner. Thus in Gillespie, where there was no such real right in respect of the tomb, the 
fact of its erection ‘unknown to [the owner] and long prior to the date of her ownership 
… would have no bearing on the unfettered nature of her ownership’424. 
 
By the beginning of the 21st century these few cases, together with the equivocation of 
the old Dutch authorities, would come to be seen as confirming the existence of the crime 
of sepulchri violatio: ‘it has always been an offence at common law to desecrate a grave’, 
                                                          
419 The owner had deceased; thus the Court says nothing about the contemporary existence of an offence of 
violation of a tomb, since the Roman penal action was unavailable against a deceased wrongdoer. See 
296A-B. 
420 at 296H-297B. 
421 at 296C-F. 
422 at 297H. 
423 Cape Town and Districts Waterworks Co (Limited) v Executors of Elders 1890 8 SC 9 at 11. 
424 Gillespie v Toplis (note 418) at 298A. 
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glossed the Supreme Court of Appeal in 2004425. One more thing remains to be noted: it 
has not always been a statutory offence to desecrate a grave. The first such general 
legislation appeared in the Transvaal in 1925426, and prohibited the desecration, 
destruction and removal of any grave within a burial place, except with the permission of 
the administrator427. (The Transvaal Ordinance has since been assigned to the Province of 
Gauteng428, Northern Province429, the Province of North-West430, and Mpumalanga431). 
Its provisions would mirrored by the Orange Free State’s Burial Place Ordinance of 
1952432 (now assigned to the Free State433).  
Early Natal Ordinances434 have been consolidated as the Kwazulu-Natal Cemeteries 
and Crematoria Act 12 of 1996435, which prohibits any disturbance or excavation of a 
grave or removal of human remains from a grave without the prior written approval of 
the minister, unless it is required for the purposes of the Inquests Act, or the grave is to be 
opened for the purposes of interring more human remains therein, or the grave is to be re-
used436.  
In the Cape the first such legislation dates back to 1980437, and enacts similar 
provisions438. Furthermore, a municipality in the Cape may undertake the maintenance of 
                                                          
425 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and others 2004 3 All SA 1 at 8d, para [21] citing, 
without question, the statement made in Lawsa vol 20(2) (first reissue) § 324. 
426 Removal of Graves and Dead Bodies Ordinance 7 of 1925 (Province of Transvaal). 
427 A burial place is defined as any burial ground, public or private, in which one or more bodies are or are 
intended to be buried, interred, cremated or otherwise disposed of. The Ordinance also prohibits the 
exhumation or disturbance of a body or the remains of a body, except with the written authorisation of 
the adminstrator and the observation of precautions prescribed by a medical practitioner appointed by 
the administrator. Contravention of these provisions is an offence, except where a person temporarily or 
out of necessity disturbs or causes to be disturbed the remains for the purposes of interring another body 
in the same grave. See ss 1 and 2.  
428 Proclamation 114 of 17 June 1994. 
429 Proclamation 109 of 17 June 1994. 
430 Proclamation 110 of 16 June 1994. 
431 Proclamation 112 of 16 June 1994. 
432 Ordinance 4 of 1952 (Province of the Orange Free State) ss 1 and 2. 
433 Proclamation 113 of 17 June 1994. 
434 Most importantly, the Cemetries and Crematoria Ordinance 39 of 1969 (Natal). 
435 The provisions on exhumation and reinterment apply throughout the province , as opposed to for 
example the provisions on cemeteries, which apply in specified areas of the province. Section 2.  
436 ss 20-22. 
437 Exhumations Ordinance 12 of 1980 (Province of the Cape of Good Hope). This now applies to the 
Eastern Cape (Proclamation 111 of 17 June 1994), Northern Cape (Proclamation 108 of 17 June 1994) 
and Western Cape (Proclamation 115 of 17 June 1994). 
438 Section 2 prohibits the desecration, destruction and damage of graves in cemeteries, as well as any 
coffin, urn or other receptacle containing a body but which has not yet been interred, subject to the 
provisions of any other law relating to the disposal of dead bodies. For the purposes of the Ordinance, a 
cemetery is any land, public or private, containing graves; a grave is any place, whether wholly or partly 
above or below the ground and whether public or private, in which a body is permanently interred or 
intended to be permanently interred, whether in a coffin or other receptacle or not; and the definition also 
includes any monument, tombstone, cross, inscription, rail, fence, chain, erection or other structure of 
whatever nature which is part of or associated with a grave (s 1). 
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a closed or disused cemetery at the request of the religious denomination or other persons 
interested in it439. A cemetery which has been closed or disused for more than 20 years, 
and of which the council is the cemetery authority, may be reused by the municipality, so 
long as it is for a purpose that will not desecrate the ground, or any human remains, 
memorials or tombstones in the cemetery440.  
The Return of Res Religiosae? Death and Reform in the Constitutional Era 
Percival Gane noted in his first translation of Voet’s ‘Things Hallowed, Funeral Expenses 
and Rights of Burial’ that, despite its obscurity, the title was ‘of some importance in 
South Africa on account of the very common practice in farming areas of burying dead 
persons on the farms where in life they resided’441. This can be seen to have been a wise 
premonition, given cases such Gillespie v Toplis and Dibley v Furter. But one wonders 
whether Gane had foreseen the types of cases that would arise in the context of land 
reform following the establishment of constitutional democracy. The pre-constitutional 
cases diminished the importance of the Roman authorities on res religiosae cited by 
Voet. In the 21st century the law seems to look at the burial place in a different light. 
Since 1994, a series of cases has developed regarding the significance of burial places 
and burial rights in the context of land reform. At first these cases reinforced the sanctity 
which property rights and commercial transactions have enjoyed in our law vis-à-vis the 
inviolability of the grave. The first such case was Serole and Another v Pienaar442, in 
which the Land Claims Court was asked to consider whether occupiers of land, as 
defined by the Extension of Security of Tenure Act443 (ESTA), were granted by that Act 
a right to bury on the land on which they were occupiers. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Section 3(1) of the Ordinance regulates exhumations, and provides that no person may exhume, disturb, 
remove or reinter any body, or cause or permit a body to be exhumed, disturbed, removed or reinterred, 
without the written approval of the MEC and in accordance with the conditions imposed by the MEC or 
by a medical practitioner appointed by the MEC. However bodies may be exhumed, disturbed, removed 
or reinterred in consequence of, in the course of, or for the purposes of the interment of another body by 
or on behalf or with the permission of the person or entity which controls and manages the cemetery. 
439 Municipal Ordinance 20 of 1974 (Cape of Good Hope) s 168.  
440 s 169. The municipality may also remove the human remains, memorials and tombstones of a cemetery 
or portion thereof to another cemetery, if the cemetery has been closed or disused for more than 20 
years, and the council is the cemetery authority. In this case all rights, powers and provileges in respect 
of the cemetery cease. See ss 169 (2) and (3). 
441 Voet Commentaries XI 7, translator’s note at 728. 
442 2000 (1) SA 328 (LCC). 
443 Act 62 of 1997 (referred to hereafter as the ESTA). 
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The ESTA is part of the series of Acts promulgated after 1994, including the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act444 and the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act445, that set 
out to achieve some degree of land reform and socio-economic change. The ESTA was 
enacted with the purpose of alleviating the hardship faced by rural occupiers of land, who 
had previously faced unfair evictions and general insecurity of tenure of the land on 
which they resided446. The Act therefore sets out the rights and duties of occupier447 and 
owner, both of whom enjoy the rights to human dignity; freedom and security of the 
person; privacy; freedom of religion, belief and opinion and freedom of expression; 
freedom of association; and freedom of movement448. The Act also grants to an occupier 
a number of specific rights aimed at securing occupancy449, including the right to security 
of tenure450 and such rights as the right to receive visitors451 and have a family life452, the 
right not to be denied or deprived of access to water453 or educational or health 
services454, and the right to maintain and visit family graves on the land455.  
In Serole the Court was asked to read a new right in to the Act, one which would 
ensure that a family could bury their dead on the farm on which they were occupiers. 
Both the deceased and the father of the deceased in this case had been employed by the 
property owner, until their dismissal two years earlier. The owner, learning of their plans 
to bury the deceased family member, obtained an interdict from the magistrate’s court 
preventing them from doing so. The family of the deceased now brought the order on 
review before the Land Claims Court456.  
                                                          
444 Act 22 of 1994. 
445 Act 3 of 1996. 
446 Preamble to the ESTA. 
447 An occupier is any ‘person residing on land which belongs to another person’, who has since 4 February 
1997 had consent of the owner or another right in law to reside on the land, but excluding any person 
who uses the land for industrial, mining, commercial or commercial farming purposes or any person 
earning over R5000 a month (s 1(1) rw para 2 of Regulation R1 632 Government Gazette 19587, 18 
December 1998). Until the ESTA’s amendment in 2001, the definition excluded labour tenants as defined 
by the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act (ESTA s 1(1)(a) deleted by s 6(a) of the Land Affairs General 
Amendment Act 51 of 2001). 
448 s 5. 
449 s 6. 
450 s 6(2)(a). 
451 s 6(2)(b). 
452 s 6(2)(d). 
453 s 6(2)(e). 
454 s 6(2)(f). 
455 s 6(4). 
456 It is quite possible that the Land Claims Court’s decision on this matter should be regarded as obiter: the 
magistrate had granted the interdict as a rule nisi, and since the order was not final the applicants were 
told they should have exhausted their remedies in that court before approaching a superior Court. See 
333E-334B, para [11]. 
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The Court held that granting a right of burial would be an intrusion upon the property 
owner’s common law rights that, one that was not justified by the Act or by its 
purpose457. It reasoned that the Act served to protect an occupier’s rights of occupation, 
rather than real rights in the land. Yet the right to establish a grave is not such a right of 
occupation, since it ‘could well amount to the granting of a servitude over that property. 
The owner of the property and all successors-in-title will, for as long as the grave exists, 
have to respect the grave, not cultivate over it, and allow family members to visit and 
maintain it’458. An  agreement between occupier and owner that the land could be used 
for burial purposes would be protected by Act, which protects an occupier’s ‘access to 
such services agreed upon with the owner or person in charge, whether expressly or 
tacitly’459. But here the Court found no proof of such a tacit agreement, despite the fact 
that the great-grandmother of the deceased and other ancestral relatives had been buried 
there460. 
The same question came before the Supreme Court of Appeal, though in a more 
elaborate form, in Nkosi and Another v Bührmann461. The occupier of a farm had again 
argued that the Extension of Security of Tenure Act protects the right of an occupier to 
use the land on which she resides for the purposes of burial. Here the argument was that 
the Act’s provision that the occupier has the right to ‘reside on and use the land’ on 
which she has resided462 is given content by the fundamental rights of the occupier 
specified in s 5 of the Act463. One of these rights is the right to freedom of religion464, 
which has imported the constitutional right of freedom of religion465 into the Act in order 
to ensure that occupiers could use the constitutional right ‘not just in the general or in the 
abstract, but effectively and in the very setting where they live and where they pursue 
their essential livelihood’466. This was to be guided by the Act’s recognition that ‘[b]asic 
to the use of land by rural people is the association between the land, the family and the 
                                                          
457 At 335F, para [16]. 
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exercise of religious rights’467, specifically in the Act’s provision that anyone has the 
right to visit and maintain family graves situated on the land of another, subject only to 
reasonable conditions imposed by the owner or person in charge of the land so as to 
safeguard life or property or prevent the undue disruption of work468. 
The Court rejected this argument, basing its decision instead upon a belief that the 
burial would diminish the value of the property and prejudice the owner’s rights of 
ownership. Thus it held that the right to practise one’s religion does not allow one to 
diminish the patrimony of another through appropriation of their property469. The Court, 
having briefly analysed the common law position with regard to the nature of burial 
places and their implication for property, found that they were onerous on the rights of a 
property holder470. The effect of a grave, ‘practically and legally’, was to permanently 
diminish the rights of a property owner: ‘[i]f a grave site could be taken by an occupier as 
of right this would amount to an appropriation’471. Thus the right to freedom of religion 
was held to contain ‘internal limits’472 such that it does not entitle one to bury one’s dead 
on another’s property without permission, even if it is a right belonging to all citizens to 
bury their dead in accordance with their religious practices473. 
As Van Der Walt would remark, the constitutional analysis employed by the SCA 
neglected to engage in limitations analysis of the infringement of the property right, 
instead intepreting the ESTA on the assumption that ‘the intention of the legislature could 
not have been to authorise such a limitation [of ownership]’ and therefore did not intend 
the Act to imply a burial right on the part of the occupier474.  
It became apparent that the courts had been entirely wrong in their assumptions then, 
when in 2001, and in response to Serole and Nkosi475, the legislature changed the legal 
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Stellenbosch Law Review 394 at 413, who suggests that the right to property should also be given such 
internal limits. 
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position by amending the ESTA476. Section 6(2)(dA) of the ESTA now grants an 
occupier the right— 
to bury a deceased member of his or her family who, at the time of that person’s 
death, was residing on the land on which the occupier is residing, in accordance 
with their religion or cultural belief, if an established practice in respect of the land 
exists. 
The Act defines ‘established practice’ as— 
A practice in terms of which the owner or person in charge or his or her 
predecessor in title routinely gave permission to people residing on the land to 
bury deceased members of their family on that land in accordance with their 
religion or cultural belief477. 
In addition, the amendment inserted section 6(5), which grants to the family members 
of a deceased long-term occupier478 a right to bury the deceased on the land on which he 
or she was an occupier. 
Subsequently the question of a burial by occupiers in terms of the ESTA was again 
raised before the Land Claims Court in Nhlabathi and Others v Fick479. In this case the 
application succeeded because of the change in law, and despite a battery of factual and 
legal issues raised by the property owner in denial of the occupiers’ right. Only the 
objection most relevant to our discussion will be considered here: this concerned the 
constitutionality of s 6(2)(dA) of the ESTA in the light of the Constitutional protection of 
property. 
Section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, 
provides, inter alia, that: 
(1) No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no 
law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. 
(2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application  
(a) for a public purpose or in the public interest; and 
                                                          
476 In terms of the Land Affairs General Amendment Act Act 51 of 2001. 
477 s 1(1). 
478 long-term occupier as defined by s 8(4), that is, an occupier: 
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(b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of 
payment of which have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or 
approved by a court. 
 
The Court agreed that the establishment of a grave by an occupier would constitute a 
deprivation of property, but pointed out that the deprivation was now in terms of a law of 
general application480. It also could not be considered arbitrary because of the way in 
which the right is couched: like the other s 6(2) rights it must be ‘balanced with the right 
of the owner or person in charge’. An established practice must be shown to exist, which 
must have originated from initial agreement between occupier and owner; the 
establishment of a grave will ‘in most cases, constitute a relatively minor intrusion into 
the landowner’s property rights’, and the cultural or religious significance of burial would 
in most instances justify the deprivation481. 
The Court assumed that the establishment of a grave might be deemed expropriation 
in terms of s 25(2) of the Constitution since, after Serole, this might constitute imposition 
of a servitude over the land482. That s 6(2)(dA) of the ESTA provides for no 
compensation could be justified in terms of the limitations analysis483. What favoured a 
finding that the limitation of the property right was justified here was not only ‘the 
nation’s commitment to land reform’484, but that meeting the requirements of s 6(2)(dA) 
entailed a balancing, so that any expropriation allowed by the section would conform 
with the limitations analysis485.  
The only thing that should attract our interest still is the Court’s interpretation of the 
requirement of an ‘established practice’. Two members of the family had previously been 
buried on the farm, but the owner alleged that these had been ‘special indulgences’, and 
thus did not constitute an agreement between him and the occupiers. The court disagreed, 
and here considered it important that other families had been allowed to bury their dead 
on the farm; for an established practice had to ‘exist in respect of the land and not in 
respect of a particular family or occupier’486. Although the smallest dictum, these words 
indicate the implications this most recent shift in the law might have; for a burial place is 
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once again able to make a place religiosus (or its contemporary constitutional 
equivalent). No longer, following Dibley or Gillespie, is a servitutal or contractual right 
necessary, but the burials of (any) occupier can institute an ‘established tradition’ in 
terms of a piece of land. 
 
There is one more case of significance for our exploration of the survival of the res 
religiosa and its equivalent functions in the law. Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of 
Cape Town and others487 ostensibly concerned a question of administrative law, but was 
decided in a way which again seems to indicate a new direction in the way that law 
imagines the hallowedness of the burial place.  
Oudekraal is the name of an area on the Cape’s Atlantic Seaboard, adjacent to Camps 
Bay and at the foot of the Twelve Apostles mountains. A short drive from the central 
business district, it is a property developer’s paradise, largely undeveloped and of 
unparalleled beauty. Yet it adjoins the sensitive ecosystem of the Table Mountain 
National Park, and is the site of Muslim kramats dating from the origins of the city. On 
the site, the Supreme Court of Appeal noted, were to be found twenty graves of great 
significance to Cape Town’s Muslim community, and including two kramats (graves of 
the enlightened). If the site can be distinguished from Prestwich Place and some of the 
other sites mentioned in Chapter 1, then it is through its great contemporary significance 
and popularity. The Court would describe the graves thus: 
They have special religious and cultural significance to the members of Cape Town’s 
Muslim community. Two of the graves are kramats. A kramat is the grave of somebody 
who, amoing adherents of the Islamic faith, is regarded as having attained, through 
conspicuous piety, an enlightened spiritual situation. Such person having thus been a 
friend of God, the spirit of God is to be found at the site. 
The kramats and other graves on the land are also important cultural symbols in the 
Muslim community of its history in the Western Cape going back to the era of slavery. 
Many of the graves are those of escaped slaves and some of the kramats are burial sites of 
spiritual leaders of the community during those times. It is believed by followers of the 
faith that by spending time at these sites they can enhance their own spirituality. One of 
the kramats on the land encompassed by the approved township is that of Sayed Jaffer. 
Thousands visit it each year. Moreover, the indications are that the kramats generally 
                                                          
487 [2004] 3 All SA 1 also reported as 2004 (6) SA 222 (SCA); on appeal from Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v 
City of Cape Town and others 2002 (6) SA 573 (C), also reported as [2002] 3 All SA 450 (C). 
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have been visited regularly since before the end of the nineteenth century. In the 
circumstances, access to the kramats is of great importance to the Muslim people of Cape 
Town.488
 
The appellant, Oudekraal Estates, owned this area, and its predecessor-in-title had 
gained approval for its laying out as a township in terms of the Townships Ordinance of 
1934489, with notification of the approval being given in the Provincial Gazette in 
1962490. The appellant had bought the land in 1965, but only in 1996 did it apply to the 
Cape Metropolitan Council for approval of an engineering services plan. The local 
authority’s key contention had been that the development rights had lapsed, since two 
requirements of the Townships Ordinance had not been complied with timeously. In each 
case the Administrator had granted an extension of time for compliance with the relevant 
requirement, but only after the time originally stipulated for compliance had expired491. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal took a different approach, and decided to look not at 
the validity of the extensions of time granted by the Administrator, but at the grant of the 
application to establish the township itself492. Here the existence of the graves was of 
central importance. The general plan submitted by the previous owner did not show the 
existence or location of the graves. Minutes of a meeting held in 1955 reveal that the 
Townships Board had inspected the site at that time, but no mention of the graves or 
kramats were made in the minutes, even though the burial places are visible features of 
the landscape. Since the Court did not have access to the entire record of the Board’s 
decision making, it could not know whether the existence of the graves had been taken 
into account or not.  
Yet the Court had to conclude that the authorities were either ignorant of the 
existence of the graves and kramats, or had else ignored them493. It was more likely that 
the officials were not aware of the graves, since they would have been aware that 
violation of graves was an offence at common law494. Even ‘on pre-constitutional 
principles’, noted the Court, the existence of religious and cultural sites of significance 
                                                          
488 at 6f-I, paras [14]-[15]. 
489 33 of 1934 (Cape Of Good Hope). 
490 at 4a-b, para [2]. 
491 at 4b-g, paras [3]-[4]. 
492 at 6d-f, para [13]. 
493 at 8b-c, para [20]. 
494 at 8d, para [21]. 
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should have been taken into account by the Administrator495. Whether he had failed to do 
so on account of ignorance or out of error, his decision to lend approval to the township 
scheme now had to be considered invalid496; it was in addition ultra vires because ‘it 
permitted subdivisions and land use in criminal disregard for the graves and kramats’497. 
Any of the proposed plans for development would have, without more, violated the grave 
and kramats and thereby committed the common law offence. 
This did not mean that the local authority was allowed to disregard the 
Administrator’s decision: until set aside by judicial review498 the decision existed in fact 
and had legal consequences, in terms of the principles of administrative law499. The local 
authority was thus possibly bound to consider plans presented by the developer, to the 
extent that it had a legal duty to do so, and had to carry out any other statutory obligations 
flowing from the Adminstrator’s approval500. Yet there were further reasons why the 
developer could not develop the land in the way in which he had planned. The one that is 
relevant to our discussion is the simple consideration that ‘exploitation of property rights 
is always constrained by such laws as exist at the time that they are sought to be 
implemented’501. In this case, the Court stated, any present day development would be 
constrained not only by the common law prohibition of violation of tombs but the 
constitutional protection of cultural and religious sites502, as well as the provisions of the 
National Heritage Resources Act that protect burial sites503. 
The Useful Dead: From Relic to Resource  
It is at last time for a brief discussion of the law which has been central to the events 
following the unearthing of the Prestwich Place burials. The NHRA, like much other 
legislation of the past ten years, is regarded as breaking with its equivalents of the past. 
                                                          
495 at 9b-c, para [24]. 
496 at 9d, para [25]. 
497 at 9d-e, para [25]. 
498 The present case arose from appellant’s application for a declaratory order with regard to its rights; and 
there is no indication that the City Council and other respondents had at that time sought judicial review 
of the Administrator’s decision. 
499 at 9g-h, para [26] et seq. 
500 at 15b-c, para [40].  
501 at 15e-f, para [42]. 
502 s 31(1) of the Constitution provides that: 
Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the right, 
with other members of that community— 
(a) to enjoy their culture, practise their religion and use their language; and 
(b) to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations and other 
organs of civil society. 
503 s 36(3) of the NHRA.  
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Yet it is necessary to begin this discussion with a brief reminder of this past, specifically 
the history of the anthropometric gaze discussed already in Chapter 1. It was noted there 
that it was due to the competitiveness of the trade in skeletal materials and a sort of 
protectionism for South African scientific endeavour, rather than the scientists’ grisly 
practices in relation to Khoisan burial sites and bodies, that the Bushman-Relics 
Protection Act was enacted in 1911504. This  was ‘the earliest statute dealing with the 
subject’, since there had been no such legislation pre-Union505. The motivations of the 
Act were evident in its language; it protected aboriginal paintings and sites of 
archaeological and anthropological interest, including burial grounds and skeletal remains 
as ‘relics’. 
The Bushman-Relics Protection Act would initiate a series of statutes and their 
amendments which aimed at protecting South Africa’s natural and cultural heritage: the 
Natural and Historical Monuments Act 6 of 1923, the Natural and Historical Monuments, 
Relics and Antiques Act 4 of 1934 (which consolidated the Bushman-Relics Protection 
Act and the National and Historical Monuments Act), and finally the NHRA’s 
predecessor, the National Monuments Act 28 of 1969. 
As far as burial sites were concerned, the National Monuments Act of 1969 
automatically protected the ‘anthropological or archaeological contents of the graves’ 
used by Bushmen or any other people who inhabited or visited the Republic before the 
settlement of Europeans at the Cape, alongside other Bushman relics and artifacts. It was 
an offence under the Act to destroy, damage, excavate, alter, remove from its original site 
or export from the Republic such objects without a permit506. Removal of such objects 
could take place without a permit where in the normal course of mining, engineering or 
agricultural activities; however anything found would have to be immediately reported to 
a cultural institution by the finder or the owner of the land507. In common law such found 
objects were regarded as res nullius, and ownership would vest in the finder; this 
principle was not affected by the Act508. 
The National Monuments Act also protected war graves after amendment in 1981509; 
previously they had been provided for by separate statutes. In fact the first legislation 
                                                          
504 Act 22 of 1911. 
505 F G Richings ‘Historical Monuments, Wrecks and War Graves’ in Lawsa vol 10(2) (first reissue) § 271. 
506 s 12(2A). 
507 s 3. 
508 s 12(3)(b). 
509 National Monuments Amendment Act 13 of 1981. 
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protecting war graves had been as early as 1898, and provided for the maintenance of 
graves of officers and those who had fallen during duty to the state510. After the South 
African War of 1899-1902, the protection and maintenance of war graves was further 
provided for by various provincial enactments511. However in 1956 the Department of 
Public Works established a war graves commission to oversee the protection and 
maintenance of war graves at a national level512. The commission became a statutory 
body with its establishment by the War Graves Act of 1967513. 
The 1981 National Monuments Amendment Act repealed the War Graves Act and 
included the provisions relating to war graves in the National Monuments Act, which 
then became known as the War Graves and National Monuments Act. As Steven 
Townsend has noted, there were 11 acts and amendments on the subjects of monuments 
and war graves between 1967 and 1981514. This flurry of legislative activity, according to 
Townsend,  ‘demonstrate[s] the apartheid establishment’s pre-occupation with heritage 
and its management in this period after South Africa’s expulsion from the United Nations 
and the Commonwealth and its deepening isolation’515.  
Indeed, the 1981 amalgamation of legislation governing war graves and national 
monuments established two separate committees for graves, the Burgergraftekomitee and 
the British War Graves Committee516, tasked with protecting the graves of those who had 
died in service in the War of 1899-1901, 19th century rebellions and the Great Trek of 
1835-54517. Townsend notes that ‘[t]he need for two committees …is revealing; and it 
                                                          
510 First Volksraad Resolution of the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (7 November 1898). 
511 Cape Imperial Colonial and Republican Forces Burial Grounds Act 14 of 1900; Natal Act 19 of 1901 
(military burial grounds); Transvaal Imperial Colonial and Republican Forces Burial Grounds 
Proclamation 20 of 1902; Imperial Colonial and Republican Forces Burial Grounds Ordinance 5 of 1903 
(OFS). The Orange Free State also established a statutory trust fund for the maintenance of such graves 
– Maintenance of Graves Trust Fund Ord 24 of 1905 (Orange Free State). 
512 Lawsa vol 10(2) (first reissue) § 287. 
513 Act 34 of 1967. 
514 The National Monuments Act was amended in 1970, 1971, 1979 and 1981, and also by the Expropriation 
Act of 1975 and the Finance Act of 1980, and in 1986.  
515 Stephen Stewart Townsend Development rights and conservation constraints. Urban conservation-
oriented controls in the city centre of Cape Town (DPhil thesis, University of Cape Town, 2003) at 62. 
516 s 3A of the War Graves and National Monuments Act 28 of 1969. 
517 The committees were tasked with identifying burial grounds and graves in any area of the Republic of 
persons who had died ar a result of wars other than the world wars and rebellions within the area now 
included in the Republic (s 3A(2)(a)); as well as burial grounds and graves in the Republic of members of 
pre-Union garrison troops (s 3A(2)(b)), of Voortrekkers (s 3A(2)(c)), and of those who had been exiled 
during the 1899-1902 war (s 3A(2)(d)) This would enable the council to act towards preserving the 
graves and burial grounds. The committees would also report on whether it was desirable to declare 
them monuments. Such graves and burial grounds could not be damaged, destroyed or altered without a 
permit (s 12(2B)(e)). 
The council could exhume and reinter the remains of a person buried in a war grave (for certain 
purposes such as moving graves to a central point for more convenient protection) (s 5(1)(cB)). However 
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reflects and emphasized the symbolic value of the graves to a divided white 
establishment during this period at the nadir of South Africa’s international isolation’518. 
Perhaps it is not too bold then to say that the hallowedness of the res religiosa had been 
retained in some sense in the language and functions of these statutory provisions. Yet 
religiosity no longer attached to the grave as protector of the human body; rather the shift 
from the Roman res divini iuris and the consecrated thing of the Catholic Church had 
found in nationalism its new hallowed object. The nation was also consecrated by that 
other heritage object, the relic of the indigenous body, whose statutory reification served 
to place South Africa on the scientific map519. 
 
This was not the end of statutory protection. The Commonwealth War Graves Act was 
enacted in 1992 in order to protect graves of members of the armed forces who died 
during World War I and World War II520. But it is the National Heritage Resources Act 
of 1999 (the NHRA), the most recent heritage legislation, having commenced operation 
on 1 April 2000, that will occupy us for the rest of this discussion. Although the Act is 
relevant in its entirety to much of what has gone before, there will only be an opportunity 
to discuss the general aims of the Act and the specific provisions regarding burials places. 
The NHRA sets out to manage ‘the national estate’, establishing the South African 
Heritage Resource Agency to co-ordinate and promote the management of heritage at a 
national level. It is a renewal of heritage discourse, firmly recognising its connection to 
transition and the memory of past, as well as goals of reconciliation and recognition of 
diverse cultural identities. Indeed, the preamble proclaims:  
Our heritage is unique and precious and it cannot be renewed. It helps us to define our 
cultural identity and therefore lies at the heart of our spiritual well-being and has the 
power to build our nation. It has the potential to affirm our diverse cultures, and in so 
doing shape our national character. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the council could not do so where the owner of land was a descendant of the person buried there and 
objected to the reinterment (s5(4A)). 
518 Townsend (note 515) at 62-3. 
519 Legassick and Rassool (note 75) passim. 
520 Act 8 of 1992. The Commonwealth War Graves Act 8 of 1992 prohibits the desecration, damage and 
destruction of graves, tombstones, monuments and memorials connected with the burials of members of 
the commonwealth armed forces who died in the First and Second World War (s 1 and 2). The owner of 
land upon which such a grave is is situated, nor any other body in control of the burial place, may disinter 
or alter the grave, unless three months’ notice were given to the commission (s 3(1)). The grave may not 
be removed except by the commission or with the written permission of the commission (s 3(4)). 
 103
Our heritage celebrates our achievements and contributes to redressing past inequities. It 
educates, it deepens our understanding of society and encourages us to empathise with 
the experience of others. It facilitates healing and material and symbolic restitution and it 
promotes new and previously neglected research into our rich oral traditions and 
customs.521
The national estate is regarded as including ‘those heritage resources of South Africa 
which are of cultural significance or other special value for the present community and 
for future generations’; these resources fall within the sphere of operations of the heritage 
resource authorities522. A variety of objects and sites may be included in the national 
estate, including places to which oral traditions are attached or which are associated with 
living heritage523, archaeological and palaeontological sites524, graves and burial 
grounds525, sites of significance relating to the history of slavery in South Africa526, and 
archaeological objects and material recovered from the soil or waters of South Africa527.  
An archaeological site or object includes, inter alia, ‘material remains resulting from 
human activity which are in a state of disuse and are in or on land and which are older 
than 100 years, including artefacts, human and hominid remains and artificial features 
and structures’528. Graves and burial grounds include: 
(i) ancestral graves; 
(ii) royal graves and graves of traditional leaders; 
(iii) graves of victims of conflict; 
(iv) graves of individuals designated by the Mninister by notice in the Gazette; 
(v) historical graves and cemeteries; and 
                                                          
521 Preamble to the National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999. 
522 s 3(1) 
523 s 3(2)(b). In terms of s 2, ‘living heritage’ refers to intangible cultural heritage, and may include: 
(a) cultural tradition; 
(b) oral history; 
(c) performance; 
(d) ritual; 
(e) poular memory; 
(f) skills and techniques; 
(g) indigenous knowledge systems; and  
(h) the holistic approach to nature, society and social relationships. 
524 s 3(2)(f). 
525 s 3(2)(g). 
526 s 3(2)(h). 
527 s 3(2)(i)(i). 
528 s 2. 
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(vi) other human remains which are not covered in terms of the Human Tissue Act, 
1983529. 
Clearly these definitions allow the delineation of the national estate to encompass a great 
many objects; in the context of human remains alone it encompasses all remains except 
those that have been donated for the advancement of medicine as provided for in terms of 
the Human Tissue Act530. Section 3(2) sets out to narrow this open-ended definition, 
‘without limiting the generality’ of the preceding subsections, by establishing that a place 
or object must have cultural significance (that is, ‘aesthetic, architectural, historical, 
scientific, social, spiritual, linguistic or technological value or significance’531) or other 
special value because of: 
(a) its importance in the community, or pattern of South Africa’s history; 
(b) its possession of uncommon, rare or endangered aspects of South Africa’s natural or 
cultural heritage; 
(c) its potential to yield information that will contribute to an understanding of South 
Africa’s natural or cultural heritage; 
(d) its importance in demonstrating the principal characteristics of a particular class of South 
Africa’s natural or cultural places or objects; 
(e) its importance in exhibiting particular aesthetic characteristics valued by a community or 
cultural group; 
(f) its importance in demonstrating a high degree of creative or technical achievement at a 
particular period; 
(g) its strong or special association with a particular community or cultural group for social, 
cultural or spiritual reasons; 
(h) its strong or special association with the life or work of a person, group or organisation of 
importance in the history of South Africa; 
(i) sites of significance relating to the history of slavery in South Africa.532 
Section 5 of the act sets out general principles for heritage resources management to 
be recognised by persons and bodies who act in terms of the legislation. The four 
principles are that: 
                                                          
529 s 3(2)(g). 
530 Act 65 of 1983. 
531 s 2. 
532 s 3(3). 
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(a) Heritage resources have lasting value in their own right and provide evidence of the 
origins of South African society and as they are valuable, finite, non-renewable and 
irreplaceable they must be carefully managed to ensure their survival; 
(b) every generation has a moral responsibility to act as trustee of the national heritage for 
succeeding generations and the State has an obligation to manage heritage resources in 
the interests of all South Africans; 
(c) heritage resources have the capacity to promote reconciliation, understanding and respect, 
and contribute to the development of a unifying South African identity; and 
(d) heritage resources management must guard against the use of heritage for sectarian 
purposes or political gain533. 
Some additional principles are recognised in the rest of s 5: heritage is ‘an important 
part of the history and beliefs of communities and must be managed in a way that 
acknowledges the right of affected communities to be consulted and to participate in their 
management’534. Heritage also plays an important role in research, education and tourism 
and ‘must be developed and presented for these purposes in a way that that ensures 
dignity and respect for cultural values’535. It would seem that these two principles would 
come into conflict if not for the subsection’s qualification that the latter emphasis on 
research, education and tourism must accord with the dignity and respect of cultural 
values. Thus it could be argued that ‘the right of affected communities to be consulted 
and to participate in [heritage] management’ limits the latter emphasis on research, 
education and tourism. 
Section 5 also sets out that the integration of heritage conservation with urban and 
rural planning and social and economic development must be promoted through policy, 
administrative planning and legislation536. Finally, the identification, assessment and 
management of heritage resources must: 
(a) take account of all relevant cultural values and indigenous knowledge systems; 
(b) take account of material or cultural heritage value and involve the least possible 
alteration or loss of it; 
(c) promote the use and enjoyment of and access to heritage resources, in a way 
consistent with their cultural significance and conservation needs; 
                                                          
533 s 5(1). 
534 s 5(4). 
535 s 5(5). 
536 s 5(6). 
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(d) contribute to social and economic development; 
(e) safeguard the options of present and future generations; and 
(f) be fully researched, documented and recorded537. 
 
When any body responsible for the national estate makes a decision (a) to formally 
protect a heritage resource by notice in the Government Gazette; (b) to issue or to not 
issue a permit; or (c) in terms of an appeal, the decision must be consistent with the 
section 5 principles, as well as any further principles prescribed538 by regulation by a 
heritage resource authority539.  
There are a number of ways in which heritage resources are protected generally540. 
The Act provides for the declaration of places as national heritage sites and provincial 
heritage sites541, and for the designation of certain surrounding areas as protected 
areas542. The Act also allows for provisional protection of areas and resources543, and it 
requires the compilation of provincial registers of heritage resources, which must then be 
protected by by-law544. Such protection however does not negate the Act’s specific 
protections of archaeological and palaeontological sites and burials545. There is provision 
also for places of environmental or cultural interest to be designated as heritage areas by 
a planning authority; by a provincial heritage resources authority; or by a municipality 
which has consulted the provincial heritage resources authority, owners of property in the 
area and affected communities546. Such a heritage area must be protected by municipal 
by-law or the municipality’s planning scheme547. 
There are also provisions for specific protection548. Section 36 is most relevant to our 
concerns, dealing specifically with graves and burial grounds. (As discussed in Chapter 1, 
this is the law that was applied after the unearthing of the Prestwich Place burials). In 
terms of this provision SAHRA must conserve and care for graves and burial grounds 
                                                          
537 s 5(7). 
538 s 6. 
539 s 10(1) and (2)(a) . 
540 See generally Chap II of the Act. 
541 s 27. 
542 s 28. 
543 s 29. 
544 s 30. 
545 s 30(14). 
546 s 31. 
547 s 30(7). 
548 See generally Chap II of the Act. 
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that are not the responsibility of any other authority549. Taking over from the old war 
graves authorities (but not the commonwealth war graves commission), SAHRA is 
mandated to identify ‘graves of the victims of conflict’ as well as ‘any other graves which 
it deems to be of cultural significance’550. (Recall the Act’s expansive definition of 
‘cultural significance’ as ‘aesthetic, architectural, historical, scientific, social, spiritual, 
linguistic or technological value or significance’551). SAHRA may erect and must 
maintain memorials associated with such graves, if they are not the responsibility of 
another authority.  
As the idea of nationhood has changed, so has the set of the graves that are hallowed. 
SAHRA had been given a five year period, beginning on 1 April 2000, to compile lists of 
graves of those who, in connection with the liberation struggle, ‘died in exile or as a 
result of the action of State security forces or agents provocateur’; and which it believes 
should be protected552. SAHRA must also assist in the identification of graves of victims 
of conflict associated with the liberation struggle in other countries, and may enter into 
negotiations to reinter such persons’ remains in the nation’s capital553. 
Specific graves are protected from damage, destruction, and disinterment without the 
permission of SAHRA or a provincial heritage resource authority554; these are the graves 
of victims of conflict555 and graves or burial grounds older than 60 years and situated 
outside of formal cemeteries556. A permit to damage or destroy such a grave may only be 
issued if the heritage resource authority is satisfied that the applicant has made 
satisfactory arrangements for exhumation and reinterment of the contents of the grave at 
his own cost and in accordance with any further relevant regulations557. Furthermore, a 
permit may only be issued if the applicant has— 
(a) made a concerted effort to contact and consult communities and individuals who by 
tradition have an interest in such grave or burial ground; and 
                                                          
549 s 36(1). 
550 s 36(2) rw s 60. 
551 s 2. 
552 s 36(7). 
553 s 36(9). 
554 Section 23 of the NHRA allows the MEC responsible for cultural matters in a province to establish a 
provincial heritage resources authority for the management of heritage resources in the province. The 
provisions of provincial legislation that establishes a provincial heritage resources authority and provides 
for the management of provincial heritage resources take precedence over equivalent provisions of the 
NHRA, as far as they relate to provincial areas of competence (s 57). In the Western Cape, this body is 
Heritage Western Cape (see Provincial Notice 173/2003 of 27 May 2003, Provincial Gazette 6017). 
555 s 36(3)(a). 
556 s 36(3)(b). 
557 s 36(4). 
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(b) reached agreements with such communities and individuals regarding the future of 
such grave or burial ground.558
 
The section provides for a specific procedure to be complied with in the event of 
discoveries of unknown graves during the course of development or other activities, 
subject to the applicability of any other law. The activity that had been engaged in must 
cease, and the discovery must be reported to SAHRA or the responsible559 provincial or 
local heritage resources authority560. The heritage resources authority, in co-operation the 
South African Police Service and in accordance with relevant regulations, must 
investigate whether a grave is protected in terms of the Act or is of significance to any 
community561. If the grave is protected or significant in this way, the heritage resource 
authority must assist ‘any person who or community which is a direct descendant’ to 
make arrangements for exhumation and reinterment of the contents of the grave; if no 
such person or community is available, the authority may make any arrangements it 
deems fit562. 
Finally, it should be noted that the language of indigenous bodies as ‘relics’ has been 
relinquished, if not its functions. Certain human remains are also protected by the Act as 
‘archaeological’, the definition of which includes ‘material remains resulting from human 
activity which are in a state of disuse and are in or on land and which are older than 100 
years, including … human and hominid remains …’563. Such remains are the 
responsibility of the provincial heritage authority rather than SAHRA564, and ownership 
of them vests in the State565. The provincial heritage resource authority must ensure that 
                                                          
558 s 36(5). 
559 The Act outlines a three-tier system for the grading of heritage resources. Grade I resources have such 
exceptional qualities that they are of national significance, Grade II resources are significant within a 
province or region, and Grade III encompasses other resources worthy of conservation (s 7(1)). SAHRA is 
responsible for identifying and managing Grade I resources; provincial heritage resource authorities are 
responsible in this way for Grade II resources, and municipalities for Grade III resources (s 9). It seems that 
a resource can be protected at any level, from the wording of s 9(5), which notes that for purposes of 
requesting a permit or other authorisation ‘a formal protection by a heritage resources authority at a higher 
level takes precedence over any formal or general protection at a local level, without prejudice to any 
incentives offered at any level’. This three-tier grading system is to be established by regulation by SAHRA, 
inc consultation with the Minister and provincial MECs (s 7). For the purposes of determining what a 
‘relevant’ heritage resource authority is within the meaning of the noted section, this system of grading would 
be relevant; it may also be relevant whether an area has been declared as a national heritage site or 
provincial heritage site in terms of s 27. 
560 s 36(6). 
561 s 36(6)(a). 
562 s 36(6)(b). 
563 s 2. 
564 s 35(1). 
565 s 35(2). 
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the object is lodged with a museum or other public institution that has a collection policy 
acceptable to the authority. The authority may furthermore establish terms and conditions 
for the conservation of the object566. It seems reasonable to suggest here that these 
provisions do not apply to remains exhumed after accidental discovery and in terms of 
the s 36 procedure described above, since these remains are to be dealt with in terms of 
arrangements made by the heritage authority and descendants in terms of s 36(6)(b). On 
this interpretation, the Act does not accord any automatic right to study such remains as 
‘archaeological’. 
c. mapping the heterotopic: nomos and anomaly 
It remains to be specific about what this too brief study of the law of burial places, dead 
bodies and heritage objects reveals about the politics and ethics of Prestwich Place. The 
point has not been to prepare a lawyer’s opinion on the matter, but rather to discern the 
ethical and political spirit which animates this area of the law, and divine something of 
the relationship between law and the dead.  
A good place to start is Yan Thomas’s recent writing on the Roman ius sepulchri and 
the requirements of res religiosae567. In his work he has aimed not so much at a doctrinal 
commentary as an account of the technical nature of legal reason in Roman times. He 
writes that in this context, ‘law and legal rules were not the expression of [religious] 
taboos. Rather, they were the instruments by which taboos were transformed into a set of 
techniques for the management of inheritance funds’568. What Thomas is concerned with 
is how the law transforms the dead body into res; indeed, the legal reification of corpus 
and tomb.  
Fundamental to this legal reification was how the distinction between body and tomb 
operated to make the religiosity of the res religiosa more manageable. Thomas 
emphasises how Roman law defined precisely the place which was made religiosus by 
interment of a body. Some heirs tried to extend the ius sepulchri to cover other properties 
annexed to the locus religiosus and intended to act as income-generating foundations for 
the expenses of the future funerary rites that were expected. Yet the law made a clear 
                                                          
566 s 35(2). 
567 Yan Thomas ‘Res religiosae: on the categories of religion and commerce in Roman Law’ in Alain Pottage 
and Martha Mundy (eds) Law, anthropology and the constitution of the social: making persons and things 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
568 Ibid 72. 
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distinction between the tomb and its surrounds, protecting only the space actually 
occupied by remains569: ‘the legal quality of this res depended on its contact and 
contiguity with the body that it contained’570. Thus the rule, already mentioned earlier, 
that it was the bones themselves that made a place religiosus: an empty cenotaph did not 
constitute a sepulchrum571. 
This was consistent with the way in which the law on violation of tombs was 
structured. It was wrongful to violate a tomb, yet there were no laws barring profanation 
of the tomb by actual exhumation of the body, nor indeed were there any laws protecting 
the body itself572. The material remains were so vital to the hallowedness of the tomb, 
that once removed the place no longer constituted res religiosa: ‘[t]hat was why the 
removal of a body from the tomb was not treated as a violatio sepulchri: the tomb no 
longer had anything to protect’573. This reliance on the material seems out of place: 
sacred things could (before Christian times at least) be constituted by consecration ‘to a 
divinity in which one might well have believed, but which could just as well have been 
invented for the purpose, given that any idea or any invocation would do’574. Does this 
point to a fastly held belief in the religiosity of the very body itself, rather than simply its 
memory?  
It is too early for the present work to come to any conclusions about the nature of the 
relation of corporeality and religiosity in Roman times; suffice to note that this problem, 
taken together with the changing views of the Reformation and the fate of Canonic law, 
and contemporary law’s preoccupation with the genome as an incorporeal thing, an 
intellectual property, mark out the trajectory of a fruitful study of law’s regard for the old 
philosophical problem of body and soul, not to mention the relation between law and the 
sacred.  
The present objective is more humble than this. What will detain us now is instead 
Thomas’s paradoxical conclusion: that ‘the law sanctified tombs rather than the dead…. 
From this perspective, to exhume the body was to put the tomb itself to death’575. Like 
the law of res sanctae, which protected the city by making the city walls inviolable, the 
                                                          
569 Ibid., 42-3. 
570 Ibid 45. 
571 D 11 7 6 1, but cf the earlier D 1 8 6 5. 
572 Thomas (note 567) at 56-60. 
573 Ibid., 61. 
574 Ibid., 46. 
575 Ibid., 63. 
 111
law protected not the dead body but its ramparts. In this way the ‘prohibition was 
spatialised in such a way as to make it perceptible, which implied according it the legal 
status of a thing’576. Reification consisted in making visible what had been buried, 
identifying its location as well as its limits. This act of enclosure was crucial for 
understanding how law dealt with religiosity (and also things which were sacrae or 
sanctae); for ‘if not restrained by legal technique, religion was everywhere: in affects, 
mentalities, social practices, and culture’577. Law dealt instead with things and objects. 
The disjuncture between material body and resting place, even as the one relied on 
the other, allowed law to manage the dead body, submitting the intangible religiosity of 
death’s consequence to man-agement. This was especially useful for the concerns of 
patrimony. Thus the law of res religiosae tells not so much of Roman beliefs about the 
dead, or about religion for that matter, so much as it tells about the proprietary rights and 
inalienability of things. The hallowed space of the grave was delimited and quantified for 
practical reasons: ‘[i]n law, any reference to the dead … was made only so as to establish 
the institutional limits of a zone in respect of which market transactions were 
prohibited’578. Thus, before Gaius at least, the use of the term purus to denote a thing that 
was not sacra, religiosa or sancta, and therefore did not in any way hinder human 
appropriation.  
Of course Roman Law’s reification579 of the dead body did not simply result from a 
misleading distinction between corpus and res religiosa. Within legal reality, it was a 
necessity. In  this respect, Thomas’ article should be read in the context of his other work 
on institutional technique, which looks specifically at how Roman Law, for example in 
its fictions, operated upon itself to create a legal reality of ‘institutional self-reference’ 
disjointed even if adjacent to social reality’s ‘natural facts’580. By instituting a legal 
version of the dead body, Roman Law made protection possible by assimilating the 
sacred to the self-referential reality of legal fictions and institutions, and making the 
divine commensurable with the commercial.  
                                                          
576 Ibid., 66. 
577 Ibid., 67. 
578 Ibid., 68. 
579 Perhaps this is similar to the reification of the individual genius of the author by copyright. See eg Mark 
Rose (note 124). 
580 Alain Pottage ‘Introduction: the fabrication of persons and things’ in Alain Pottage and Martha Mundy 
(eds) Law, anthropology and the constitution of the social. Making persons and things (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004) 1 at 12 – 18, glossing Yan Thomas ‘Fictio legis: l’empire de la fiction 
romaine et ses limites médiévales’ (1995) 21 Droits 17. 
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What is interesting then is how res religiosa has fared in later times. After its 
apparent demise in post-Reformation Holland, it is seemingly resurrected as the hallowed 
object of nationalism in South African heritage legislation, and is engaged in 
contemporary struggles involving the rights of property owners in the line of cases 
beginning with Cape Town and Districts Waterworks581 and leading up to Oudekraal 
Estates582. What these cases reveal, beyond Thomas’ insights, is that the legal rhetoric of 
hallowedness is in itself significant to the law’s ‘institutional self-referentiality’. After 
this rhetoric was rendered void in the wake of the Reformation, the grave became no 
longer a manageable manifestation of the res ex commercio, but a plain hindrance to 
commercium. The South African cases up to Dibley v Furter583 and even Nkosi and 
Another v Bührmann584, have been the working out of this logic. 
So for example, in Dibley v Furter, a place of burial is no longer inalienable because 
it is religiosa. Rather, it may be difficult to alienate because ‘the presence of the 
graveyard on the property may affect its price in a sale’585. In fact, it may well be 
practically inalienable: the plaintiff in Dibley was not concerned with a lowered market 
value, but appealed to the court because of a ‘dislike of living on or owning such a 
property which can in no way be compensated for by a payment of money’586. The 
plaintiff claimed that the graves were ‘abhorrent’: no longer hallowed but horrible, 
inspiring horrere. The court disagreed somewhat, proposing instead some equally graphic 
images of disdain, quoting yet more abrogated provisions of Justinian’s Digesta:  
this property with these graves on it falls in to the same category as the ugly slave 
or the slave whose breath smells, Dig. 21.1.12, or the slave who wets his bed, 
Dig 21.1.14.587
 
The point is that the grave, although not a redhibitory defect for the purposes of the 
case, was in the court’s imaginary at least potentially defective. The way in which the 
grave is named is important (remembering our earlier discussion in Chapter Two). 
Hallowedness and abhorrence concern religious beliefs, whether of the most high or the 
most low. Defectiveness concerns worldly, pragmatic values. 
                                                          
581 (note 423). 
582 (note 425). 
583 (note 406). 
584 (note 461). 
585 Dibley v Furter (note 406) at 88H. 
586 at 89F-G. 
587 at 82H. 
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What then of the previous section’s contention that the new hallowed thing is the object 
of nationalism? Evidenced by the statutory occupation with the resting place of national 
heroes, we might define the ‘heritage resource’, and before it the relic and war grave, as 
the new res religiosa. But this is not to exclude it from the law as some transcendental 
thing; rather the language of heritage resources provides the means for the law to grasp, 
to man-age intangible, transcendental, extra-legal nationalism and cultural identity. It is 
no longer the religious hallowed that is enshrined in the tomb, but the stuff of national 
identity, a new res sacra et ex commercio that ‘helps us to define our cultural identity and 
therefore lies at the heart of our spiritual well-being and has the power to build our 
nation’588. 
Prestwich Place then brings together what might at first seem disparate histories: the 
haunting of the law by the res religiosa on the one hand, and the religion of nationhood 
on the other. On the one hand, the history of res religiosae shows how law has always 
worked to manage the unmanageable even while speaking the language of the 
unmanageable thing, as if nomos could not abide an anomaly. On the other hand, it is 
nationhood that has become this anomalous thing, pre-constitutional and yet the very 
object of the constitutional in memoriam (as per Chapter One). Heritage legislation 
sanctifies while reifying this nationhood, in the form of the objects and institutional and 
procedural rigours of heritage resource management (‘direct descendancy’ is one such 
technique).  
In Oudekraal Estates the shift from res religiosa to heritage resource is clear, even 
though the language of the NHRA is not used. Nor is the language of the offence of 
sepulchri violatio or the constitutional protection of religion used. Instead the Oudekraal 
kramats have become ‘sites of cultural significance’; and thus the new nation (and the 
new religiosity) is defined and struggled for. And simultaneously managed, as the NHRA 
shows. It is then at Prestwich Place that a certain contestation, between the religiosity of 
national memory, the NHRA’s management of the sacred object of memory and the 
anomaly that the site presents to both, is plain. 
Since this discussion began in Chapter One with an invocation of the spatiality of 
Prestwich Place’s significances, indeed a sort of cartography of transitional justice, allow 
                                                          
588 Preamble to the NHRA. 
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one more spatial metaphor to be admitted in illustration of the site’s anomalousness. 
Prestwich Place tends toward the heterotopic. In ‘Of other spaces’, a text only published 
posthumously, Michel Foucault proposed the notion of a ‘heterotopia’, a sort of 
anomalous topology that further destabilises space in the wake of Galileo’s revolution589. 
Galileo not only decentred the place of the earth by rediscovering that the earth revolves 
around the sun rather than vice versa, says Foucault; he also destabilised space, which 
had to be as seen no longer stationary but constantly in transit and open to the infinite. 
Foucault intended the heterotopia to be a further destabilisation of Cartesian space, a 
‘desanctification’ of it even.  
Foucault was therefore interested in places that have ‘the curious property of being in 
relation with all the other sites, but in such a way as to suspect, neutralize, or invent the 
set of relations that they happen to designate, mirror, or reflect’. What he describes is a 
counter-site, one which disrupts the stability of the relations between all other sites. 
Unlike a utopia, however, a heterotopia is a real space. It is: ‘a kind of effectively enacted 
utopia in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, 
are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted’. Heterotopias are ‘outside of all 
places, even though it may be possible to indicate their location in reality’590.The idea 
captures the anomaly as a spatial notion, something which is part of the totality of space 
yet simultaneously apart. The heterotopia is also the haunted place: for phantoms ‘haunt 
the places where cities are out of joint; out of joint in terms of both time and space’591. 
Perhaps Prestwich Place is heterotopic in this sense, working to restructure the spatial 
imaginary and the relationships of other spaces in the city? This might explain why the 
conflict over Prestwich Place is as much about space as about bones: it reveals a politics 
of inhabiting and of memorial cartography. Yet Foucault’s description in ‘Of other 
spaces’, in which he specifies the six ‘principles’ of the heterotopia, becomes somewhat 
incoherent592. It is difficult to ‘tell’ what a heterotopia is, what distinguishes it as an 
‘other’ space; and so Foucault’s description has ended up as a ‘handy marker for a variety 
of centreless structures or an elastic postmodern plurality’593. It is more helpful to look at 
                                                          
589 Michel Foucault ‘Of other spaces’ 1986 Diacritics 22. 
590 Ibid. 
591 Steve Pile ‘Ghosts and the city of hope’ in Loretta Lees (ed) The emancipatory city? (London: Sage, 
2004) 210, borrowing from Derrida’s borrowing from Shakespeare. See Derrida (note 149).  
592 Benjamin Genocchio ‘Discourse, discontinuity, difference’ in Sophie Watson and Katherine Gibson (ed) 
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593 ibid., 42. 
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The order of things, where Foucault also mentions the heterotopia, but here in the context 
of discourse, where he refers to it as a sort internal or discursive site of impossibility594.  
What should be rescued from Foucault’s idea is a kind of anomalous energy, a 
tendency towards a limit, that limit being the site of an impossibly different and 
discontinuous space595. We might call this the heterotopic, as though we can assimilate 
an adjectival potentiality of Foucault’s thought and not its full madness. The hallowed 
thing can then be thought of as tending towards such a limit, towards the heterotopic. It is 
this tendency that nomos, with its will to de-scribe and reify, cannot abide.  
For those curious about the juridical significance of Prestwich Place, it should finally 
be located here, between nomos and anomaly. But this is not to protest legal reification 
and bureaucratisation – processes which are inevitable and necessary for any outcome, no 
matter what its political allegiance. This tracing of the heterotopic is rather a means to 
peer behind necessity, to glimpse anomaly, and to discern the spectral presence of an 
absence that haunts the law. 
d. law in the haunted archive 
Across the history of Prestwich Place, and the genealogy of its silences, falls the shadow 
of law. The juridical has been implicated right since the beginning of this place, with the 
uncovery of the burials at Prestwich Place and their swift inclusion into the framework of 
new heritage legislation. But before this was another beginning, marked by the deaths of 
those buried at Prestwich Place, and the exclusion of their dead bodies, by the law and 
from the law. And before this even is the beginning that takes place through the 
inscription of the geo-graphical ends of the colonial city. The end of the colonial city 
would be prescribed by the boundary, the frontier, the first inscription of the law, the 
graphic line between citizen and subject, inhabitant and alien/native. The frontier along 
Buitengracht Street and Bree Street, marking the western end of the city and beyond 
which lay the ‘menace of wild animals [and] the depredations of marauding 
Hottentots’596, would come to prescribe the (dis)location of the informal burials of the 
city’s slaves, freed slaves and poor, who were excluded from burial grounds within city 
walls. Already I have suggested the uncanniness of this location; here too is the imprint 
                                                          
594 Foucault (note 285). 
595 Genocchio (note 592) passim. 
596 Marischal Murray Under Lion’s Head (Cape Town: A A Balkema, 1964) 3. 
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of ‘bare death’, a thanatopolitics by which colonial sovereignty prescribed the fate of the 
body even after the end of bare life.  
Recall also that the scene of territorial inscription locates the origin of the law:  
The primordial scene of the nomos opens with a drawing of a line in the soil. This very 
act initiates a specific concept of law, which derives order from the notion of space. The 
plough draws lines – furrows in the field – to mark the space of one’s own. As such, as 
ownership, the demarcating plough touches the juridical sphere.597
 
Here is law, inscribed, archived, graphic, at the scene of the impression. Peter 
Fitzpatrick relates this primordial law of spatial order to occupation, the condition of the 
origins of law during imperial expansion598; it is certainly consistent with the history of 
the frontier and the establishment of European law at the Cape599. 
This description of nomos and beginning returns us to the archival inscription, and to 
the hypomnēsis of the memorial, and hints at the relationship between law and memory. 
Derrida reminds us of the etymological roots of archive in arkhē, the beginning, but 
signifying not one beginning but two: at once commencement and commandment. The 
arkhē institutes ‘two orders of order: sequential and jussive’600. This bifurcation has its 
roots in Plato’s distinction between two notions of action, archein (beginning) and 
prattein (achieving). Greek thought had regarded these as conjoined elements of action; 
Plato distinguished them so that action became two separate gestures, beginning and 
completion601. The beginning has sovereignty over the remains, and the one who begins 
the action guards and governs it, as an architect or a patriarch. Here is a primordial 
explanation of chronological order, of the rule of what is prior and past; of arkhē, and of 
the intimacy of the archive and sovereignty602.  
                                                          
597 Cornelia Vismann 1997 ‘Starting from scratch: concepts of order in no man’s land’ in Bernd Hüppauf (ed) 
War, violence and the modern condition (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 46-64) 46-7; as quoted by Peter 
Fitzpatrick Modernism and the grounds of law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 91-92.  
598 Fitzpatrick (note 597) at 92, 146ff. 
599 The history of European law at the Cape, and of sovereignty, begins not with a doctrine of terra nullius as 
was mistakenly claimed by jurists in the mid-20th century, but with the extension of jurisdiction over the 
inhabitants of the Cape. See Francois du Bois and Daniel Visser, ‘Der einfluss des Europaischen rechts in 
Sudafrika’ 2 Jahrbuch fur Europaische Geschichte (2001) 47 (translated as ‘The influence of European 
law in South Africa’ by the authors). This is a territorial, geographical, basically nomological gesture prior 
even to ownership and sovereignty. 
600 Derrida Archive fever (note 259) 1. 
601 This is Arendt’s interpretation of the Statesman;  see Hannah Arendt The human condition (New York: 
Doubleday Anchor, 1959) 199-200. 
602 See also Mbembe (note 180) on this intimacy of archive and sovereignty. 
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Insofar as this provides grounds to believe that the archive in some way documents 
the force and extent of law, we might also ask about the juridical function of the silences 
which haunt the archive. First of all, why does the figure of the phantom come so quickly 
to the archive? It is as if the archive is the habitual place of the phantom, its haunt. Here it 
is necessary to understand how haunting exists beyond its rhetorical invocation. The 
archival inscription (the impression of the plough, the frontier’s circumscription, the 
memorial circumcision603) is nomological and topological. The archive not only records 
a beginning, of an order both chronological and juridical, but it is a place. The genealogy 
of the concept reminds us of the arkheion, in ancient Greece the place of domicile of the 
archive and also of the archons who presided over it604. But the archive’s relation to place 
is structural rather than merely historical. As hypomnēsis, it is a memory aid, a memorial, 
a writing: not living memory, but always exterior605.  (So strong is the necessity to give 
the archive a place that we even talk of that ideal dematerialised archive, cyberspace, in 
topographical terms).  
Archival technology is one way to inscribe place in space; another way to make place 
is a most basic and non-technological gesture, it is to inhabit (to make of it a haunt). This 
is a gesture of embodied memory rather than of hypomnēsis. Inhabiting is an intimate, 
corporeal gesture relating place and memory, the most primordial version of which is the 
inhabiting of the body606. We inhabit because ‘habit is too worn a word to express this 
passionate liaison of our bodies, which do not forget, with an unforgettable house’607.  
Inhabiting and haunting share as their basis this wearing (out) of habit, the repetition of 
the spatial gesture608. There is a symmetry too in this relation: the corporeality of the 
inhabitant is reflected in the incorporeality of the phantom. We can imagine then that 
haunting is an excess of inhabiting; that it is habit inscribed in place but without 
inscription, viewed without the limit between tangible and intangible, inscription and 
memory, (or as Socrates would have it) the living and the dead.  
                                                          
603 Derrida Archive fever (note 259) 20ff. 
604 Ibid., 2. 
605 See also Derrida (note 179). 
606 Ricoeur Memory, history, forgetting (note 154) 41-43. 
607 Gaston Bachelard The poetics of space (trans. Maria Jolas) (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964, 1994) 15. 
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Here we might also briefly remind ourselves that Prestwich Place is only one place 
amidst a landscape of places of memory, and that the struggles that have begun to unfold 
across this haunted cultural landscape of death and burial reveal a politics of inhabiting, 
as has been glimpsed in the first chapter. Contestation of these places does not typically 
consist of crude political grasps at space, but instead claims to space as place, gestures 
that are imbued with memory and the desire of habit and inhabiting.  
Habit is a corporeal form of memory, the mémoire-habitude as Henri Bergson’s 
phenomenology names it609. Like Freud’s repressed memory, that is not remembered but 
repeated unconsciously, the habit is something that we forget into the body:  
the patient does not remember anything of what he has forgotten and repressed, but acts it 
out. He reproduces it not as a memory but as an action; he repeats it, without, of course, 
knowing that he is repeating it.610  
 
The seemingly forgetful habit is thus a gesture of incomplete forgetting or, in its 
pathological sense, incomplete mourning, and so can be related to the secret, the crypt-ic, 
what the body has encrypted. The habit that is not acted out but borne inside, worn inside 
perhaps, like a vest of the mind, a secret. Here psychoanalysis continues to be a useful 
tool for excavation, specifically the work of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, whose 
reformulation of Freudianism includes an occupation with the idea of the psychic tomb 
and the transgenerational secret611.  
In their work, they describe the family secret as in fact being passed down to 
descendants, but encrypted and entombed – here is one plausible theory of what might be 
called a ‘grave in the mind’612. The psychic tomb is then a sort of silence of the 
unconscious, undecipherable, a transgenerational secret or phantom. According to 
Abraham and Torok’s thesis of introjection, in order for mourning to be completed the 
psychic tomb must be named.   
                                                          
609 Henri Bergson Matter and memory (trans. Nancy M Paul and W Scott Palmer) (London: Allen and Unwin, 
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 119
Hopefully these ideas tend towards rescuing the phantom and haunting from their 
excessively rhetorical use. There is in them also the beginning of an idea of embodied 
authority, of an archive-without-writing613 of habit, inhabiting, and haunting that 
encompasses the corporeal and the spectral (but not the hypomnēsic). Here is the idea of 
an archive without arkhē, without commencement, and an authority without 
commandment. This archive-without-writing gives a different view of what is at stake at 
Prestwich Place. There is a well established connection between the monument and the 
constitution: the founding myth is the common gene pool of sovereign power and 
remembrance. The archive-without-writing is a counterpart to this, a silent heritage, a 
genetics even, not in a bio-ontological sense, but in a genealogical sense; an archive not 
of beginnings and inscriptions but of births and relations, reproducing itself corporeally 
and spectrally (but not by any hypomnēsis). Here is a very different response to ‘direct 
descendancy’, one that looks instead for phantoms, ‘virtual archives’614, Spuren instead 
of Zeugnisse.  
There is in this a spectral law of silence, a silence that reproduces itself, that resonates 
and proliferates. This is what an ethics of memory and a theory of law must take into 
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